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Some multilateral agencies implement aid projects in a broad range of sectors, with aid disbursements showing a strong overlap with those of bilateral donors. The question then arises of why do bilateral donors delegate sizable shares of their aid to non-specialized agencies for implementation? This paper develops a game theoretic model to explain this puzzle. Donors delegate aid implementation to the multilateral agency (ML) to strengthen the policy selectivity of aid, incentivizing policy improvements in recipient countries, in turn improving aid's development effectiveness. Bilateral donors are better off delegating aid to ML even when they are purely altruistic but disagree on how aid should be distributed across recipients. Key for our result to hold is that ML searches some middle ground among disagreeing donors. Aid selectivity-in terms of both policy and poverty-emerges endogenously and is credible, as it is the solution to ML's optimization problem. Moreover, the model shows that if one sufficiently large donor is policy selective in its aid allocations, there is no need for other donors to be policy selective. The World Bank's aid program for lower-income countries, the International Development Administration (IDA), is shown to fit the assumptions and predictions of the model. Specifically, IDA is a dominant donor in most of its recipient countries and is much more policy and poverty selective than bilateral aid. Donors view it as a public good, and contribution more to it when bilateral aid is less selective. Potential threats to IDA's role as a dominant, policy-selective donor include the emergence of nontraditional donors, changes in voting shares, and traditional donors' increasing use of earmarked contributions.

Access --- Aid allocation --- Aid conditionality --- Bilateral aid --- Bilateral donor --- Bilateral donors --- Coastal & marine environment --- Collusion --- Competitors --- Cooperative --- Development administration --- Development agencies --- Development aid --- Development assistance --- Development banks --- Development economics & aid effectiveness --- Development policy --- Development research --- Dis --- Disability --- Domestic resources --- Donors --- Economic growth --- Education --- Environment --- Equality --- Finance and financial sector development --- Gender --- Gender & health --- Grants --- Humanitarian aid --- Inclusion --- Industrial countries --- International development --- Loan --- Loans --- Macroeconomics and economic growth --- Markets --- Middle-income countries --- Mineral resources --- Multilateral development banks --- Participation --- Priorities --- Shareholders --- Social protections and labor --- Society

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The complex relationships between altruists, beneficiaries, and brokers in the global effort to fight AIDS in AfricaIn the wake of the AIDS pandemic, legions of organizations and compassionate individuals descended on Africa from faraway places to offer their help and save lives. A Fraught Embrace shows how the dreams of these altruists became entangled with complex institutional and human relationships. Ann Swidler and Susan Cotts Watkins vividly describe the often mismatched expectations and fantasies of those who seek to help, of the villagers who desperately seek help, and of the brokers on whom both Western altruists and impoverished villagers must rely.Based on years of fieldwork in the heavily AIDS-affected country of Malawi, this powerful book digs into the sprawling AIDS enterprise and unravels the paradoxes of AIDS policy and practice. All who want to do good-from idealistic volunteers to world-weary development professionals-depend on brokers as guides, fixers, and cultural translators. These irreplaceable but frequently unseen local middlemen are the human connection between altruists' dreams and the realities of global philanthropy.The mutual misunderstandings among donors, brokers, and villagers-each with their own desires and moral imaginations-create all the drama of a romance: longing, exhilaration, disappointment, heartache, and sometimes an enduring connection. Personal stories, public scandals, and intersecting, sometimes clashing fantasies bring the lofty intentions of AIDS altruism firmly down to earth.Swidler and Watkins ultimately argue that altruists could accomplish more good, not by seeking to transform African lives but by helping Africans achieve their own goals. A Fraught Embrace unveils the tangled relations of those involved in the collective struggle to contain an epidemic.

