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This paper aims to shed some new light on the conditions needed to ensure the effectiveness of Boards of Directors of state owned enterprises with a focus on infrastructure sectors. In the case of developing countries, empirical studies have found evidence of positive links between the composition of the Board of Directors and financial performance. Yet the lack of solid theoretical foundations, and in some cases poor data availability, makes the conclusions of most studies weak. Several policy recommendations emerge from the review of the economic literature and evidence from case studies. First, the introduction of a sufficient number of independent directors emerges as an important corporate governance milestone. Empowering them to exercise effective monitoring of management, however, may prove to be a formidable challenge for of state owned enterprises. More attention to board procedures, particularly related to the Board selection and evaluation process, is essential, to produce the necessary insulation of Boards from government interference. Ensuring sufficient continuity of services to directors is particularly crucial to improve corporate governance. In addition, other factors that may reduce directors' ability to monitor corporate activities, such as the age profile and the number of Boards on which they sit, need to be handled more carefully.

Board member --- Boards of Directors --- Corporate governance --- Corporate Law --- Debt Markets --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial performance --- Firm performance --- Governance --- Governance arrangements --- Independent directors --- Law and Development --- Little attention --- Microfinance --- National Governance --- Private enterprises --- Private Partnerships --- Private Sector Development

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In the Interest of Others develops a new theory of organizational leadership and governance to explain why some organizations expand their scope of action in ways that do not benefit their members directly. John Ahlquist and Margaret Levi document eighty years of such activism by the International Longshore and Warehouse Union in the United States and the Waterside Workers Federation in Australia. They systematically compare the ILWU and WWF to the Teamsters and the International Longshoremen's Association, two American transport industry labor unions that actively discouraged the pursuit of political causes unrelated to their own economic interests. Drawing on a wealth of original data, Ahlquist and Levi show how activist organizations can profoundly transform the views of members about their political efficacy and the collective actions they are willing to contemplate. They find that leaders who ask for support of projects without obvious material benefits must first demonstrate their ability to deliver the goods and services members expect. These leaders must also build governance institutions that coordinate expectations about their objectives and the behavior of members. In the Interest of Others reveals how activist labor unions expand the community of fate and provoke preferences that transcend the private interests of individual members. Ahlquist and Levi then extend this logic to other membership organizations, including religious groups, political parties, and the state itself.

Labor unions --- Labor movement. --- Political activity. --- ILWU leaders. --- ILWU members. --- International Brotherhood of Teamsters. --- International Longshore and Warehouse Union. --- International Longshoremen's Association. --- Maritime Union of Australia. --- Waterside Workers' Federation. --- activist unions. --- aggregate behavior. --- altruism. --- business unions. --- cooperation. --- economic opportunities. --- economism. --- equilibrium selection. --- ethnic divisions. --- governance arrangements. --- governance equilibrium. --- governance. --- ill-formed beliefs. --- individual members. --- industrial efficacy. --- information acquisition. --- internal heterogeneity. --- international trade. --- labor organization. --- labor unions. --- leadership rents. --- members. --- membership organizations. --- national-level organizations. --- nationalist groups. --- organization governance. --- organizational governance. --- organizational leaders. --- organizational leadership. --- organizational norms. --- political activism. --- political beliefs. --- political causes. --- political commitments. --- political mobilization. --- political opinions. --- religious divisions. --- selective incentives. --- self-selection. --- social justice. --- social networks. --- solidarity. --- state-building. --- trade liberalization. --- trade restrictions. --- union activities. --- union activity. --- union leaders. --- union. --- unions. --- volunteering.

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The rapid growth of trust funds at multilateral development organizations has been widely neglected in the academic literature so far. Using a simple illustrative model, this paper examines the choice by sovereign donors among various trust fund options. The authors contend that the choice among the different trust funds involves a fundamental trade-off: larger funds provide donors with the benefit of burden sharing. Conversely, each donor can better assert its individual preferences in a fund with fewer other donors. The theoretical considerations yield testable implications on a range of factors affecting this fundamental tradeoff, most notably the area of intervention of the trust fund and competing domestic interests of donor countries. Using a sample of World Bank trust funds, the paper examines the participation decisions of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee donors over the past decade. In line with the theoretical argument, preference homogeneity among donors as well as indicators for global activities and fragile states assistance are robust determinants of participation in (large) multi-donor funds. In contrast, donors tend to prefer single-donor trust funds in areas in which their national interests dominate. Although they could use bilateral aid for the same purpose, they often prefer to channel their contributions through trust funds at multilateral agencies. Donors thereby reduce their own administrative costs, while benefiting from the expertise of the multilateral agency. These findings confirm prior qualitative case studies and evidence from donor reports, suggesting that reduced reliance on single-donor trust funds-a costly instrument from the perspective of multilateral agencies-can improve the development effectiveness of aid.

Accountability --- Accounting --- Administrative costs --- Agreements --- Aid --- Aid financing --- Aid institutions --- Aids --- Allocation decisions --- Bank --- Banks and banking reform --- Bilateral agencies --- Bilateral aid --- Bilateral donor --- Bilateral donors --- Climate change --- Coastal & marine environment --- Compromise --- Conflict --- Conflict and development --- Conflict resolution --- Constraint --- Corporate law --- Developed country --- Development assistance --- Development banks --- Diseases --- Divergences --- Donor --- Donor countries --- Donor country finance and financial sector development --- Donors --- Economy --- Employment --- Environment post conflict reconstruction --- Expert --- Food security --- Foreign aid --- Foreign policies --- Foreign policy --- Foundations --- Gender --- Gender & health --- Governance --- Governance arrangements --- Government --- Health services --- IFC --- IMF --- Interest --- International affairs --- International bank --- International community --- International development --- International negotiation --- International studies --- International trade --- Investment --- Law and development --- Lead --- Leads --- Lending --- Member states --- MIC --- MICs --- Middle-income countries --- Middle-income country --- Multilateral agencies --- Multilateral aid --- Multilateral development banks --- Nation --- Partner countries --- Partnership --- Partnerships --- Peace --- Portfolio --- Privatization --- Probability models --- Public services --- Reconstruction --- Resource mobilization --- Risk --- SI --- States --- Tactics --- Taxation --- Technical assistance --- Terrorism --- Transaction costs --- Trust --- Trust funds --- UNDP --- Union --- United nations system --- University --- Value --- Voluntary contributions --- World development