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Despite the recent misfortunes of many dotcoms, e-commerce will have major and lasting effects on economic activity. But the rise and fall in the valuations of the first wave of e-commerce companies show that vague promises of distant profits are insufficient. Only business models based on sound economic propositions will survive. This book provides professionals, investors, and MBA students the tools they need to evaluate the wide range of actual and potential e-commerce businesses at the microeconomic level. It demonstrates how these tools can be used to assess a variety of existing applications. Advances in web-based technology--particularly automation and delegation technologies such as smart agents, shopping bots, and bidding elves--support the further growth of e-commerce. In addition to enabling consumers to conduct automated comparisons and sellers to access visitors' background information in real time, such software programs can make decisions for individuals, negotiate with other programs, and participate in online markets. Much of e-commerce's economic value arises from this kind of automation, which not only reduces operating costs but adds value by generating new market interactions. This text teaches how to analyze the added value of such applications, considering consumer behavior, pricing strategies, incentives, and other critical factors. It discusses added value in several e-commerce arenas: online shopping, business-to-business e-commerce, application design, online negotiation (one-to-one trading), online auctions (one-to-many trading), and many-to-many electronic exchanges. Combining insights from several years of microeconomic research as well as from game theory and computer science, it stresses the importance of economic engineering in application design as well as the need for business models to take into account the "total game." As the only serious treatment of the microeconomics of e-commerce, this book should be read by anyone seeking e-commerce solutions or planning to work in the field.
stock markets. --- selling agents. --- retailers. --- protocols. --- procurement systems. --- personalization. --- online auctions. --- naïve bidders. --- matching process. --- marketplaces. --- loyalty. --- late bidding. --- information. --- incentives. --- game theory. --- exchanges. --- deadlines. --- competition. --- bilateral negotiations. --- auction design. --- alternating offers. --- adverse selection. --- Vickrey auction. --- ShopBots. --- English auctions. --- Dutch auctions. --- Bertrand paradox. --- Electronic commerce. --- naïve bidders.
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Neoclassical economics as-sumes that people are highly rational and can reason their way through even the most complex economic problems. In Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Peyton Young argues for a more realistic view in which people have a limited understanding of their environment, are sometimes short-sighted, and occasionally act in perverse ways. He shows how the cumulative experiences of many such individuals coalesce over time into customs, norms, and institutions that govern economic and social life. He develops a theory that predicts how such institutions evolve and characterizes their welfare properties. The ideas are illustrated through a variety of examples, including patterns of residential segregation, rules of the road, claims on property, forms of economic contracts, and norms of equity. The book relies on new results in evolutionary game theory and stochastic dynamical systems theory, many of them originated by the author. It can serve as an introductory text, or be read on its own as a contribution to the study of economic and social institutions.
Game theory. --- Evolutionary economics. --- Institutional economics. --- Social institutions. --- Blume, Larry. --- Gibbs distribution. --- Hofbauer, Josef. --- Hurkens, Sjaak. --- Kandori, Michihiro. --- Kreps, David. --- Levine, David. --- Malouf, Michael. --- Nash, John. --- Owen, Guillermo. --- Schumpeter, Joseph. --- alternating offers model. --- basin of attraction. --- chicken game. --- disequilibrium. --- ergodic process. --- fashion game. --- finite improvement path. --- interpersonal comparisons. --- local conformity. --- marriage game. --- mode of a distribution. --- noise models. --- payoffs. --- proposal game. --- risk factor. --- roles in a game. --- social capital. --- successor state. --- vector field.
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