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Approvisionnement en eau --- Water --- Water services --- Pumping stations --- Distribution. --- Water services --- Pumping stations
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WATER CONSUMPTION --- WATER RESOURCES --- WATER SERVICES --- WATER TABLE --- WATER POLLUTION --- ECONOMIC ANALYSIS --- WATER CONSUMPTION --- WATER RESOURCES --- WATER SERVICES --- WATER TABLE --- WATER POLLUTION --- ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
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WATER SERVICES --- WATER POLLUTION --- WATER TREATMENT --- ECONOMIC ANALYSIS --- WATER LAW --- LEGISLATION --- GROUND WATER --- WASTEWATER --- INDUSTRIAL WATER --- WATER RESOURCES --- EXPOSITIONS --- WATER SERVICES --- WATER POLLUTION --- WATER TREATMENT --- ECONOMIC ANALYSIS --- WATER LAW --- LEGISLATION --- GROUND WATER --- WASTEWATER --- INDUSTRIAL WATER --- WATER RESOURCES --- EXPOSITIONS
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Water --- Sampling. --- Water quality. --- Standards. --- Industrial water --- Chemical composition --- Water treatment chemicals --- Water treatment devices --- Sludge --- Water services --- Water chemistry --- Physicochemical properties --- Ion exchanging --- Water softening --- Purification. --- Analysis.
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HEATING --- HEATING EQUIPMENT --- VENTILATION --- AIR CONDITIONING --- WATER SERVICES --- WATER SUPPLY --- FIRE PROTECTION --- WATER TREATMENT --- CORROSION PREVENTION --- SANITATION --- WASTES --- ILLUMINATING --- ELECTRIC POWER --- AUTOMATIC CONTROL --- NOISE REDUCTION --- COMBUSTION --- REFRIGERATING --- ELEVATORS LIFTS --- AIR CIRCULATION --- WATER --- STEAM --- HEAT TRANSFER --- FLUID FLOW --- STANDARDS --- FUEL OILS --- DISPOSAL --- HEATING --- HEATING EQUIPMENT --- VENTILATION --- AIR CONDITIONING --- WATER SERVICES --- WATER SUPPLY --- FIRE PROTECTION --- WATER TREATMENT --- CORROSION PREVENTION --- SANITATION --- WASTES --- ILLUMINATING --- ELECTRIC POWER --- AUTOMATIC CONTROL --- NOISE REDUCTION --- COMBUSTION --- REFRIGERATING --- ELEVATORS LIFTS --- AIR CIRCULATION --- WATER --- STEAM --- HEAT TRANSFER --- FLUID FLOW --- STANDARDS --- FUEL OILS --- DISPOSAL
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An important infrastructure policy issue for rapidly growing cities in developing countries is how to raise fiscal revenues to finance basic services in a fair and efficient manner. This paper applies hedonic analysis that explicitly accounts for spatial spillovers to derive the value of improved access to water in the Indian cities of Bhopal and Bangalore. The findings suggest that by looking at individual or private benefits only, the analysis may underestimate the overall social welfare from investing in service supply especially among the poorest residents. The paper further demonstrates how policy simulations based on these estimates help prioritize spatial targeting of interventions according to efficiency and equity criteria.
Clean water --- Communities & Human Settlements --- Hand Pump --- Households --- Housing and Human Habitats --- Industry --- Service provision --- Sewer system --- Surface water --- Town Water Supply and Sanitation --- Urban area --- Urban growth --- Water and Industry --- Water Resources --- Water services --- Water supply --- Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions --- Water Use
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An important infrastructure policy issue for rapidly growing cities in developing countries is how to raise fiscal revenues to finance basic services in a fair and efficient manner. This paper applies hedonic analysis that explicitly accounts for spatial spillovers to derive the value of improved access to water in the Indian cities of Bhopal and Bangalore. The findings suggest that by looking at individual or private benefits only, the analysis may underestimate the overall social welfare from investing in service supply especially among the poorest residents. The paper further demonstrates how policy simulations based on these estimates help prioritize spatial targeting of interventions according to efficiency and equity criteria.
