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This paper documents to what extent firms from developing countries borrow short versus long term, using data on corporate bond and syndicated loan markets. Contrary to claims in the literature based on firm balance sheets, firms from developing countries borrow through bonds and syndicated loans at maturities similar to those obtained by developed country firms. The composition and use of financing matters. Firms from developing countries borrow shorter term in domestic bond markets, but the differences in international issuances (accounting for most of the proceeds) are significantly smaller. Developing country firms borrow longer term in syndicated loan markets, which they partially use for infrastructure projects. However, only large firms from developing countries (similar in size to those from developed ones) issue bonds and syndicated loans. The short-termism in developing countries is partly explained by a lower proportion of firms using these markets, with more firms relying on other shorter-term instruments.

Capital Raising --- Corporate Bonds --- Developing Countries --- Domestic Debt --- Firm Financing --- International Debt --- Issuance Maturity --- Long-Term Debt --- Markets --- Short-Term Debt --- Syndicated Loans

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March 2000 - What can the international community do to prevent financial contagion? Chang and Majnoni try to identify and evaluate the public policy implications of financial contagion on the basis of a very simple model of financial crises. In this model, financial contagion can be driven by a combination of fundamentals and by self-fulfilling market expectations. The model allows the authors to identify different notions of contagion, especially the distinction between monsoonal effects, spillovers, and switchers between equilibria. They discuss both domestic and international policy options. Domestic policies, they say, should be aimed at reducing financial fragility - that is, reducing unnecessary short-term debt commitments. With explicit commitments, the maturity of external debts should be lengthened. With implicit commitments, such as private liability guarantees, they emphasize limiting or eliminating such guarantees, to improve an economy's international liquidity and reduce its exposure to contagion. Internationally, they stress the need for improving financial standards, which makes it easier to assess when a country is subject to different kinds of contagion. The effectiveness of international rescue packages depends on the kind of contagion to which a country is exposed. Implications: The international community should help those countries that are already helping themselves. This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study the determinants and policy implications of international financial contagion. The author Giovanni Majnoni may be contacted at gmajnoni@worldbank.org.

Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Currency --- Currency Crises --- Debt Markets --- Deposit Insurance --- Emerging Markets --- Exchange --- Exchange Rate --- External Debts --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Contagion --- Financial Crises --- Financial Fragility --- Foreign Interest --- Guarantees --- Interest Rates --- International Financial Contagion --- International Investors --- Liability --- Liquidity --- Market --- Maturity --- Options --- Policy Responses --- Private Sector Development --- Short-Term Debt

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July 2000 - Many transport projects undertaken during the boom period of the 1990s came to a crashing halt in 1997, and conditions in emerging markets worsened in 1998 and 1999. Many projects failed, victim of everything from overoptimistic forecasts to excessive debt to an inability to refinance bridge loans. As available financing dried up, many projects went bankrupt, had to be renegotiated, or were taken over by the government. What have we learned from all this? Recent developments in emerging financial markets have dramatically changed the appetite for (and terms of) transport infrastructure projects. As a result of defaults in Asia and Russia and devaluations in Asia, Brazil, and Russia, political and currency and exchange risk premia have increased dramatically. Given large needs for sovereign debt financing, infrastructure project finance will be seeking guarantees at the same time as governments are issuing primary securities. Large portfolio outflows in emerging market funds mean that the sources of both equity and debt capital that became available in the mid-1990s are drying up for all but the most creditworthy projects. Moreover, real economic effects from financial events have consequences in the transport sector, since transport is a derived demand. Any decline in real economic activity is felt quickly in traffic levels and revenues. Currency devaluations that help spur exports may generate higher volumes for seaports and air cargo activity. These effects vary by sector, especially over the medium to longer term. Declines in real economic activity make matters especially difficult for toll roads, as drivers shift to free alternatives and reduce the number of trips taken. What does all this mean for project finance in transport? Risks have increased. Debt finance costs more. The available tenor of debt instruments has shortened and more equity is required for projects. The sources and availability of equity finance have changed. Project finance efforts have shifted from new projects to the privatization, rehabilitation, and expansion of existing facilities. And a superclass of sponsors, bankers, and investors has emerged. Failures and mistakes in project finance deals in the 1990s were sharp and persistent. But much has been learned about sound project economics, conservative financial structures, comprehensive sensitivity analysis, the effects of macroeconomic factors, and the need for proper incentives and sound institutional and regulatory arrangements. This paper-a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute-is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The authors may be contacted at aestache@worldbank.org or jstrong@worldbank.org.

Bank Debt --- Banks and Banking Reform --- Bond --- Capital Structures --- Debt Markets --- Debt Servicing --- Emerging Bond Markets --- Emerging Markets --- Environment --- Environmental Economics and Policies --- Finance --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Crises --- Financial Intermediation --- Financial Literacy --- Financial Performance --- Good --- Infrastructure Finance --- Interest --- Interest Rate --- Interest Rate Risk --- Investing --- Market --- Pension --- Pension Assets --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Economics and Finance --- Revenues --- Short-Term Debt --- Transport --- Transport Economics, Policy and Planning