Voluntarism --- Antiretroviral agents --- Non-governmental organizations --- HIV infections --- AIDS (Disease) --- Anti-retroviral agents --- Antiretroviral drugs --- Antiretrovirals --- Antiviral agents --- INGOs (International agencies) --- International non-governmental organizations --- NGOs (International agencies) --- Nongovernmental organizations --- Organizations, Non-governmental (International agencies) --- Private and voluntary organizations (International agencies) --- PVOs (International agencies) --- International agencies --- Nonprofit organizations --- HIV (Viruses) infections --- HTLV-III infections --- HTLV-III-LAV infections --- Human T-lymphotropic virus III infections --- Lentivirus infections --- Sexually transmitted diseases --- Acquired immune deficiency syndrome --- Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome --- Acquired immunological deficiency syndrome --- Immunological deficiency syndromes --- Virus-induced immunosuppression --- Voluntary action --- Volunteer work --- Volunteering --- Volunteerism --- National service --- Associations, institutions, etc. --- Social aspects --- Patients --- Services for --- AIDS altruism. --- AIDS enterprise. --- AIDS money. --- AIDS organizations. --- AIDS pandemic. --- AIDS policy. --- AIDS. --- Africa. --- African aid. --- Africans. --- Global Fund. --- HIV virus. --- HIV. --- Malawi. --- Malawian brokers. --- Malawians. --- NGOs. --- PEPFAR. --- Save the Children. --- USAID. --- Unites States. --- aid chain. --- altruism. --- altruists. --- beneficiary. --- bilateral donors. --- brokers. --- career aspirations. --- counseling. --- cultural practices. --- donors. --- economic mobility. --- education. --- epidemic. --- evaluation. --- fighting stigma. --- foreign altruists. --- funders. --- global AIDS system. --- global philanthropy. --- guides. --- harmful practices. --- institutional altruists. --- journalists. --- lock donors. --- malice. --- merit. --- middlemen. --- miracles. --- mutual aid. --- orphans. --- poverty. --- project evaluation. --- routinized activities. --- sexual practices. --- testimonials. --- training. --- villagers. --- vulnerable women.

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The rapid growth of trust funds at multilateral development organizations has been widely neglected in the academic literature so far. Using a simple illustrative model, this paper examines the choice by sovereign donors among various trust fund options. The authors contend that the choice among the different trust funds involves a fundamental trade-off: larger funds provide donors with the benefit of burden sharing. Conversely, each donor can better assert its individual preferences in a fund with fewer other donors. The theoretical considerations yield testable implications on a range of factors affecting this fundamental tradeoff, most notably the area of intervention of the trust fund and competing domestic interests of donor countries. Using a sample of World Bank trust funds, the paper examines the participation decisions of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee donors over the past decade. In line with the theoretical argument, preference homogeneity among donors as well as indicators for global activities and fragile states assistance are robust determinants of participation in (large) multi-donor funds. In contrast, donors tend to prefer single-donor trust funds in areas in which their national interests dominate. Although they could use bilateral aid for the same purpose, they often prefer to channel their contributions through trust funds at multilateral agencies. Donors thereby reduce their own administrative costs, while benefiting from the expertise of the multilateral agency. These findings confirm prior qualitative case studies and evidence from donor reports, suggesting that reduced reliance on single-donor trust funds-a costly instrument from the perspective of multilateral agencies-can improve the development effectiveness of aid.

Accountability --- Accounting --- Administrative costs --- Agreements --- Aid --- Aid financing --- Aid institutions --- Aids --- Allocation decisions --- Bank --- Banks and banking reform --- Bilateral agencies --- Bilateral aid --- Bilateral donor --- Bilateral donors --- Climate change --- Coastal & marine environment --- Compromise --- Conflict --- Conflict and development --- Conflict resolution --- Constraint --- Corporate law --- Developed country --- Development assistance --- Development banks --- Diseases --- Divergences --- Donor --- Donor countries --- Donor country finance and financial sector development --- Donors --- Economy --- Employment --- Environment post conflict reconstruction --- Expert --- Food security --- Foreign aid --- Foreign policies --- Foreign policy --- Foundations --- Gender --- Gender & health --- Governance --- Governance arrangements --- Government --- Health services --- IFC --- IMF --- Interest --- International affairs --- International bank --- International community --- International development --- International negotiation --- International studies --- International trade --- Investment --- Law and development --- Lead --- Leads --- Lending --- Member states --- MIC --- MICs --- Middle-income countries --- Middle-income country --- Multilateral agencies --- Multilateral aid --- Multilateral development banks --- Nation --- Partner countries --- Partnership --- Partnerships --- Peace --- Portfolio --- Privatization --- Probability models --- Public services --- Reconstruction --- Resource mobilization --- Risk --- SI --- States --- Tactics --- Taxation --- Technical assistance --- Terrorism --- Transaction costs --- Trust --- Trust funds --- UNDP --- Union --- United nations system --- University --- Value --- Voluntary contributions --- World development