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Standards and technical regulations exist to protect consumer safety or to achieve other goals, such as ensuring the interoperability of telecommunications systems, for example. Standards and technical regulations can, however, raise substantially both start-up and production costs for firms. Maskus, Otsuki, and Wilson develop econometric models to provide the first estimates of the incremental production costs for firms in developing nations in conforming to standards imposed by major importing countries. They use firm-level data generated from 16 developing countries in the World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Survey Database. Their findings indicate that standards do increase short-run production costs by requiring additional inputs of labor and capital. A 1 percent increase in investment to meet compliance costs in importing countries raises variable production costs by between 0.06 and 0.13 percent, a statistically significant increase. The authors also find that the fixed costs of compliance are nontrivial-approximately USD 425,000 per firm, or about 4.7 percent of value added on average. The results may be interpreted as one indication of the extent to which standards and technical regulations might constitute barriers to trade. While the relative impact on costs of compliance is relatively small, these costs can be decisive factors driving export success for companies. In this context, there is scope for considering that the costs associated with more limited exports to countries with import regulations may not conform to World Trade Organization rules encouraging harmonization of regulations to international standards, for example. Policy solutions then might be sought by identifying the extent to which subsidies or public support programs are needed to offset the cost disadvantage that arises from nonharmonized technical regulations.

Administrative and Regulatory Law --- Capital --- Competitiveness --- Cost Functions --- Damages --- Econometric Models --- Economic Theory and Research --- Exports --- Fixed Costs --- Inputs --- Investment --- Labor Policies --- Law and Development --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Markets --- Production --- Production Costs --- Public Sector Regulation --- Social Protections and Labor --- Tariff Barriers --- Telecommunications --- Trade --- Trade Disputes --- Value --- Value Added --- World Trade Organization --- WTO

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Standards and technical regulations exist to protect consumer safety or to achieve other goals, such as ensuring the interoperability of telecommunications systems, for example. Standards and technical regulations can, however, raise substantially both start-up and production costs for firms. Maskus, Otsuki, and Wilson develop econometric models to provide the first estimates of the incremental production costs for firms in developing nations in conforming to standards imposed by major importing countries. They use firm-level data generated from 16 developing countries in the World Bank Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Survey Database. Their findings indicate that standards do increase short-run production costs by requiring additional inputs of labor and capital. A 1 percent increase in investment to meet compliance costs in importing countries raises variable production costs by between 0.06 and 0.13 percent, a statistically significant increase. The authors also find that the fixed costs of compliance are nontrivial-approximately USD 425,000 per firm, or about 4.7 percent of value added on average. The results may be interpreted as one indication of the extent to which standards and technical regulations might constitute barriers to trade. While the relative impact on costs of compliance is relatively small, these costs can be decisive factors driving export success for companies. In this context, there is scope for considering that the costs associated with more limited exports to countries with import regulations may not conform to World Trade Organization rules encouraging harmonization of regulations to international standards, for example. Policy solutions then might be sought by identifying the extent to which subsidies or public support programs are needed to offset the cost disadvantage that arises from nonharmonized technical regulations.

Administrative and Regulatory Law --- Capital --- Competitiveness --- Cost Functions --- Damages --- Econometric Models --- Economic Theory and Research --- Exports --- Fixed Costs --- Inputs --- Investment --- Labor Policies --- Law and Development --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Markets --- Production --- Production Costs --- Public Sector Regulation --- Social Protections and Labor --- Tariff Barriers --- Telecommunications --- Trade --- Trade Disputes --- Value --- Value Added --- World Trade Organization --- WTO

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This Selected Issues paper investigates the direct and indirect exposure of the Czech Republic to these external risks. The Czech Republic is a small open economy that has become increasingly reliant on export-driven growth over the last three decades. Domestic value-added in foreign exports as a share of gross exports in the Czech Republic is higher than the average share of the European Union 28. Services have a relatively low contribution to value-added in gross exports. Given the high integration of the Czech Republic into global value chains, it is crucial to take supply chain linkages into account when assessing the impact of trade shocks. The exposure to Germany is even more pronounced at the sectoral level. Manufacturing of machinery and transportation vehicles account for a large share of exports and imports in the Czech Republic. Although the impact of the US-China trade disputes on the Czech Republic would likely be limited, a hard Brexit scenario or lower demand in Germany could have sizable effects.

