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This paper provides new evidence on the unique role of trade credit and contracting terms as a way for both sellers and buyers to mange business risk. The authors use a novel and unique dataset on almost 30,000 supplier contracts for 56 large buyers and more than 24,000 suppliers in Europe and North America. The sample of buyers and suppliers includes firms of varying size, investment grade, and sectors. The paper finds evidence in support of four important, and not mutually exclusive, reasons for trade credit: 1) as a method of financing; 2) as a means of price discrimination; 3) as a bond assuring buyers of product quality; and 4) as a screening mechanism to gauge buyer default risk. In particular, the analysis finds that the largest and most creditworthy buyers receive contracts with the longest maturities, as measured by net days, from smaller, investment grade suppliers. In comparison, early payment discounts seem to be used as a risk management tool to limit the potential nonpayment risk of trade credit. Early payment discounts are generally offered to smaller, non-investment grade buyers. The results suggest that contract terms are jointly determined by supplier and buyer characteristics.
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Provisional Agenda for the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee.
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Provisional Agenda for the Thirty-Ninth Meeting of the International Monetary and Financial Committee.
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Developing economies can strengthen their financial systems by implementing the main elements of global regulatory reform. But to build an effective prudential framework, they may need to adapt international standards taking into account the sophistication and size of their financial institutions, the relevance of different financial operations in their market, the granularity of information available and the capacity of their supervisors. Under a proportionate application of the Basel standards, smaller institutions with less complex business models would be subject to a simpler regulatory framework that enhances the resilience of the financial sector without generating disproportionate compliance costs. This paper provides guidance on how non-Basel Committee member countries could incorporate banks’ capital and liquidity standards into their framework. It builds on the experience gained by the authors in the course of their work in providing technical assistance on—and assessing compliance with—international standards in banking supervision.
Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Financial services law & regulation --- Banking --- Liquidity risk --- Liquidity requirements --- Basel III --- Basel Core Principles --- Banks and banking --- State supervision --- Financial risk management
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Advocates for internal model-based capital regulation argue that this approach will reduce costs and remove distortions that are created by rules-based capital regulations. These claims are examined using a Merton-style model of deposit insurance. Analysis shows that internal model-based capital estimates are biased by safety-net-generated funding subsidies that convey to bank shareholders when market and credit risk regulatory capital requirements are set using bank internal model estimates. These subsidies are not uniform across the risk spectrum, and, as a consequence, internal model regulatory capital requirements will cause distortions in bank lending behavior.
Banks and Banking --- Insurance --- Investments: Bonds --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Insurance Companies --- Actuarial Studies --- Financial services law & regulation --- Banking --- Investment & securities --- Insurance & actuarial studies --- Credit risk --- Market risk --- Bonds --- Financial risk management --- Banks and banking
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This paper investigates the determinants of exchange rate regime choice in 93 countries during 1990-98. Cross-country analysis of variations in international reserves and nominal exchange rates shows that (i) truly fixed pegs and independent floats differ significantly from other regimes and (ii) significant discrepancies exist between de jure and de facto flexibility. Regression results highlight the influence of political factors (political instability and government temptation to inflate), adequacy of reserves, dollarization (currency substitution), exchange rate risk exposure, and some traditional optimal currency area criteria, in particular capital mobility, on exchange rate regime selection.
Banks and Banking --- Foreign Exchange --- International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions --- Open Economy Macroeconomics --- Economic Development: General --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Currency --- Foreign exchange --- Financial services law & regulation --- Exchange rate arrangements --- Exchange rate flexibility --- Conventional peg --- Exchange rates --- Exchange rate risk --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Financial risk management --- United States
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The Czech government placed high priority on implementing and observing the international standards relevant for financial stability. The supervisory staff exhibited a high understanding of best international supervisory standards, policies, and practices. Nevertheless, the report noted significant weaknesses in laws governing debtor-creditor relations, inefficiencies in the judicial process, cumbersome administrative requirements, and low supervisory skills, and the need to audit computer-based systems and evaluate risk management systems. Enhancing the legal and regulatory framework is required to build up supervisory capacity, and to increase attention to supervisory coordination and cooperation.
Banks and Banking --- Finance: General --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Financial services law & regulation --- Banking --- Credit risk --- Market risk --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Basel Core Principles --- Financial risk management --- Banks and banking --- State supervision --- Czech Republic
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We contrast how monetary policy affects intangible relative to tangible investment. We document that the stock prices of firms with more intangible assets react less to monetary policy shocks, as identified from Fed Funds futures movements around FOMC announcements. Consistent with the stock price results, instrumental variable local projections confirm that the total investment in firms with more intangible assets responds less to monetary policy, and that intangible investment responds less to monetary policy compared to tangible investment. We identify two mechanisms behind these results. First, firms with intangible assets use less collateral, and therefore respond less to the credit channel of monetary policy. Second, intangible assets have higher depreciation rates, so interest rate changes affect their user cost of capital relatively less.
Investments: General --- Macroeconomics --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Investment --- Capital --- Intangible Capital --- Capacity --- Monetary Policy --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Price Level --- Inflation --- Deflation --- Monetary Systems --- Standards --- Regimes --- Government and the Monetary System --- Payment Systems --- Monetary economics --- Depreciation --- Intangible capital --- Asset prices --- Currencies --- Investment policy --- National accounts --- Prices --- Money --- Saving and investment --- United States
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We contrast how monetary policy affects intangible relative to tangible investment. We document that the stock prices of firms with more intangible assets react less to monetary policy shocks, as identified from Fed Funds futures movements around FOMC announcements. Consistent with the stock price results, instrumental variable local projections confirm that the total investment in firms with more intangible assets responds less to monetary policy, and that intangible investment responds less to monetary policy compared to tangible investment. We identify two mechanisms behind these results. First, firms with intangible assets use less collateral, and therefore respond less to the credit channel of monetary policy. Second, intangible assets have higher depreciation rates, so interest rate changes affect their user cost of capital relatively less.
United States --- Investments: General --- Macroeconomics --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Investment --- Capital --- Intangible Capital --- Capacity --- Monetary Policy --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Price Level --- Inflation --- Deflation --- Monetary Systems --- Standards --- Regimes --- Government and the Monetary System --- Payment Systems --- Monetary economics --- Depreciation --- Intangible capital --- Asset prices --- Currencies --- Investment policy --- National accounts --- Prices --- Money --- Saving and investment
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This note, prepared ahead of the G20 Summit (November 15), builds upon the points laid out in the Managing Director’s letter to the Heads of State and Government (November 9). It lays out two tasks ahead for policy makers. Policies for now should cover:(i)implementing and coordinating policies to sustain demand; (ii) providing liquidity support to emerging economies; and (iii) protecting low-income countries. Longer term reforms of the financial architecture should touch upon:(i) the design of financial regulation; (ii) a better way of assessing systemic risk; and (iii) mechanisms for more effective actions for crisis prevention and resolution.
Economic assistance --- International Monetary Fund --- Planning. --- Internationaal monetair fonds --- International monetary fund --- Finance: General --- Financial Risk Management --- Industries: Financial Services --- Financial Crises --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Portfolio Choice --- Investment Decisions --- General Financial Markets: Government Policy and Regulation --- Financial Institutions and Services: General --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Finance --- Financial crises --- Early warning systems --- Liquidity --- Systemic risk --- Financial sector --- Crisis management --- Economics --- Financial risk management --- Financial services industry
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