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February 2000 - Some say that democracy is more likely to survive under parliamentary governments. That result is not robust to the use of different variables from the Database of Political Institutions, a large new cross-country database that may illuminate many other issues affecting and affected by political institutions. This paper introduces a large new cross-country database on political institutions: the Database on Political Institutions (DPI). Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh summarize key variables (many of them new), compare this data set with others, and explore the range of issues for which the data should prove invaluable. Among the novel variables they introduce: Several measures of tenure, stability, and checks and balances; Identification of parties with the government coalition or the opposition; Fragmentation of opposition and government parties in legislatures. The authors illustrate the application of DPI variables to several problems in political economy. Stepan and Skach, for example, find that democracy is more likely to survive under parliamentary governments than presidential systems. But this result is not robust to the use of different variables from the DPI, which raises puzzles for future research. Similarly, Roubini and Sachs find that divided governments in the OECD run higher budget deficits after fiscal shocks. Replication of their work using DPI indicators of divided government indicates otherwise, again suggesting issues for future research. Among questions in political science and economics that this database may illuminate: the determinants of democratic consolidation, the political conditions for economic reform, the political and institutional roots of corruption, and the elements of appropriate and institutionally sensitive design of economic policy. This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the institutional bases of poverty alleviation and economic reform. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Database on Institutions for Government Decisionmaking (RPO 682-79). The authors may be contacted at tbeck@worldbank.org, gclarke@worldbank.org, pkeefer@worldbank.org, or pwalsh@worldbank.org.
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Modern warfare is almost always multilateral to one degree or another, requiring countries to cooperate as allies or coalition partners. Yet as the war in Afghanistan has made abundantly clear, multilateral cooperation is neither straightforward nor guaranteed. Countries differ significantly in what they are willing to do and how and where they are willing to do it. Some refuse to participate in dangerous or offensive missions. Others change tactical objectives with each new commander. Some countries defer to their commanders while others hold them to strict account. NATO in Afghanistan explores how government structures and party politics in NATO countries shape how battles are waged in the field. Drawing on more than 250 interviews with senior officials from around the world, David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman find that domestic constraints in presidential and single-party parliamentary systems--in countries such as the United States and Britain respectively--differ from those in countries with coalition governments, such as Germany and the Netherlands. As a result, different countries craft different guidelines for their forces overseas, most notably in the form of military caveats, the often-controversial limits placed on deployed troops. Providing critical insights into the realities of alliance and coalition warfare, NATO in Afghanistan also looks at non-NATO partners such as Australia, and assesses NATO's performance in the 2011 Libyan campaign to show how these domestic political dynamics are by no means unique to Afghanistan.
#SBIB:327.5H21 --- #SBIB:327.6H01 --- #SBIB:327.7H32 --- Vrede – oorlog, oorlogssituaties --- Internationale en diplomatieke relaties: specifieke conflicten --- Bondgenootschappen: NAVO / NATO --- Afghanistan --- History, Military --- #SBIB:327.7H32Vrede – oorlog, oorlogssituaties --- Bondgenootschappen: NAVO / NATOAfghanistanHistory, Military --- Afghan war, 2001. --- International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan). --- North Atlantic Treaty Organization -- Afghanistan. --- North Atlantic Treaty Organization -- History. --- Afghan War, 2001 --- -International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) --- Regions & Countries - Asia & the Middle East --- History & Archaeology --- South Asia --- Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001 --- -War on Terrorism, 2001-2009 --- North Atlantic Treaty Organization --- North Atlantic treaty organisation --- NAVO --- OTAN --- NATO --- HISTORY / Military / General. --- POLITICAL SCIENCE / Public Policy / General. --- POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / Diplomacy. --- International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) --- -North Atlantic Treaty Organization --- -Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001 --- ISAF --- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. --- Kumak aw Hamkārī (Afghanistan) --- -Afghan War, 2001 --- Afghanistan. --- Australia. --- British-style politics. --- Canada. --- Denmark. --- Dutch government. --- France. --- Germany. --- Great Britain. --- International Security Assistance Force. --- Jacques Chirac. --- Libya. --- NATO countries. --- NATO effort. --- NATO institutions. --- NATO intervention. --- NATO interventions. --- NATO membership. --- NATO. --- Netherlands. --- New Zealand. --- Nicolas Sarkozy. --- Operation Enduring Freedom. --- Poland. --- United States. --- agent selection incentives. --- alliance actions. --- alliance warfare. --- caveats. --- civilЭilitary relations. --- coalition governments. --- coalition warfare. --- coalitions. --- decision makers. --- decision making. --- decision units. --- defense spending. --- domestic consequences. --- domestic political institutions. --- domestic politics. --- forum shopping. --- incentives. --- intrusive oversight. --- military behavior. --- military decisions. --- military interventions. --- minority government. --- multilateral contingents. --- multilateral efforts. --- multilateral forum shopping. --- multilateral military effort. --- multilateral military operations. --- multilateralism. --- national commands. --- officer selection. --- parliamentary coalition behavior. --- parliamentary government. --- parliamentary governments. --- political coalition. --- political cultures. --- political ideology. --- prime ministers. --- principal-agency theory. --- principal-agent relations. --- red cards. --- restrictions. --- unilateralism. --- Afghan War, 2001-2021
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