Fiscal policy --- Economic development --- Development, Economic --- Economic growth --- Growth, Economic --- Economic policy --- Economics --- Statics and dynamics (Social sciences) --- Development economics --- Resource curse --- Tax policy --- Taxation --- Finance, Public --- Government policy --- Exports and Imports --- Globalization --- International Economics --- Trade: General --- Trade Policy --- International Trade Organizations --- Globalization: General --- Economic Integration --- International economics --- Public finance & taxation --- Exports --- Imports --- Tariffs --- Global value chains --- Trade disputes --- International trade --- Taxes --- Tariff --- Czech Republic

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The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? In Why Adjudicate?, Christina Davis investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens. Davis demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO. Democratic checks and balances bias the trade policy process toward public lawsuits and away from informal settlements. Trade officials use legal complaints to manage domestic politics and defend trade interests. WTO dispute settlement enables states and domestic groups to signal resolve more effectively, thereby enhancing the information available to policymakers and reducing the risk of a trade war. Davis establishes her argument with data on trade disputes and landmark cases, including the Boeing-Airbus controversy over aircraft subsidies, disagreement over Chinese intellectual property rights, and Japan's repeated challenges of U.S. steel industry protection. In her analysis of foreign trade barriers against U.S. exports, Davis explains why the United States gains better outcomes for cases taken to formal dispute settlement than for those negotiated. Case studies of Peru and Vietnam show that legal action can also benefit developing countries.

Foreign trade regulation. --- Administrative procedure. --- Adjective administrative law --- Adjudication, Administrative --- Administrative adjudication --- Administrative procedure --- Administrative rule making --- Regulatory reform --- Rule making, Administrative --- Procedure (Law) --- Export and import controls --- Foreign trade control --- Foreign trade regulation --- Import and export controls --- International trade --- International trade control --- International trade regulation --- Prohibited exports and imports --- Trade regulation --- Law and legislation --- World Trade Organization. --- Biśva Bāṇijya Saṃsthā --- Dėlkhiĭn Khudaldaany Baĭguullaga --- DTÖ --- Dünya Ticaret Örgütü --- Munaẓẓamat al-Tijārah al-ʻĀlamīyah --- O.M.C. --- OMC --- ʻOngkān Kānkhā Lōk --- Organisation mondiale du commerce --- Organização Mundial do Comércio --- Organización Mundial de Comercio --- Organización Mundial del Comercio --- Organizația Mondială de Comerț --- Organizzazione mondiale del commercio --- Organizzazione mondiale per il commercio --- Qaṅgkār Bāṇijjakamm Bibhab Lok --- Sāzmān-i Tijārat-i Jahānī --- Shi jie mao yi zu zhi --- SOT --- Světová obchodní organizace --- Svitova orhanizat︠s︡ii︠a︡ torhivli --- Światowa Organizacja Handlu --- Tổ chức thương mại thế giới --- Viśva Vyapāra Saṅgaṭhana --- Vsemirnai︠a︡ torgovai︠a︡ organizat︠s︡ii︠a︡ --- VTO --- W.T.O. --- Welthandelsorganisation --- World Trade Organisation --- WTO --- منظمة التجارة العالمية --- 世界貿易組織 --- 世界贸易组织 --- General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization) --- E-books --- Political sociology --- Foreign trade policy --- China. --- Japan. --- Japanese trade policy. --- Peru. --- U.S. Congress. --- U.S. trade policy. --- United States. --- Vietnam. --- WTO. --- accountability. --- adjudication. --- bargaining. --- bureaucracy. --- conflict. --- cooperation. --- courts. --- delegation of authority. --- democracy. --- democratic politics. --- developing countries. --- dispute settlement. --- domestic constraints. --- domestic politics. --- exports. --- foreign economic policy. --- free trade. --- geopolitics. --- industry lobbying. --- international politics. --- international relations. --- international trade law. --- international trade. --- labeling. --- legalization. --- liberalization. --- politicization. --- trade barriers. --- trade disputes. --- trade law enforcement. --- trade policy. --- trade.