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Most theories of elections assume that voters and political actors are fully rational. While these formulations produce many insights, they also generate anomalies--most famously, about turnout. The rise of behavioral economics has posed new challenges to the premise of rationality. This groundbreaking book provides a behavioral theory of elections based on the notion that all actors--politicians as well as voters--are only boundedly rational. The theory posits learning via trial and error: actions that surpass an actor's aspiration level are more likely to be used in the future, while those that fall short are less likely to be tried later. Based on this idea of adaptation, the authors construct formal models of party competition, turnout, and voters' choices of candidates. These models predict substantial turnout levels, voters sorting into parties, and winning parties adopting centrist platforms. In multiparty elections, voters are able to coordinate vote choices on majority-preferred candidates, while all candidates garner significant vote shares. Overall, the behavioral theory and its models produce macroimplications consistent with the data on elections, and they use plausible microassumptions about the cognitive capacities of politicians and voters. A computational model accompanies the book and can be used as a tool for further research.

Elections. --- Voting --- Behaviorism (Political science) --- Behavioralism (Political science) --- Behaviouralism (Political science) --- Behaviourism (Political science) --- Political psychology --- Polls --- Elections --- Politics, Practical --- Social choice --- Suffrage --- Electoral politics --- Franchise --- Political science --- Plebiscite --- Political campaigns --- Representative government and representation --- Psychological aspects. --- Political systems --- Social psychology --- Condorcet winner. --- Downsian party competition. --- Duverger's Law. --- Markov chain. --- Pareto dominance. --- adaptation. --- aspiration-based adaptation. --- aspiration-based adaptive rule. --- aspiration-based adjustment. --- aspirations. --- bandwagon effect. --- behavior. --- behavioral theory. --- bounded rationality. --- candidates. --- computational model. --- decision making. --- election voting. --- elections. --- equilibrium behavior. --- faction size. --- framing. --- game-theoretic model. --- hedonics. --- heuristics. --- incumbent. --- majority faction. --- multiparty elections. --- parties. --- party affiliation. --- party competition. --- payoffs. --- platforms. --- political parties. --- politicians. --- population size. --- propensity. --- rational choice theory. --- rational choice. --- rationality. --- retrospective voting. --- satisficing. --- search behavior. --- stochastic process. --- turnout. --- two-party elections. --- voter choice. --- voter coordination. --- voter participation. --- voter turnout. --- voters. --- Balloting

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A field experiment in rural Liberia is used to study democratic participation in fragile states. Fragile states are marked by political fragmentation, local patronage systems, and voter vulnerability. To understand the effects of such conditions on democratic expression through elections, the experiment introduced new forms of interaction between rural citizens and third-party actors: (i) civic education and town hall workshops directed by non-governmental organizations in communities over nine months and (ii) security committees that brought rural community representatives into monthly exchange with United Nations peacekeepers. Civic education workshops increased enthusiasm for electoral participation, produced a coordinated shift from parochial to national candidates, and increased willingness to report on manipulation. A program combining the two interactions had similar effects. The security committees had negligible effects. Barriers to political information and voter coordination appear to be important but resolvable problems for elections in fragile states.

Access to information --- Accounting --- Allegiance --- Anarchy --- Attrition --- Ballot box --- Banking --- Candidates --- Channels of communication --- Citizen access --- Civic education --- Civics --- Civil society --- Collective action --- Committees --- Community members --- Constituencies --- Constituent --- Constituents --- Crises --- Democracies --- Democracy --- Development economics --- Dictatorial regimes --- E-Government --- Economic conditions --- Economics --- Educational attainment --- Effects --- Election --- Election outcome --- Elections --- Electoral choices --- Electoral information --- Electoral participation --- Electoral systems --- Factions --- Forms of participation --- Free press --- Freedom --- Freedoms --- Governance --- Government --- Governments --- Incentives --- Income --- Information --- Innovations --- International peace --- Labor policies --- Law --- Liberty --- Literacy rates --- Loyalty --- Mobile phone --- Monitoring --- Monopolies --- Motivation --- Nation --- National elections --- Ordinary citizens --- Organizations --- Outcomes --- Parliamentary government --- Participants --- Participation --- Participation variables --- Party members --- Patronage --- Peace --- Pluralism --- Policies --- Policy issues --- Political authority --- Political behavior --- Political change --- Political culture --- Political democracy --- Political discussion --- Political economy --- Political information --- Political landscape --- Political leaders --- Political participation --- Political pluralism --- Political rights --- Political science --- Politicians --- Politics --- Politics and government --- Queen --- Representatives --- Rights --- Security --- Social protections and labor --- Terrorism --- Theory --- Training --- United Nations --- Value --- Vote choice --- Voter participation --- Voter turnout --- Voting --- Voting rights