Listing 1 - 10 of 2798 | << page >> |
Sort by
|
Choose an application
Choose an application
.
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Clientelism in public employment - the practice of offering jobs in return for political favours to a party or politician - is a problem from the perspectives of equality, democratic accountability and economic efficiency. Focusing on intra-party competition, this book presents an original explanation of why some politicians and parties engage more extensively in such practices than others. Examining Argentina and Turkey in a period of economic restructuring, the author argues that patronage jobs are distributed hierarchically to the politicians' circle within the party. Consequently, the distribution of patronage is affected by competition for party leadership. Analysis of original statistical and case study data at the subnational level confirms that clientelistic practices are influenced by party characteristics. The results reveal counter intuitively that when parties are important for politicians' careers and when the party leadership is open to competition clientelism's proliferation is contained
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Listing 1 - 10 of 2798 | << page >> |
Sort by
|