Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

This book argues that explaining judicial independence-considered the fundamental question of comparative law and politics-requires a perspective that spans the democracy/autocracy divide. Rather than seeking separate explanations in each regime context, in The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in Dictatorship and Democracy, Brad Epperly argues that political competition is a salient factor in determining levels of de facto judicial independence across regime type, and in autocracies a factor of far greater import. This is because a full "insurance" account of independence requires looking not only at the likelihood those in power might lose elections but also the variable risks associated with such an outcome, risks that are far higher for autocrats. First demonstrating that courts can and do provide insurance to former leaders, he then shows via exhaustive cross-national analyses that competition's effects are far higher in autocratic regimes, providing the first evidence for the causal nature of the relationship. Epperly argues that these findings differ from existing case study research because in democratic regimes, a lack of political competition means incumbents target the de jure independence of courts. This argument is illustrated via in-depth case study of the Hungarian Constitutional Court after the country's 2010 <"constitutional coup,>" and then tested globally. Blending formal theory, observational and instrumental variables models, and elite interviews of leading Hungarian legal scholars and judges, Epperly offers a new framework for understanding judicial independence that integrates explanations of both de jure and de facto independence in both democratic and autocratic regimes.

Judicial independence. --- Independence of the judiciary --- Independent judiciary --- Judicial power --- Separation of powers

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

The Framers of the American Constitution took special pains to ensure that the governing principles of the republic were insulated from the reach of simple majorities. Only super-majoritarian amendments could modify these fundamental constitutional dictates. The Framers established a judicial branch shielded from direct majoritarian political accountability to protect and enforce these constitutional limits. Paradoxically, only a counter-majoritarian judicial branch could ensure the continued vitality of our representational form of government. This important lesson of the paradox of American democracy has been challenged and often ignored by office holders and legal scholars. This book provocatively defends the centrality of these special protections of judicial independence.

Judicial independence --- Judicial power --- Independence of the judiciary --- Independent judiciary --- Separation of powers --- Constitutional law --- Democracy

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

"This volume challenges the conventional wisdom about judicial independence in China and its relationship to economic growth, rule of law, human rights protection, and democracy. The volume adopts an interdisciplinary approach that places China's judicial reforms and the struggle to enhance the professionalism, authority, and independence of the judiciary within a broader comparative and developmental framework. Contributors debate the merits of international best practices and their applicability to China; provide new theoretical perspectives and empirical studies; and discuss civil, criminal, and administrative cases in urban and rural courts. This volume contributes to several fields, including law and development and the promotion of rule of law and good governance, globalization studies, neo-institutionalism and studies of the judiciary, the emerging literature on judicial reforms in authoritarian regimes, Asian legal studies, and comparative law more generally"--Provided by publisher.

Judicial independence --- Independence of the judiciary --- Independent judiciary --- Judicial power --- Separation of powers --- Law --- General and Others

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Het doel van deze masterproef is het kritisch weergeven en evalueren van de tuchtwetgeving en de bijhorende tuchtprocedure binnen justitie. Er wordt een antwoord geformuleerd op de vraag in hoeverre de tuchtprocedure als voldoende effectief kan beschouwd worden om de kwaliteit te garanderen van de werking van justitie. Gezien er relatief weinig literatuur voorhanden is omtrent dit onderwerp werd geopteerd voor een kwalitatief onderzoek aan de hand van diepte-interviews. Deze interviews peilden naar de percepties van onder andere de voorzitters van de rechtbank van eerste aanleg in Brugge en Ieper, de ondervoorzitter van de rechtbank van eerste aanleg in Gent en tevens lid van de Hoge Raad voor de Justitie, een medewerker van de beleidscel Justitie, de Gentse procureur-generaal, twee (gepensioneerde) rechters, een vrederechter en tevens lid van de Adviesraad van de magistratuur, de bestuurder departement deontologie bij de Orde van Vlaamse Balies, de permanent afgevaardigde van het ACV voor Hoven en Rechtbanken, de justitiespecialist van een politieke partij en tenslotte de afdelingsvoorzitter van het Hof van Cassatie die tevens voorzitter is van de Nederlandstalige kamer van de Nationale Tuchtraad. Door deze brede selectie aan respondenten kunnen de knelpunten uit de literatuur getoetst worden aan hun ervaring uit de praktijk. Bovendien wordt binnen dit artikel tevens aandacht besteed aan het wetsvoorstel om de tucht bij de magistratuur te hervormen.

Disciplinary law. --- Disciplinary proceeding. --- Justitie. --- Magistracy. --- Magistratuur. --- S140-publiek-recht. --- S142-gerechtelijk-privaatrecht. --- The judiciary. --- Tuchtprocedure. --- Tuchtrecht.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

"This volume challenges the conventional wisdom about judicial independence in China and its relationship to economic growth, rule of law, human rights protection, and democracy. The volume adopts an interdisciplinary approach that places China's judicial reforms and the struggle to enhance the professionalism, authority, and independence of the judiciary within a broader comparative and developmental framework. Contributors debate the merits of international best practices and their applicability to China; provide new theoretical perspectives and empirical studies; and discuss civil, criminal, and administrative cases in urban and rural courts. This volume contributes to several fields, including law and development and the promotion of rule of law and good governance, globalization studies, neo-institutionalism and studies of the judiciary, the emerging literature on judicial reforms in authoritarian regimes, Asian legal studies, and comparative law more generally"--Provided by publisher.

Judicial independence --- Indépendance judiciaire --- S08/0350 --- S11/0920 --- China: Law and legislation--General works and codices: since 1949 --- China: Social sciences--Corruption --- Indépendance judiciaire --- Independence of the judiciary --- Independent judiciary --- Judicial power --- Separation of powers --- Judicial independence - China --- Chine