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Many private infrastructure projects mix regulation that subjects the private company to considerable risk, a government or regulator that is reluctant to see the company go bankrupt, and high leverage on the part of the company. If all goes well, equityholders make a profit, debtholders are repaid, customers pay no more than they expected, and the government is not called on to bail the company out. If all goes badly enough, however, the prospect of bankruptcy will loom. Unwilling to see the company go bankrupt, however, the regulator will have to permit an unscheduled price increase, or the government will have to inject taxpayers' money into the firm. In other words, the combination means customers and taxpayers bear more risk than would appear from the regulations governing the private infrastructure project.Ehrhardt and Irwin examine how these problems have played out in five cases. Then they describe how governments and regulators can quantify the extent of the problems and, using option-pricing techniques, value the customer and taxpayer guarantees involved. Finally, the authors analyze three options for mitigating the problem: making bankruptcy a more credible threat, limiting the private operator's leverage, and reducing the private operator's exposure to risk.The authors conclude that appropriate policy depends on the tax system, the feasibility of enforcing bankruptcy, and the benefits of risk transfer from taxpayer to the private sector.This paper - a product of Infrastructure Economics and Finance - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to improve government policy toward private infrastructure providers.
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Many private infrastructure projects mix regulation that subjects the private company to considerable risk, a government or regulator that is reluctant to see the company go bankrupt, and high leverage on the part of the company. If all goes well, equityholders make a profit, debtholders are repaid, customers pay no more than they expected, and the government is not called on to bail the company out. If all goes badly enough, however, the prospect of bankruptcy will loom. Unwilling to see the company go bankrupt, however, the regulator will have to permit an unscheduled price increase, or the government will have to inject taxpayers' money into the firm. In other words, the combination means customers and taxpayers bear more risk than would appear from the regulations governing the private infrastructure project.Ehrhardt and Irwin examine how these problems have played out in five cases. Then they describe how governments and regulators can quantify the extent of the problems and, using option-pricing techniques, value the customer and taxpayer guarantees involved. Finally, the authors analyze three options for mitigating the problem: making bankruptcy a more credible threat, limiting the private operator's leverage, and reducing the private operator's exposure to risk.The authors conclude that appropriate policy depends on the tax system, the feasibility of enforcing bankruptcy, and the benefits of risk transfer from taxpayer to the private sector.This paper - a product of Infrastructure Economics and Finance - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to improve government policy toward private infrastructure providers.
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This paper shows that China has launched a new global system for cross-border rescue lending to countries in debt distress. We build the first comprehensive dataset on China's overseas bailouts between 2000 and 2021 and provide new insights into China's growing role in the global financial system. A key finding is that the global swap line network put in place by the People's Bank of China is increasingly used as a financial rescue mechanism, with more than USD 170 billion in liquidity support extended to crisis countries, including repeated rollovers of swaps coming due. The swaps bolster gross reserves and are mostly drawn by distressed countries with low liquidity ratios. In addition, we show that Chinese state-owned banks and enterprises have given out an additional USD 70 billion in rescue loans for balance of payments support. Taken together, China's overseas bailouts correspond to more than 20 percent of total IMF lending over the past decade and bailout amounts are growing fast. However, China's rescue loans differ from those of established international lenders of last resort in that they (i) are opaque, (ii) carry relatively high interest rates, and (iii) are almost exclusively targeted to debtors of China's Belt and Road Initiative. These findings have implications for the international financial and monetary architecture, which is becoming more multipolar, less institutionalized, and less transparent.
International finance. --- Economics. --- Bailouts (Government policy)
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Bailouts (Government policy) --- Pensions --- General Motors Corporation. --- Delphi Corporation.
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Pension trusts --- Bailouts (Government policy) --- Finance. --- Delphi Corporation --- Employees --- Pensions.
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This toolkit is designed for policy makers and stakeholders who are considering the establishment of a publicly funded asset management company (AMC). An AMC is a statutory body or corporation, fully or partially owned by the government, usually established in times of financial sector stress, to assume the management of distressed assets and recoup the public cost of resolving the crisis. AMCs were first used in the early 1990s in Sweden (Securum) and the United States (the RTC), and again during the Asian crisis (for instance, Danaharta in Malaysia, KAMCO in the Republic of Korea). The 2008 financial crisis marked a renewal of the use of this tool to support the resolution of financial crises (for instance, NAMA in Ireland, SAREB in Spain). The toolkit does not address broader bank resolution issues. It has a narrow focus on the specific tool of a public AMC established to support bank resolution, and with the objective of providing insight on the design and operational issues surrounding the creation of such AMCs. It seeks to inform policy makers on issues to consider if and when planning to establish a public AMC through: An analysis of recent public AMCs established as a result of the global financial crisis; Detailed case studies in developed and emerging markets over three generations; A toolkit approach with questions and answers, including questions on design and operations that are critical for authorities confronted with the issue of whether to establish an AMC; An emphasis on "how to?" that is, a practical versus a principled approach. The toolkit is structured as followed: Part I summarizes the findings on the preconditions, the design, and the operationalization of public AMCs. Part II provides case studies on three generations of AMCs, whose lessons are embedded in Part I. The case studies cover emerging and developed markets, and have been selected based on the lessons they offer.
Bailouts (Government policy) --- Government financial institutions. --- Financial crises --- Government policy.
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Bank failures --- Bankruptcy --- Bailouts (Government policy) --- Government policy
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Pension trusts --- Bailouts (Government policy) --- Finance. --- Delphi Corporation --- Employees --- Pensions.
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Bailouts (Government policy) --- Bank failures --- Financial crises --- Intervention (Federal government)
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Bailouts (Government policy) --- Capitalism --- Financial crises --- International finance
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