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The authors review the applications of noncooperative bargaining theory to water related issues-which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. They aim to identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge and their characteristics, to support policymakers in devising the " rules of the game " that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially trans-boundary allocation, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, the authors first discuss the noncooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Key findings include the important role noncooperative negotiations can play in cases where binding agreements cannot be signed; the value added of politically and socially acceptable compromises; and the need for a negotiated model that considers incomplete information over the negotiated resource.

Common Property Resource Development --- Environment --- Environmental --- Environmental Economics --- Environmental Economics and Policies --- Environmental Problems --- Equilibrium --- Equity --- Incentives --- Industry --- Information --- Interest --- Labor --- Law and Development --- Marginal Cost --- Models --- Natural Resources --- Need --- Policies --- Policy Makers --- Rural Development --- Side Payments --- Supply --- Theoretical Models --- Town Water Supply and Sanitation --- Trade --- Water --- Water and Industry --- Water Conservation --- Water Law --- Water Resources --- Water Resources Law --- Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions --- Water Supply and Systems

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Interests, Institutions, and Information examines the central factors that influence the strategic game of domestic politics. It shows that it is the outcome of this internal game - not fears of other countries' relative gains or the likelihood of cheating - that ultimately shapes how the international game is played out and therefore the extent of cooperative endeavors. The interaction of the domestic actors' preferences, given their political institutions and levels of information, defines when international cooperation is possible and what its terms will be. Several test cases examine how this argument explains the phases of a cooperative attempt: the initiation, the negotiations at the international level, and the eventual domestic ratification. The book reaches the surprising conclusion that theorists - neo-Institutionalists and Realists alike - have overestimated the likelihood of cooperation among states.

International relations. Foreign policy --- #SBIB:327.1H10 --- #SBIB:327.7H01 --- #SBIB:AANKOOP --- Internationale betrekkingen: theorieën --- Grondslagen, principes, evolutie internationale gemeenschap --- #A0206PO --- Information policy. --- International relations. --- Nation-state. --- World politics --- Information policy --- International relations --- Nation-state --- Information science --- Information services and state --- Communication policy --- National state --- State, The --- National interest --- Self-determination, National --- Coexistence --- Foreign affairs --- Foreign policy --- Foreign relations --- Global governance --- Interdependence of nations --- International affairs --- Peaceful coexistence --- World order --- National security --- Sovereignty --- Government policy --- INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. --- CASE STUDIES. --- STATES. --- POLITICAL COOPERATION. --- International co-operation. --- Information. --- States. --- International politics. --- Foreign policy. --- Politics. --- Política interna. --- Política internacional. --- Relações internacionais. --- Rationele keuze. --- Politieke instellingen. --- Binnenlandse politiek. --- Internationale samenwerking. --- Theorie --- Nationalstaat --- Internationale Politik --- Interessenpolitik --- World politics. --- Accords internationaux. --- CED = Communaute europeenne de defense. --- Politique de l'information. --- Politique internationale. --- Relations internationales. --- UE/CE CECA. --- UE/CE Traite de Maastricht. --- Unions economiques et monetaires. --- 89.70 international relations: general. --- 89.71 international cooperation: general. --- Information --- Politique mondiale --- Nation. --- Politique gouvernementale. --- Colonialism --- Global politics --- International politics --- Political history --- Political science --- World history --- Eastern question --- Geopolitics --- International organization --- Belgium. --- Bundesbank. --- Chicago Convention. --- Democrats (US). --- Evans, Peter. --- Frieden, Jeffry. --- German rearmament. --- Jacobson, Harold. --- Keohane, Robert. --- Keynes Plan. --- Laver, Michael. --- Lijphart, Arendt. --- Milner, Helen. --- Obstfeld, Maurice. --- Phillips curve. --- Putnam, Robert. --- Rogowski, Ronald. --- Schelling conjecture. --- Truman Administration. --- absolute gains. --- amendment power. --- balance of payments. --- capital mobility. --- cartel. --- domestic politics. --- hierarchy. --- independents. --- interest groups. --- legislature. --- parliamentary systems. --- ratification. --- side payments. --- two-level games. --- World politics - 1989 --- -Information policy --- VIE INTERNATIONALE --- POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES --- REGLES INTERNATIONALES --- POLITIQUE ECONOMIQUE EXTERIEURE --- ORGANISATIONS INTERGOUVERNEMENTALES --- REGIMES INTERNATIONAUX --- Interessenvermittlung --- Lobbyismus --- Interessenverband --- Internationale Beziehungen --- Politische Beziehungen --- Zwischenstaatliche Beziehungen --- Weltpolitik --- Außenpolitik --- Internationales politisches System --- Nationalstaaten --- Staat --- Nationale Einheit --- Praxis