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Book
The Master Equation and the Convergence Problem in Mean Field Games : (AMS-201)
Authors: --- ---
ISBN: 0691193711 Year: 2019 Publisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press,

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Abstract

This book describes the latest advances in the theory of mean field games, which are optimal control problems with a continuum of players, each of them interacting with the whole statistical distribution of a population. While originating in economics, this theory now has applications in areas as diverse as mathematical finance, crowd phenomena, epidemiology, and cybersecurity.Because mean field games concern the interactions of infinitely many players in an optimal control framework, one expects them to appear as the limit for Nash equilibria of differential games with finitely many players, as the number of players tends to infinity. This book rigorously establishes this convergence, which has been an open problem until now. The limit of the system associated with differential games with finitely many players is described by the so-called master equation, a nonlocal transport equation in the space of measures. After defining a suitable notion of differentiability in the space of measures, the authors provide a complete self-contained analysis of the master equation. Their analysis includes the case of common noise problems in which all the players are affected by a common Brownian motion. They then go on to explain how to use the master equation to prove the mean field limit.This groundbreaking book presents two important new results in mean field games that contribute to a unified theoretical framework for this exciting and fast-developing area of mathematics.

Keywords

Convergence. --- Mean field theory. --- Many-body problem --- Statistical mechanics --- Functions --- A priori estimate. --- Approximation. --- Bellman equation. --- Boltzmann equation. --- Boundary value problem. --- C0. --- Chain rule. --- Compact space. --- Computation. --- Conditional probability distribution. --- Continuous function. --- Convergence problem. --- Convex set. --- Cooperative game. --- Corollary. --- Decision-making. --- Derivative. --- Deterministic system. --- Differentiable function. --- Directional derivative. --- Discrete time and continuous time. --- Discretization. --- Dynamic programming. --- Emergence. --- Empirical distribution function. --- Equation. --- Estimation. --- Euclidean space. --- Folk theorem (game theory). --- Folk theorem. --- Heat equation. --- Hermitian adjoint. --- Implementation. --- Initial condition. --- Integer. --- Large numbers. --- Linearization. --- Lipschitz continuity. --- Lp space. --- Macroeconomic model. --- Markov process. --- Martingale (probability theory). --- Master equation. --- Mathematical optimization. --- Maximum principle. --- Method of characteristics. --- Metric space. --- Monograph. --- Monotonic function. --- Nash equilibrium. --- Neumann boundary condition. --- Nonlinear system. --- Notation. --- Numerical analysis. --- Optimal control. --- Parameter. --- Partial differential equation. --- Periodic boundary conditions. --- Porous medium. --- Probability measure. --- Probability theory. --- Probability. --- Random function. --- Random variable. --- Randomization. --- Rate of convergence. --- Regime. --- Scientific notation. --- Semigroup. --- Simultaneous equations. --- Small number. --- Smoothness. --- Space form. --- State space. --- State variable. --- Stochastic calculus. --- Stochastic control. --- Stochastic process. --- Stochastic. --- Subset. --- Suggestion. --- Symmetric function. --- Technology. --- Theorem. --- Theory. --- Time consistency. --- Time derivative. --- Uniqueness. --- Variable (mathematics). --- Vector space. --- Viscosity solution. --- Wasserstein metric. --- Weak solution. --- Wiener process. --- Without loss of generality.


Book
A cooperative species : human reciprocity and its evolution
Authors: ---
ISBN: 1283088851 9786613088857 1400838835 9781400838837 0691151253 0691158169 9780691158167 9780691151250 Year: 2011 Publisher: Princeton : Princeton University Press,

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Why do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin. In A Cooperative Species, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis--pioneers in the new experimental and evolutionary science of human behavior--show that the central issue is not why selfish people act generously, but instead how genetic and cultural evolution has produced a species in which substantial numbers make sacrifices to uphold ethical norms and to help even total strangers. The authors describe how, for thousands of generations, cooperation with fellow group members has been essential to survival. Groups that created institutions to protect the civic-minded from exploitation by the selfish flourished and prevailed in conflicts with less cooperative groups. Key to this process was the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and our capacity to internalize social norms so that acting ethically became a personal goal rather than simply a prudent way to avoid punishment. Using experimental, archaeological, genetic, and ethnographic data to calibrate models of the coevolution of genes and culture as well as prehistoric warfare and other forms of group competition, A Cooperative Species provides a compelling and novel account of how humans came to be moral and cooperative.

Keywords

Cooperation. --- Cooperativeness. --- Behavior evolution. --- Behavioral evolution --- Cooperation (Psychology) --- Collaborative economy --- Cooperative distribution --- Cooperative movement --- Distribution, Cooperative --- Peer-to-peer economy --- Sharing economy --- Evolutionary psychology --- Social psychology --- Economics --- Profit-sharing --- Cooperation --- Cooperativeness --- Behavior evolution --- E-books --- Australia. --- altruism. --- altruistic cooperation. --- altruistic punishment. --- ancestral humans. --- behavior. --- beliefs. --- coevolution. --- common good. --- constraints. --- coordinated punishment. --- correlated equilibrium. --- costly signaling. --- cultural transmission. --- culture. --- early humans. --- equilibrium selection. --- ethical norms. --- evolution. --- evolutionary dynamics. --- fitness-reducing norm. --- fitness. --- folk theorem. --- foragers. --- free-riders. --- free-riding. --- gene-culture coevolution. --- genetic differentiation. --- genetic inheritance. --- group competition. --- group membership. --- guilt. --- helping behavior. --- hostility. --- human cooperation. --- hunter-gatherer society. --- inclusive fitness. --- indirect reciprocity. --- institutions. --- intergroup conflict. --- internalization. --- multi-level selection. --- norms. --- parochial altruism. --- parochialism. --- peer pressure. --- phenotypic expression. --- positive assortment. --- preferences. --- prehistoric human society. --- private information. --- prosocial behavior. --- public goods game. --- public information. --- punishment. --- reciprocal altruism. --- repeated game. --- reproductive leveling. --- sacrifice. --- selective extinction. --- self-interest. --- shame. --- social behavior. --- social dilemmas. --- social emotions. --- social institutions. --- social interactions. --- social norms. --- social order. --- social preferences. --- socialization. --- sociobiology. --- strong reciprocity. --- within-group segmentation.

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