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The aim of this paper is to empirically explore the relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation, an issue that has recently occupied much of the policy debate on the effectiveness of infrastructure industry reforms. Taking the view that political accountability is a key factor that links political structures and regulatory processes, the authors investigate, for the case of telecommunications, its impact on the performance of regulation in two time-series-cross-sectional data sets on 29 developing countries and 23 industrial countries covering the period 1985-99. In addition to confirming some well documented results on the positive role of regulatory governance in infrastructure industries, the authors provide empirical evidence on the impact of the quality of political institutions and their modes of functioning on regulatory performance. The analysis of the data sets shows that the (positive) effect of political accountability on the performance of regulation is stronger in developing countries. An important policy implication of this finding is that future reforms in these countries should give due attention to the development of politically accountable systems.

Accountability Variables --- Debt Markets --- E-Business --- Economic Development --- Economic Incentives --- Economic Theory and Research --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Governance --- Governance Indicators --- Growth --- Growth Performance --- Infrastructure Economics and Finance --- Infrastructure Regulation --- Institutional Environment --- Institutional Quality --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market Economies --- Measurement --- National Governance --- Policy Implications --- Political Accountability --- Political Economy --- Political Institutions --- Political Structures --- Politics --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Regulation --- Regulatory Institutions --- Science and Technology Development --- Service --- Services --- Statistical and Mathematical Sciences

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Presentation de l'editeur : "Regulation is frequently less successful than it could be, largely because the allocation of authority to regulatory institutions, and the relationships between them, are misunderstood. As a result, attempts to create new regulatory programs or mend under-performing ones are often poorly designed. Reorganizing Government explains how past approaches have failed to appreciate the full diversity of alternative approaches to organizing governmental authority. The authors illustrate the often neglected dimensional and functional aspects of inter-jurisdictional relations through in-depth explorations of several diverse case studies involving securities and banking regulation, food safety, pollution control, resource conservation, and terrorism prevention. This volume advances an analytical framework of governmental authority structured along three dimensions--centralization, overlap, and coordination. Camacho and Glicksman demonstrate how differentiating among these dimensions better illuminates the policy tradeoffs of organizational alternatives, and reduces the risk of regulatory failure. The book also explains how differentiating allocations of authority based on governmental function can lead to more effective regulation and governance. The authors illustrate the practical value of this framework for future reorganization efforts through the lens of climate change, an emerging and vital global policy challenge, and propose an "adaptive governance" infrastructure that could allow policy makers to embed the creation, evaluation, and adjustment of the organization of regulatory institutions into the democratic process itself."

Authority. --- Federal government --- Delegated legislation --- Interagency coordination --- Decentralization in government --- Administrative agencies --- Law and legislation --- Reorganization. --- United States. --- United States --- Politics and government --- 9/11 Commission. --- Commodity Futures Trading Commission. --- Dodd-Frank Act. --- Endangered Species Act. --- National Environmental Policy Act. --- Office of the Director of National Intelligence. --- Securities and Exchange Commission. --- US Congress. --- adaptive governance. --- administrative state. --- agency jurisdiction. --- banking regulation. --- centralization. --- climate change governance. --- compliance monitoring. --- concurrent jurisdictions. --- coordination. --- decentralization. --- derivatives regulation. --- executive branch. --- federalism. --- food safety regulation. --- functional jurisdiction. --- geoengineering. --- government authority. --- government coordination. --- government organization. --- governmental authority. --- governmental function. --- information distribution. --- information management. --- institutional design. --- intelligence community. --- intelligence failures. --- interagency coordination. --- intergovernmental authority. --- intergovernmental relationships. --- interjurisdictional relations. --- learning infrastructure. --- legislature. --- management authority. --- mitigation. --- overlapping authority. --- overlapping jurisdictions. --- pollution control laws. --- project implementation. --- prudential regulators. --- regulation. --- regulatory allocations. --- regulatory arbitrage. --- regulatory authority. --- regulatory institutions. --- regulatory structures. --- substantive jurisdiction.