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This paper examines whether and how rainfall shocks affect tariff setting in the agricultural sector. In a model of strategic trade policy, the authors show that the impact of a negative rainfall shock on optimal import tariffs is generally ambiguous, depending on the weight placed by the domestic policy maker on tariff revenue, profits and the consumer surplus. The more weight placed on domestic profits, the more likely it is that the policy maker will respond to a rainfall shortage by reducing import tariffs. These findings are robust to alternative assumptions about market structure and the timing of the game. Using detailed panel data on applied tariffs and rainfall for 70 nations, the authors find robust evidence that rainfall shortages generally induce policy makers to set lower tariffs on agricultural imports.

Agribusiness --- Agriculture --- Economic Theory & Research --- Free Trade --- International Economics & Trade --- Markets and Market Access --- Optimal tariffs --- Rainfall shocks --- Science of Climate Change --- Strategic trade policy

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This paper provides a first analysis of optimal offset policies by a "policy bloc" of fossil fuel importers implementing a climate policy, facing a (non-policy) fringe of other importers, and a bloc of fuel exporters. The policy bloc uses either a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade scheme, jointly with a fully efficient offset mechanism for reducing emissions in the fringe. The policy bloc is then shown to prefer a tax over a cap-and-trade scheme, since 1) a tax extracts more rent as fuel exporters reduce the export price, and more so when the policy bloc is larger relative to the fringe; and 2) offsets are more favorable to the policy bloc under a tax than under a cap-and-trade scheme. The optimal offset price under a carbon tax is half the tax rate; under a cap-and-trade scheme the quota and offset price are equal. The domestic carbon and offset price are both higher under a tax than under a cap-and-trade scheme when the policy bloc is small; when it is larger the offset price can be higher under a cap-and-trade scheme. Fringe countries gain by mitigation in the policy bloc, and more under a carbon tax since the fuel import price is lower, and since the price obtained when selling offsets is often higher (always so for a large fringe).

Carbon Emissions --- Carbon Taxes, Cap-And-Trade Schemes --- Climate Change Economics --- Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases --- Climate Policy --- Energy --- Energy Production and Transportation --- Environment --- Environment and Energy Efficiency --- Markets and Market Access --- Strategic Trade Policy