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The global financial crisis has already led to sharp downturns in the developing world. In the past, international aid has been able to offset partially the effects of crises that began in the developing world, but because this crisis began in the wealthy countries, donors may be less willing or able to increase aid in this crisis. Not only have donor-country incomes fallen, but the cause of the drop - the banking and financial-sector crisis - may exacerbate the effect on aid flows because of its heavy fiscal costs. This paper estimates how donor-country banking crises have affected aid flows in the past, using panel data from 24 donor countries between 1977 and 2007. The analysis finds that banking crises in donor countries are associated with a substantial additional fall in aid flows, beyond any income-related effects, perhaps because of the high fiscal costs of crisis and the debt hangover in the post-crisis periods. In most specifications, aid flows from crisis-affected countries fall by an average of 20 to 25 percent (relative to the counterfactual) and bottom out only about a decade after the banking crisis hits. In addition, the results confirm that donor-country incomes are robustly related to per-capita aid flows, with an elasticity of about 3. Because all donor countries are being hit hard by the current global recession, and several have also suffered banking-sector crises, there are reasons to expect that aid could fall by a significant amount (again, relative to the counterfactual) in the coming years - just when aid may be most clearly justified to help smooth exogenous shocks to developing countries.

Banks & Banking Reform --- Capita income --- Debt Markets --- Development Economics & Aid Effectiveness --- Domestic needs --- Economic conditions --- Economic Conditions and Volatility --- Economic downturns --- Economic outlook --- Economic uncertainty --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial conditions --- Financial crises --- Financial volatility --- Income --- Income levels --- Inflation --- International country risk guide --- International monetary fund --- Labor Policies --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market volatility --- Per capita income --- Social Protections and Labor --- Standard errors --- Systemic banking crises --- Transition economies

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September 2000 - Certain measures add greatly to the fiscal cost of banking crises: unlimited deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidity support, repeated recapitalization, debtor bail-outs, and regulatory forbearance. The findings in this paper tilt the balance in favor of a strict rather than an accommodating approach to crisis resolution. In recent decades, a majority of countries have experienced a systemic banking crisis requiring a major-and expensive-overhaul of their banking system. Not only do banking crises hit the budget with outlays that must be absorbed by higher taxes (or spending cuts), but they are costly in terms of forgone economic output. Many different policy recommendations have been made for limiting the cost of crises, but there has been little systematic effort to see which recommendations work in practice. Honohan and Klingebiel try to quantify the extent to which fiscal outlays incurred in resolving banking distress can be attributed to crisis management measures of a particular kind adopted by the government in the early years of the crisis. They find evidence that certain crisis management strategies appear to add greatly to fiscal costs: unlimited deposit guarantees, open-ended liquidity support, repeated recapitalization, debtor bail-outs, and regulatory forbearance. Their findings clearly tilt the balance in favor of a strict rather than an accommodating approach to crisis resolution. At the very least, regulatory authorities who choose an accommodating or gradualist approach to an emerging crisis must be sure they have some other way to control risk-taking. This paper-a product of Finance, Development Research Group, and Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department-is part of a larger effort in the Bank to examine the effects of financial sector regulation. The authors may be contacted at phonohan@worldbank.org or dklingebiel@worldbank.org.

Bank --- Banking --- Banking Crises --- Banking System --- Banking Systems --- Banks --- Banks and Banking Reform --- Central Banks --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Debt Markets --- Deposit Guarantees --- Economic Theory and Research --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Crisis Management and Restructuring --- Financial Institutions --- Financial Literacy --- Financial Systems --- Gambling --- Governments --- Inflation --- Liquidation --- Loans --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Real Sector --- Regulatory Forbearance --- Strategies --- Systemic Banking Crises --- Taxation

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

The global financial crisis has already led to sharp downturns in the developing world. In the past, international aid has been able to offset partially the effects of crises that began in the developing world, but because this crisis began in the wealthy countries, donors may be less willing or able to increase aid in this crisis. Not only have donor-country incomes fallen, but the cause of the drop - the banking and financial-sector crisis - may exacerbate the effect on aid flows because of its heavy fiscal costs. This paper estimates how donor-country banking crises have affected aid flows in the past, using panel data from 24 donor countries between 1977 and 2007. The analysis finds that banking crises in donor countries are associated with a substantial additional fall in aid flows, beyond any income-related effects, perhaps because of the high fiscal costs of crisis and the debt hangover in the post-crisis periods. In most specifications, aid flows from crisis-affected countries fall by an average of 20 to 25 percent (relative to the counterfactual) and bottom out only about a decade after the banking crisis hits. In addition, the results confirm that donor-country incomes are robustly related to per-capita aid flows, with an elasticity of about 3. Because all donor countries are being hit hard by the current global recession, and several have also suffered banking-sector crises, there are reasons to expect that aid could fall by a significant amount (again, relative to the counterfactual) in the coming years - just when aid may be most clearly justified to help smooth exogenous shocks to developing countries.

Banks & Banking Reform --- Capita income --- Debt Markets --- Development Economics & Aid Effectiveness --- Domestic needs --- Economic conditions --- Economic Conditions and Volatility --- Economic downturns --- Economic outlook --- Economic uncertainty --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial conditions --- Financial crises --- Financial volatility --- Income --- Income levels --- Inflation --- International country risk guide --- International monetary fund --- Labor Policies --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market volatility --- Per capita income --- Social Protections and Labor --- Standard errors --- Systemic banking crises --- Transition economies