Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Old age pensions --- -Old age pensions --- -Pension funds --- -Pensions

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Scores of lawsuits have pushed retirement plan sponsors to shorter, easier-to-navigate menus, but - as Ian Ayres and Quinn Curtis argue in this work - we've only scratched the surface of retirement plan design. Using participant-level plan data and straightforward tests, Ayres and Curtis show how plan sponsors can monitor plans for likely allocation mistakes and adapt menus to encourage success. Beginning with an overview of the problem of high costs and the first empirical evidence on retirement plan fee lawsuits, they offer an overview of the current plan landscape. They then show, based on reforms to a real plan, how streamlining menus, eliminating pitfalls, and adopting static and dynamic limits on participant allocations to certain risky assets or 'guardrails' can reduce mistakes and lead to better retirement outcomes. Focusing on plausible, easy-to-implement interventions, Retirement Guardrails shows that fiduciaries need not be limited to screening out funds but can design menus to actively promote good choices.

Pension trusts --- Trusts and trustees --- Finance --- Law and legislation --- Employee pension trusts --- Pension funds --- Pension plans

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

This paper looks at the impact of members' ability to switch pension fund provider and /or portfolio on the allocation of pension funds to long-term investments. The level of annual turnover in pension fund portfolios was compared with the amount of short-term investments (using government treasury bills and bank deposits as proxy). The investment regulations around switching and other market conduct were then considered. The paper finds that greater movements between pension fund providers and between portfolios is linked to increased holdings of short-term and more liquid assets. Switching appears to be driven by competition, market structure, and investment advice, and, unfortunately, frequently results in poor investment returns for members. The paper makes six recommends for regulators. First, use administrative controls to prevent fraudulent switching between pension providers. Second, provide clear performance and cost comparisons to inform members' choice of provider/fund and encourage informed decision making, which is beneficial for members and the system. Third, supervise and control advertising and marketing (including reporting of performance periods) carefully, to avoid switches based on misleading advice. Fourth, control financial incentives for sales agents, so that switching advice is given in members' interest and not for commercial gain. Fifth, concentrate issuance in government securities, to create more liquid instruments. And sixth, conduct further research on the concept of a central liquidity pool to manage unexpected outflows.

Asset Allocation --- Capital Control --- Capital Gain --- Capital Markets --- Financial Instruments --- Pension Funds --- Portfolio --- Regulation

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

The movement from a defined benefit to a defined contribution pension system has important implications in the area of portfolio allocation. While the focus of defined benefit pension funds is essentially in the long term, some defined contribution funds might have incentives to invest with shorter-term horizons. The case of open pension funds, such as the ones in several countries in Latin America and Central and Eastern European countries, shows that competition on short-term returns may bring pension funds into suboptimal portfolio strategies. As policy makers become increasingly interested in finding long-term sources of financing for infrastructure and other long-term projects, it becomes essential to upgrade the regulatory framework of open pension funds. This paper contributes to the literature by proposing an investment regulatory framework based on strategic asset allocation that can be applicable to open pension funds. Based on the use of lifecycle investment strategies, the paper proposes the implementation of common portfolio benchmarks for pension funds. Three elements are emphasized for implementation of strategic asset allocation: (a) a well-defined pension objective, (b) sound governance of the portfolio benchmark, and (c) a methodology for developing the benchmark. The paper proposes the use of the approximation methodology as a starting point for designing portfolio benchmarks, and illustrates step-by-step how to build these long-term portfolios in a didactical way.

Contributory Pensions --- Financial Modeling --- Investment Incentives --- Pension Funds --- Plain Vanilla Anchor Investments

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Many of Asia’s retirement-income systems are ill prepared for the rapid population ageing that will occur over the next two decades. The demographic transition – to fewer babies and longer lives – took a century in Europe and North America. In Asia, this transition will often occur in a single generation. Asia’s pension systems need modernising urgently to ensure that they are financially sustainable and provide adequate retirement incomes. This report examines the retirement-income systems of 18 countries in the region. The report provides new data for comparing pension systems of different countries. It combines the OECD’s expertise in modelling pension entitlements with a network of national pension experts who provided detailed information at the country level, verified key results and provided feedback and input to improve the analysis.

Pensions --- Pension trusts --- Retirement income --- Income --- Employee pension trusts --- Pension funds --- Pension plans --- Trusts and trustees --- E-books