Clean water --- Communities & Human Settlements --- Hand Pump --- Households --- Housing and Human Habitats --- Industry --- Service provision --- Sewer system --- Surface water --- Town Water Supply and Sanitation --- Urban area --- Urban growth --- Water and Industry --- Water Resources --- Water services --- Water supply --- Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions --- Water Use
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In public-private partnership transactions in the water sector, one of the alleged concerns is that there is little market competition at the auction stage. This paper casts light on a tradeoff between the competition effect at the auction level and potential economies of scale in service operation. If the authorities design a large-scale public-private partnership water transaction, it is expected to exploit operational scale economies. But the competition effect may have to be sacrificed. The paper shows a risk that the selection of the contract size could be a very restrictive condition that excludes many prospective bidders. Moreover, the paper quantifies the optimal size of public-private partnership contracts in the sector by estimating a cost function. The analysis shows that economies of scale exist but tend to diminish quickly as production increases. When the amount of water sold exceeds about 40 million m3, the statistical significance of economies of scale disappears. And there is no rationale for auctioning the water operation with annual water delivery of more than 400 million m3 under a single contract.
Competitive Bidding --- Industry --- Local Water --- Municipal Water --- Private Participation --- Sewerage Services --- Town Water Supply and Sanitation --- Urban Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water and Industry --- Water Conservation --- Water Districts --- Water Resources --- Water Sector --- Water Services --- Water Supply --- Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions --- Water Utilities
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Why did reform in Santiago improve water system performance, when similar reform attempts under public management in other countries failed? In the late 1980s, Chile planned to privatize Santiago's sanitary works enterprise (EMOS) but instead reformed it under public ownership. It did so through a regulatory framework that mimicked the design of a concession with a private utility, setting tariffs that ensured at least a 7 percent return on assets, creating a neutral regulator independent of ministry intervention, and giving EMOS the right to appeal the regulator's tariff decisions. This reform of Santiago's water system is often cited as a case of successful reform under public management. Comparing a comprehensive measure of welfare with a counterfactual example, Shirley, Xu, and Zuluaga show surprisingly large gains from Santiago's reform, given the relatively good initial conditions. (The gains accrued largely to government and employees, but consumers benefited from improved service and coverage.) Why did reform in Santiago improve water system performance, when similar reform attempts under public management in other countries failed? Chile has a long tradition of private water rights, shaped by early recognition that water is a scarce and tradable private good; The reformed regulatory framework was designed to attract private investors to the water system and to motivate them to operate efficiently and expand the system; Chile's unique electoral institutions sustained this framework under state operation after democracy was restored; Chile's strong bureaucratic norms and institutions (permitting little corruption), combined with Santiago's relatively low-cost water system, permitted prices that effectively increased quasi-rents for investing in the system while minimizing the risk of inefficiency or monopoly rents. The authors also address the question of why EMOS was reformed but not privatized, and what the costs of not privatizing were. The system was privatized in 1999, but the changes from privatization are likely to be less significant than those introduced in 1989-90. This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to draw lessons from regulatory reform and understand political and institutional change. This study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Competition and Privatization in Urban Water Supply (RPO 682-64). Mary Shirley may be contacted at mshirley@worldbank.org.
Bill Collection --- Cubic Meters --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory and Research --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Industry --- Infrastructure Economics and Finance --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Number Of Connections --- Price Of Water --- Private Participation in Infrastructure --- Private Sector Development --- Private Utility --- Public Works --- Sewage Treatment --- Sewerage Services --- Tariff Decisions --- Tariff Setting --- Tariff Setting Process --- Town Water Supply and Sanitation --- Urban Water --- Urban Water Supply --- Urban Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water and Industry --- Water Companies --- Water Conservation --- Water Consumption --- Water Resources --- Water Sector --- Water Services --- Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions --- Water Supply and Systems --- Water System --- Water Systems --- Water Tariffs
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