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In order to explain mainly the instantaneous and cumulative impulse responses of bank profitability on the negotiable debt securities market to innovation shocks related to profitability itself, the inflation rate and the key rate between 2008 and 2019 in the DRC, it was appropriate to apply econometric analyses via non-structural VAR modelling. Indeed, after estimating the model, the empirical results obtained confirm that inflation and key interest rates significantly cause, in the Granger sense, bank profitability for the period under study. In the same vein, the instantaneous impulse response function (IRF) analysis showed that profitability reacted first negatively and significantly and then positively to innovations in the inflation rate when the innovation shock is projected over time: the maximum negative impact being reached 2 weeks after the shock and the maximum positive impact 3 weeks after the shock before returning to balance after about 6 weeks. The (IRF) first shows a positive profitability response to the key rate before turning negative when the shock is projected over time: the maximum negative impact being reached 3 weeks after the shock and the maximum positive impact 2 weeks after the shock before returning to equilibrium after about 5 weeks. The (IRF) reveals that profitability reacts negatively to its own innovations. On the other hand, we can realize that the accumulated impulse response (AIR) shows a positive and significant profitability response to its own innovations and those of the key rate, whereas it reacted negatively to an innovation shock on the inflation rate before returning to balance. In addition, the analysis of the decomposition of the variance of the VAR model's forecast error variance showed that the variance of the profitability forecast error was due to its own innovations averaging 80.1% and those of the key rate averaging 19.6%, as well as to innovations in the inflation rate averaging 0.32% over 10 periods, all in proportion. Finally, these analyses covered 18 banks operating in the DRC and a size of 516 observations at weekly frequency from April 2008 to September 2019.
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Economists and the governments they advise have based their macroeconomic policies on the idea of a natural rate of unemployment. Government policy that pushes the rate below this point-about 6 percent-is apt to trigger an accelerating rate of inflation that is hard to reverse, or so the argument goes. In this book, Storm and Naastepad make a strong case that this concept is flawed: that a stable non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), independent of macroeconomic policy, does not exist. Consequently, government decisions based on the NAIRU are not only misguided but have huge and avoidable social costs, namely, high unemployment and sustained inequality.Skillfully merging theoretical and empirical analysis, Storm and Naastepad show how the NAIRU's neglect of labor's impact on technological change and productivity growth eclipses the many positive contributions that labor and its regulation make to economic performance. When these positive effects are taken into account, the authors contend, a more humane policy becomes feasible, one that would enhance productivity and technological progress while maintaining profits, thus creating conditions for low unemployment and wider equality.
BUSINESS & ECONOMICS --- Economics / Macroeconomics --- Natural rate of unemployment --- Macroeconomics --- Monetary policy --- Business & Economics --- Labor & Workers' Economics --- Natural rate of unemployment. --- Macroeconomics. --- Monetary policy. --- Monetary management --- NAIRU (Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) --- Non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment --- Economic policy --- Currency boards --- Money supply --- Economics --- Equilibrium (Economics) --- Unemployment --- Inflation (Finance) --- E-books --- 331.31 --- 332.620 --- 333.841 --- 333.846.3 --- AA / International- internationaal --- Economisch beleid --- Werkloosheid: algemeenheden. Philipscurve --- Inflatie --- Verband tussen de geld-, bank- en kredietpolitiek en de lonen
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Russia had more-or-less completed the privatization of its manufacturing and natural resource sectors by the end of 1997. And in February 1998, the annual inflation rate at last dipped into the single digits. Privatization should have helped with stronger micro-foundations for growth. The conquest of inflation should have cemented macroeconomic credibility, lowered real interest rates, and spurred investment. Instead, Russia suffered a massive public debt-exchange rate-banking crisis just six months later, in August 1998. In showing how this turn of events unfolded, the authors focus on the interaction among Russia's deteriorating fiscal fundamentals, its weak micro-foundations of growth and financial globalization. They argue that the expectation of a large official bailout in the final 10 weeks before the meltdown played an important role, with Russia's external debt increasing by USD 16 billion or 8 percent of post-crisis gross domestic product during this time. The lessons and insights extracted from the 1998 Russian crisis are of general applicability, oil and geopolitics notwithstanding. These include a discussion of when financial globalization might actually hurt and a cutoff in market access might actually help; circumstances in which an official bailout could backfire; and why financial engineering tends to fail when fiscal solvency problems are present.
