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L'édition 2017 du Panorama des pensions met en lumière les réformes des retraites introduites par les pays de l'OCDE au cours des deux dernières années. Elle comprend de plus un chapitre spécialement consacré aux possibilités de retraites flexibles offertes par ces pays, dans lequel il est également question des préférences des individus en la matière, du recours effectif aux dispositifs proposés et des répercussions sur le montant des prestations. La présente édition contient en outre des informations actualisées sur les principales caractéristiques des pensions servies dans les pays de l'OCDE, ainsi que des projections des revenus que percevront demain les travailleurs d'aujourd'hui. Elle propose des indicateurs concernant la conception des systèmes de retraite, les droits à la retraite, le contexte démographique et économique dans lequel s'inscrivent les systèmes de retraite, les revenus et la pauvreté chez les personnes âgées, l'équilibre financier des systèmes de retraite et les pensions privées.

Pensions.

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Pensions.

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Denmark's insurance sector is highly developed with a particularly high penetration and density in the life sector. Traditionally, work-related life insurance and pension savings are offered as a combined package, and life insurance companies dominate the market for mandatory pension schemes for employees. The high penetration explains the overall size of the insurance sector, which exceeds those of peers from other Nordic countries and various other EU member states. Assets managed by the insurance industry amounted to 146 percent of the GDP at end-2018, compared to 72 percent for the EU average.

Pensions.

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Vittas argues that public and private pillars are essential for a well-functioning pension system. Public pillars, funded or unfunded, offer basic benefits that are independent of the performance of financial markets. Since financial markets suffer from prolonged, persistent, and large deviations from long-term trends, they cannot be relied on as the sole provider of pension benefits. Funded pillars provide benefits that are based on long-term capital accumulation and financial market performance. But they need to be privately managed to minimize dependence on public sector institutions and avoid government dominance of the economy and financial markets. The author focuses mainly on the promotion, structure, and regulation of funded pillars. He discusses the case for using compulsion and tax incentives, for exempting some categories of workers such as the very young (under 25), the very old (over the normal retirement age), the very poor (those earning less than 40 percent of the average wage), and the self-employed, and for offering a credit transfer to be added to individual capitalization accounts to encourage participation by lower-income groups. A robust regulatory framework with a panoply of prudential and protective rules covering "fit and proper" tests, asset diversification and market valuation rules, legal segregation of assets and safe external custody, independent financial audits and actuarial reviews, and adequate disclosure and transparency would be essential. An effective, proactive, well-funded, and properly staffed supervision agency would be necessary. Tight investment rules could initially be justified for countries with weak capital markets and limited tradition of private pension provision. But in the long run, adoption of the "prudent expert" approach with publication of "statements of investment policy objectives" (SIPOs) would be preferable and more efficient. Various guarantees covering aspects such as minimum pension levels and relative investment returns need to be provided to protect workers from aberrant asset managers and insolvency of annuity providers, but care must be taken to address effectively the risk of moral hazard. Vittas also argues for greater individual choice, including the creation of a dual regulatory structure. One part would involve heavy regulation with constrained choice of investment funds, limits on operating fees and on account switching, and strong government safeguards and guarantees. This would cater to those workers with low risk tolerance. The other part would be more liberal but based on strong conduct rules. It would offer greater choice of investment funds, allowing multiple accounts and liberal account switching, imposing no limits on operating fees, and providing no or fewer state guarantees. This would cater to workers seeking a higher return and who are willing to tolerate a higher level of risk. This paper--a product of the Financial Sector Development Department--is part of a larger effort in the department to study the promotion of pension funds. The author may be contacted at dvittas@worldbank.org.

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Pensions