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The Ottonians were the most powerful monarchs in Europe during the tenth and early eleventh century, exercising hegemony in West Francia, Burgundy, and much of Italy in addition to ruling the German realm. Despite their enormous political and military success, however, the foundations of Ottonian royal power remain highly contested and largely misunderstood, with previous scholarship tending to have considered it as depending upon the ability of the king to shape and harness the power of the nobles.
This study challenges the dominant historiographical paradigm, rebutting the notion of putative power-sharing between the king and the nobility, which simply did not exist as a legal class in the Ottonian century. Rather, it argues that the foundations of royal power under the Ottonians comprised not only their own enormous wealth, but also their unique authority and ability, through the royal 'bannum' the authority inherent in the office of the king, to make use of the economic resources and labour of the broad free population of the realm, as well as from the Church. In so doing, the Ottonians drew upon and further developed the administrative, institutional, and ideological inheritance of their Carolingian predecessors, in the process creating the dominant polity in tenth-century Europe.
Pouvoir royal --- Impôt --- Germany --- Holy Roman Empire --- History --- Politics and government --- Authority --- Autorité --- Politique et gouvernement --- Allemagne --- Saint Empire romain germanique --- HISTORY / Europe / Western. --- Carolingian Inheritance. --- Carolingian Successor State. --- Economic Resources. --- European History. --- Foundations of Royal Power. --- Governmental Administration. --- Hegemony. --- Material Resources. --- Medieval Germany. --- Ottonian Kingdom. --- Political Power. --- Autorité --- Power (Social sciences) --- Europe
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Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.
Game theory. --- Evolutionary economics. --- Institutional economics. --- Social institutions. --- Blume, Larry. --- Gibbs distribution. --- Hofbauer, Josef. --- Hurkens, Sjaak. --- Kandori, Michihiro. --- Kreps, David. --- Levine, David. --- Malouf, Michael. --- Nash, John. --- Owen, Guillermo. --- Schumpeter, Joseph. --- alternating offers model. --- basin of attraction. --- chicken game. --- disequilibrium. --- ergodic process. --- fashion game. --- finite improvement path. --- interpersonal comparisons. --- local conformity. --- marriage game. --- mode of a distribution. --- noise models. --- payoffs. --- proposal game. --- risk factor. --- roles in a game. --- social capital. --- successor state. --- vector field.
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