Access to Finance --- Bailout --- Banking crisis --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Credibility --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Currency --- Debt Markets --- Debt obligations --- Emerging market --- Emerging Markets --- Exchange rate --- External debt --- Face value --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Globalization --- Gross domestic product --- Inflation --- Inflation rate --- International Bank --- Market access --- Private Sector Development --- Public debt --- Real interest --- Real interest rates --- Repo --- Solvency
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Countries are increasingly being ranked by some new "mashup index of development," defined as a composite index for which existing theory and practice provides little or no guidance to its design. Thus the index has an unusually large number of moving parts, which the producer is essentially free to set. The parsimony of these indices is often appealing - collapsing multiple dimensions into just one, yielding unambiguous country rankings, and possibly reducing concerns about measurement errors in the component series. But the meaning, interpretation and robustness of these indices are often unclear. If they are to be properly understood and used, more attention needs to be given to their conceptual foundations, the tradeoffs they embody, the contextual factors relevant to country performance, and the sensitivity of the implied rankings to changing the data and weights. In short, clearer warning signs are needed for users. But even then, nagging doubts remain about the value-added of mashup indices, and their policy relevance, relative to the "dashboard" alternative of monitoring the components separately. Future progress in devising useful new composite indices of development will require that theory catches up with measurement practice.
Agriculture --- Air pollution --- Competitive markets --- Decision making --- Development policy --- Economic competitiveness --- Economic resources --- Economic Theory & Research --- GDP --- GDP per capita --- Governance --- Governance Indicators --- Income --- Inflation rate --- Information and Communication Technologies --- Information Security & Privacy --- Living standards --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- National income --- Poverty Reduction --- Property rights --- Purchasing power --- Regional Economic Development --- Rural Poverty Reduction --- Shadow prices --- Tradeoffs --- Unemployment --- Unemployment rate --- Wealth
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A recent study of house price behavior in U.S. cities by Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006) raises questions about so-called superstar cities in which housing is so inelastically supplied that it becomes unaffordable, as higher-income families outbid residents. We consider the case of Accra, Ghana, in this light, estimating the elasticity of housing supply and discussing the implications for growth and income distribution. There is not a great deal of data available to examine trends in Accra, so our method is indirect. First, we use a variant of the traditional monocentric city model to calculate the elasticity of Accra's housing supply relative to those of other similarly-sized African cities. This suggests that housing supply responsiveness is much higher elsewhere. This muted supply responsiveness is consistent with the observed higher housing prices. Second, we estimate a number of traditional housing demand equations and reduced form equations. Placing a number of restrictions on the equations allows us to infer Accra's housing supply elasticity. Taken together, our approaches suggest that lower-income families in Accra have such poor housing conditions because the market is extremely unresponsive to demand. Although the outcomes we have traced-high housing prices and low quality-are not unusual relative to the other developed country superstar cities, they are extreme. The welfare costs are considerable, so much so that in addition to direct housing market effects, these policies also appear to have potentially significant implications for the achievement of more equitable growth.
Adverse Effects --- Banks and Banking Reform --- Communities & Human Settlements --- Development Economics --- Economic Theory and Research --- Economics --- Elasticity --- Equations --- Gross Domestic Product --- Housing and Human Habitats --- Income --- Income Groups --- Inflation Rate --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Markets and Market Access --- Public Sector Management and Reform --- Underestimates
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Countries are increasingly being ranked by some new "mashup index of development," defined as a composite index for which existing theory and practice provides little or no guidance to its design. Thus the index has an unusually large number of moving parts, which the producer is essentially free to set. The parsimony of these indices is often appealing - collapsing multiple dimensions into just one, yielding unambiguous country rankings, and possibly reducing concerns about measurement errors in the component series. But the meaning, interpretation and robustness of these indices are often unclear. If they are to be properly understood and used, more attention needs to be given to their conceptual foundations, the tradeoffs they embody, the contextual factors relevant to country performance, and the sensitivity of the implied rankings to changing the data and weights. In short, clearer warning signs are needed for users. But even then, nagging doubts remain about the value-added of mashup indices, and their policy relevance, relative to the "dashboard" alternative of monitoring the components separately. Future progress in devising useful new composite indices of development will require that theory catches up with measurement practice.
Agriculture --- Air pollution --- Competitive markets --- Decision making --- Development policy --- Economic competitiveness --- Economic resources --- Economic Theory & Research --- GDP --- GDP per capita --- Governance --- Governance Indicators --- Income --- Inflation rate --- Information and Communication Technologies --- Information Security & Privacy --- Living standards --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- National income --- Poverty Reduction --- Property rights --- Purchasing power --- Regional Economic Development --- Rural Poverty Reduction --- Shadow prices --- Tradeoffs --- Unemployment --- Unemployment rate --- Wealth
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Russia had more-or-less completed the privatization of its manufacturing and natural resource sectors by the end of 1997. And in February 1998, the annual inflation rate at last dipped into the single digits. Privatization should have helped with stronger micro-foundations for growth. The conquest of inflation should have cemented macroeconomic credibility, lowered real interest rates, and spurred investment. Instead, Russia suffered a massive public debt-exchange rate-banking crisis just six months later, in August 1998. In showing how this turn of events unfolded, the authors focus on the interaction among Russia's deteriorating fiscal fundamentals, its weak micro-foundations of growth and financial globalization. They argue that the expectation of a large official bailout in the final 10 weeks before the meltdown played an important role, with Russia's external debt increasing by USD 16 billion or 8 percent of post-crisis gross domestic product during this time. The lessons and insights extracted from the 1998 Russian crisis are of general applicability, oil and geopolitics notwithstanding. These include a discussion of when financial globalization might actually hurt and a cutoff in market access might actually help; circumstances in which an official bailout could backfire; and why financial engineering tends to fail when fiscal solvency problems are present.
