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This paper reports on a randomized evaluation of two teacher incentive programs, which were conducted in a nationally representative sample of 420 public primary schools in Guinea. In 140 schools, high-performing teachers were rewarded in-kind, with the value of goods increasing with level of performance. In another 140 schools, high-performing teachers received a certificate and public recognition from the government. After one year, the in-kind program improved learning by 0.24 standard deviations, while the recognition treatment had a smaller and statistically insignificant impact. After two years, the effect from the in-kind program was smaller (0.16 standard deviations) and not significant; the paper provides suggestive evidence that the reduction may be due to the onset of an Ebola outbreak. The effects of the recognition program remained small and insignificant. The effects differed by teacher gender: for female teachers, both programs were equally effective, while for male teachers, only the in-kind program led to statistically significant effects.

Education --- Education Reform and Management --- Effective Schools and Teachers --- Learning Outcomes --- Primary Education --- Recognition Rewards --- Student Achievement --- Teacher Incentives

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Few would contest that teachers are a very important determinant of whether students learn in school. Yet, in the face of compelling evidence that many students are not learning what they are expected to learn, how to improve teacher performance has been the focus of much policy debate in rich and poor countries. This paper examines how incentives, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary, influence teacher effort. Using school survey data from Lao PDR, it estimates new measures of teacher effort, including the number of hours that teachers spend preparing for classes and teacher provision of private tutoring classes outside class hours. The estimation results indicate that teachers increase effort in response to non-pecuniary incentives, such as greater teacher autonomy over teaching materials, and monitoring mechanism, such as the existence of an active parent-teacher association and the ability of school principals to dismiss teachers. Methodologically, the paper provides a detailed derivation of a simultaneous ordinary least squares-probit model with school random effects that can jointly estimate teacher work hours and tutoring provision.

Education --- Education For All --- Joint Probit-Ols --- Poverty Reduction --- Primary Education --- Private Tutoring --- Random Effects --- Secondary Education --- Teacher Effort --- Teacher Incentives --- Teaching and Learning --- Tertiary Education

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Pay levels for public sector workers-and especially teachers-are a constant source of controversy. In many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, protests and strikes suggest that pay is low, while simple comparisons to average national income per capita suggest that it is high. This study presents data on teacher pay from 15 African countries, along with five comparator countries from other regions. The results suggest that in several (seven) countries, teachers' monthly salaries are lower than other formal sector workers with comparable levels of education and experience. However, in all of those countries, teachers report working significantly fewer hours than other workers, so that their hourly wage is higher. Teachers who report fewer hours are no more likely to report holding a second job, although teachers overall are nearly two times more likely to hold a second job than other workers. With higher national incomes, the absolute value of teacher salaries rises, but they fall as a percentage of income per capita. The study explores variation across types of teacher contracts, the association between teacher pay and student performance, and the association between teacher pay premia and other aspects of economies.

Education --- Education Outcomes --- Effective Schools and Teachers --- Labor Market --- Labor Markets --- Public Sector Development --- Public Sector Economics --- Public Sector Wage --- Social Protections and Labor --- Teacher Incentives --- Teacher Pay --- Wages, Compensation and Benefits