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The draft law on Railway Transport of Ukraine (the 'new Railway Law') is currently awaiting sign-off from other ministries and the approval of the Cabinet of Ministers. The Law, among other aims, is intended to align with commitments contained the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement 2014. The Agreement commits the parties to cooperate and seek to harmonize policy, legislation and regulation across a broad range of areas. In its railway sector, Ukraine undertakes to approximate its legislation to specified EU legislation (the 'rail acquis') within stipulated timeframes, generally by 2022. The 'market opening' provisions of the new Railway Law will include arrangements allowing properly licensed cargo train operating companies, whether public or private, to provide transport services on Ukraine's rail network on a fair and equal (competitively neutral) basis. JSC Ukrzaliznytsia has already begun a wide-ranging reform program with its development strategy for 2019-2023 that includes a comprehensive strategy dealing with its vision and values, market analysis, objectives, reorganization into business segments, and actions that are commensurate with best practice observed by the World Bank. The strategy should result in a sustainable and expanding railway to meet the country's needs. The focus of this policy note is on selected cargo business issues involved in JSC Ukrzaliznytsia (UZ) preparations for competing in the provision of rail cargo transport services.

State-Owned Enterprises

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A large sector of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is well known as the hallmark of the Chinese economy. But exactly how much do they contribute to the country's gross domestic product (GDP) and employment? Since available statistics do not provide a straightforward answer, this note attempts to make some estimations. In conclusion, estimations in this note suggest that the share of SOEs in China's GDP should be twenty-three to twenty-eight percent and their share in employment can be anywhere between five and sixteen percent in 2017.

Employment --- Foreign Direct Investment --- State-Owned Enterprises

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This paper provides a diagnostic framework (DF) for helping governments conceptualize and develop desirable functions and institutional arrangements for public investments managed by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The DF also extends its coverage to not-for-profit, quasi-independent government entities. Determining the appropriate approach to managing SOE public investments requires a measured reconciliation of multiple trade-offs. In certain cases, when SOEs make profit-seeking investments for commercial purposes, operate in competitive markets, and make investments that present no major externalities, governments should take a hands-off approach, a scenario that may include cases in which governments simply exit and leave the corporate governance in the hands of private investors. Governments should let SOEs make their own investment decisions in pursuit of business efficiency. In such instances, governments need to establish a level playing field on which SOEs can operate and compete with private actors and exercise their public interest as a shareholder. In other cases, however, governments should establish a robust system - well aligned with the national public investment management (PIM) architecture to regulate SOE investments. This alignment should occur when SOE investments extend the role of line ministries and are financed by the general government budget or involve large-scale projects, posing significant fiscal risks through implicit or explicit contingent liabilities. The PIM practiced by SOEs should also align with the national PIM system when there are potential detrimental impacts on the environment, climate, and resilience. Our DF consists of four matrices intended to be used in combination to assess the gap between a country's current SOE PIM and international best practices. Matrix 1 sketches the guideposts to determine which stakeholders should guard SOE investments, focusing on who. Matrix 2 helps assess PIM functions, focusing on what should be done under each PIM function and by whom. Matrix 3 presents a framework and a set of measurement indicators to evaluate how governments should introduce PIM processes and systems. Matrix 4 gives some consideration to the project viability of SOEs. To effectively apply the DF, it cannot be used mechanically: it must be grounded in a good understanding of the country's political economy and the vested incentives of all stakeholders involved in SOE PIM.

Corporate Governance --- Public Sector Development --- State-Owned Enterprises

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This Country Partnership Framework (CPF) provides the main elements of the cooperation between the Republic of Tajikistan and the World Bank Group during the five years spanning FY19-23. The CPF builds on the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) of FY15-18, and incorporates the Implementation Note (IN) for the IDA18 Risk Mitigation Regime (RMR). The overarching goal of the CPF is to support Tajikistan in adopting policies geared towards reducing poverty and promoting shared prosperity in a sustainable manner. to this end, the CPF is aligned with the National Development Strategy (NDS) and the Medium-Term Development Program (2016-20) of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan. CPF priorities have been informed by consultations with key stakeholders.This CPF has been developed at a critical time for Tajikistan, with several external changes having opened a window of opportunity; taking advantage of these would substantially enhance the country's growth trajectory and increase resilience. Changes include the recent opening of borders with China and Uzbekistan during 2016-17 and increased trade with Afghanistan, reversing more than a century of adverse historic developments. These developments have reopened nearby export markets and reduced the costs of trading with new markets. to succeed in this potentially transformative move towards an economy integrated with neighbors and wider markets, Tajikistan will need to address principal structural, macroeconomic, and environmental legacy issues. Going forward, fiscal constraints, persisting inequalities, and a deceleration in poverty reduction call for an urgent upgrade of policies. Adopting policies that ensure opportunity for all, allow for more openness and accountability, protect the poor, and address inequalities will reduce fragility, increase resilience, and improve citizens' standard of living.

Climate Change --- Fiscal Sustainability --- Gender --- Migration --- Poverty --- State-Owned Enterprises

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Low productivity and the competitiveness of Russian firms have been among Russia's primary economic challenges over the past decade. The Government of Russia (GoR) has made boosting productivity a policy priority and since 2012 has rolled out several visible policy initiatives to strengthen employment practices in firms to raise their productivity and positive spillovers, including the 2012 Plan for Raising the Productivity of Companies, the 2018-2024 National Project on Labor Productivity, and 2018-2019 National Plan for Competition Development. The objective of this report is to contribute to this productivity agenda by analyzing the employment practices of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), their implications for labor supply and internal firm capabilities, and the influence of state policy. SOEs contribute a significant share of output and employment in Russia's economy and academic recent research shows that they have lower productivity than private sector firms. The implications of SOE employment practices-compensation and management-on overall productivity however, has not been investigated, a gap that this report aims to fill by analyzing the following questions: What are SOE employment practices and how do they compare to international and private sector benchmarks? How do SOE employment practices, particularly compensation, affect allocation of labor across firms? How do SOE compensation and management practices shape their internal capabilities? How does government financial and non-financial support to SOEs influence these employment practices? Taking the level and form of government participation in the economy as a given, the report focuses primarily on the sector's current practices, and how government policies towards the sector can be improved to boost SOE performance and positive spillovers. We explore these questions using five Russian microlevel datasets, including worker and firm surveys and a large firm register. The report utilizes a taxonomy of SOEs that includes state SOEs which have 100 percent government ownership, and mixed SOEs which have some share of state ownership that is less than 100 percent. The report finds that Russian SOEs pay an overall compensation premium and that this premium contributes to labor shortages in the private sector. While overall the SOE sector has a small wage penalty, wage differentials with the private sector vary by type and size of the SOEs. Mixed SOEs pay a small wage premium over the private sector while state SOEs have a small wage penalty. Both types of SOEs pay a wage premium in competitive settings. SOEs have an overall compensation premium as they provide more generous benefits like paid vacations, maternity leave, and training than private sector firms.

Corporate Governance --- Labor Market --- Public Sector Reform --- State-Owned Enterprises