Access to Finance --- Bailout --- Banking crisis --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Credibility --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Currency --- Debt Markets --- Debt obligations --- Emerging market --- Emerging Markets --- Exchange rate --- External debt --- Face value --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Globalization --- Gross domestic product --- Inflation --- Inflation rate --- International Bank --- Market access --- Private Sector Development --- Public debt --- Real interest --- Real interest rates --- Repo --- Solvency
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A recent study of house price behavior in U.S. cities by Gyourko, Mayer, and Sinai (2006) raises questions about so-called superstar cities in which housing is so inelastically supplied that it becomes unaffordable, as higher-income families outbid residents. We consider the case of Accra, Ghana, in this light, estimating the elasticity of housing supply and discussing the implications for growth and income distribution. There is not a great deal of data available to examine trends in Accra, so our method is indirect. First, we use a variant of the traditional monocentric city model to calculate the elasticity of Accra's housing supply relative to those of other similarly-sized African cities. This suggests that housing supply responsiveness is much higher elsewhere. This muted supply responsiveness is consistent with the observed higher housing prices. Second, we estimate a number of traditional housing demand equations and reduced form equations. Placing a number of restrictions on the equations allows us to infer Accra's housing supply elasticity. Taken together, our approaches suggest that lower-income families in Accra have such poor housing conditions because the market is extremely unresponsive to demand. Although the outcomes we have traced-high housing prices and low quality-are not unusual relative to the other developed country superstar cities, they are extreme. The welfare costs are considerable, so much so that in addition to direct housing market effects, these policies also appear to have potentially significant implications for the achievement of more equitable growth.
Adverse Effects --- Banks and Banking Reform --- Communities & Human Settlements --- Development Economics --- Economic Theory and Research --- Economics --- Elasticity --- Equations --- Gross Domestic Product --- Housing and Human Habitats --- Income --- Income Groups --- Inflation Rate --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Markets and Market Access --- Public Sector Management and Reform --- Underestimates
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paper presents estimations of the shadow economies for 162 countries, including developing Eastern European, Central Asian, and high-income countries over the period 1999 to 2006/2007. According to the estimations, the average size of the shadow economy (as a percentage of "official" gross domestic product) in 2006 in 98 developing countries is 38.7 percent; in 21 Eastern European and Central Asian (mostly transition) countries, it is 38.1 percent, and in 25 high-income countries, it is 18.7 percent. The authors find that the driving forces of the shadow economy are an increased burden of taxation (both direct and indirect), combined with labor market regulations and the quality of public goods and services, as well as the state of the "official" economy.
Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Debt Markets --- Deregulation --- Development economics --- Economic Theory & Research --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- GDP --- GDP per capita --- Government regulation --- Gross domestic product --- Gross national product --- Import quotas --- Income --- Inflation rate --- Labor Markets --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Price controls --- Private Sector Development --- Purchasing power --- Regulatory framework --- Social Protections and Labor --- Tax revenues --- Taxation --- Trade barriers --- Unemployment --- Unemployment rate --- Value added --- Wages
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paper presents estimations of the shadow economies for 162 countries, including developing Eastern European, Central Asian, and high-income countries over the period 1999 to 2006/2007. According to the estimations, the average size of the shadow economy (as a percentage of "official" gross domestic product) in 2006 in 98 developing countries is 38.7 percent; in 21 Eastern European and Central Asian (mostly transition) countries, it is 38.1 percent, and in 25 high-income countries, it is 18.7 percent. The authors find that the driving forces of the shadow economy are an increased burden of taxation (both direct and indirect), combined with labor market regulations and the quality of public goods and services, as well as the state of the "official" economy.
Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Debt Markets --- Deregulation --- Development economics --- Economic Theory & Research --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- GDP --- GDP per capita --- Government regulation --- Gross domestic product --- Gross national product --- Import quotas --- Income --- Inflation rate --- Labor Markets --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Price controls --- Private Sector Development --- Purchasing power --- Regulatory framework --- Social Protections and Labor --- Tax revenues --- Taxation --- Trade barriers --- Unemployment --- Unemployment rate --- Value added --- Wages
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