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A woman glances at a broken clock and comes to believe it is a quarter past seven. Yet, despite the broken clock, it really does happen to be a quarter past seven. Her belief is true, but it isn't knowledge. This is a classic illustration of a central problem in epistemology: determining what knowledge requires in addition to true belief. In this provocative book, Richard Foley finds a new solution to the problem in the observation that whenever someone has a true belief but not knowledge, there is some significant aspect of the situation about which she lacks true beliefs--something important that she doesn't quite "get." This may seem a modest point but, as Foley shows, it has the potential to reorient the theory of knowledge. Whether a true belief counts as knowledge depends on the importance of the information one does or doesn't have. This means that questions of knowledge cannot be separated from questions about human concerns and values. It also means that, contrary to what is often thought, there is no privileged way of coming to know. Knowledge is a mutt. Proper pedigree is not required. What matters is that one doesn't lack important nearby information. Challenging some of the central assumptions of contemporary epistemology, this is an original and important account of knowledge.

Belief and doubt. --- Knowledge, Theory of. --- Conviction --- Doubt --- Consciousness --- Credulity --- Emotions --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- Religion --- Will --- Agnosticism --- Rationalism --- Skepticism --- Epistemology --- Theory of knowledge --- Belief and doubt --- Edmund Gettier. --- Gettier game. --- Peter Klein. --- Rain Man. --- a priori knowledge. --- accurate beliefs. --- adequate information view. --- adequate information. --- associated truths. --- autobiographical knowledge stories. --- awareness. --- belief system. --- belief. --- beliefs. --- blind luck. --- collective acceptance. --- collective knowledge. --- comprehensive beliefs. --- conjunctions. --- contemporary epistemology. --- contingent truths. --- counterfactual truths. --- crucial information. --- deception. --- defeasibility theory. --- defeasibility. --- demon hypothesis. --- disjunctions. --- epistemically rational belief. --- epistemology. --- facts. --- fiction. --- first-person beliefs. --- fixedness. --- general theory of rationality. --- global luck. --- human concerns. --- human values. --- ignorance. --- imagination. --- important truths. --- indefeasible justification. --- independent information. --- individual achievements. --- individual beliefs. --- individual human knowledge. --- individual knowledge. --- information gap. --- information gaps. --- information. --- inquiry. --- instability. --- intellectual specialization. --- introspective knowledge. --- intuitions. --- justification theorists. --- justification-based theories. --- justification. --- justifications. --- justified belief. --- justified true belief. --- knowledge block. --- knowledge blocks. --- knowledge gap. --- knowledge stories. --- knowledge. --- literary devices. --- local luck. --- lottery stories. --- lottery ticket. --- lottery. --- luck. --- lucky knowledge. --- misleading defeaters. --- missing information. --- morals. --- narrow knowledge. --- necessary truths. --- neighboring opinions. --- nondefective justification. --- ordinary belief. --- perceptual knowledge. --- philosophical problems. --- pragmatism. --- preface. --- rational belief. --- rationality. --- reliability theories. --- reliability theorists. --- reliability. --- reoriented epistemology. --- reverse lottery stories. --- skepticism. --- tests. --- theory of justified belief. --- theory of knowledge. --- tracking theories. --- true belief value. --- true belief. --- true beliefs. --- truth tracking. --- truth. --- truths. --- unstable beliefs. --- value. --- winning ticket. --- working familiarity.