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Publikacja prezentuje przekrojowe spojrzenie na konsekwencje uczestnictwa Polski w Jednolitym Rynku Europejskim (JRE). Przedstawiono w niej syntetycznie problematykę korzyści z członkostwa Polski w UE oraz szacunki efektów gospodarczych udziału w JRE i napływu transferów (funduszy strukturalnych i funduszy związanych ze wspólną polityką rolną), a także bilans korzyści i kosztów wynikający dla Polski z czterech swobód JRE: przepływu towarów, usług, kapitału i pracowników. Tom zawiera również refleksję na temat znaczenia funduszy europejskich dla rozwoju Polski oraz bilansu korzyści i kosztów członkostwa dla polskiego sektora rolno-spożywczego.

European Union. --- Politics / Political Sciences --- Economy --- International relations/trade --- Security and defense

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The political, military and economic parameters of German power influence the vision of the international order that Berlin favours. Politically, Germany is a regional power in the EU with considerable diplomatic potential. Economically, it is the world's third largest power with growing global trade and investment links. At the same time, Germany's military potential is limited and the German strategic culture makes the country sceptical about the use of military instruments. Berlin is thus essentially interested in maintaining peace and stability, both in Europe and globally, and in developing diplomatic mechanisms to manage regional and global crises and conflicts. // The German preference for dialogue and compromise in conflict situations in the regional and global dimensions may increasingly pose a risk to maintaining the cohesion and credibility of NATO – both from the perspective of the USA and Germany’s allies from Central-Eastern and Northern Europe.

Politics / Political Sciences --- Politics --- Security and defense --- Military policy --- North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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Pytanie o rolę sił zbrojnych w przestrzeni informacyjnej jest w istocie pytaniem o rolę czynnika siły w polityce wewnętrznej i zewnętrznej państwa. W Rosji był on i nadal jest traktowany jako wyznacznik jej pozycji mocarstwowej, instrument odstraszania, nacisków i budowy sfer wpływów. Dostosowana do takich zadań wojskowa strategia informacyjna przewiduje walkę na wielu frontach: wewnętrznym i zewnętrznym, informacyjno-psychologicznym, cybernetycznym i in. Jej widoczne konsekwencje przejawiły się nie tylko w militaryzacji języka polityki i propagandy, narzucaniu opinii publicznej narracji o wydanej Rosji wojnie informacyjnej oraz diametralnej zmianie wizerunku armii. Rosja siłą domaga się respektowania swoich stref wpływów w sąsiedztwie (agresja wobec Ukrainy, interwencja zbrojna w Syrii). Burzy europejską i globalną architekturę bezpieczeństwa, przedstawiając się zarazem jako gwarant procesów pokojowych. Prezentując się jako biegun siły, manifestuje prawo do współdecydowania w kwestiach bezpieczeństwa globalnego.

Politics / Political Sciences --- Politics --- Security and defense --- Military policy --- Geopolitics --- Russia (Federation) --- Armed Forces.

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(English edition) Throughout the totalitarian rule of the regime of Slobodan Milošević and his henchmen, which lasted for over a decade, the country’s prisons remained shut to public scrutiny. Information about the state of human rights of the prisoners and the conditions in which they served their sentences was the exclusive privilege of the state authorities directly involved and of the individuals and institutions concerned with the matter for purposes of scientific research. The question of prisoners’ human rights was completely marginalized by war, crimes, economic hardship and daily violations of citizens’ human rights and freedoms up to 5 October 2000. For many a convict, being locked away to serve a sentence of imprisonment did not mean mere deprivation of liberty for a set period of time, but also the start of a cruel struggle for survival in the gloom of lawlessness, corruption, torture, inhuman conditions and society’s total lack of interest in his or her life behind bars. It was only after widespread prison rioting broke out in November 2000 that the public’s attention was drawn to the conditions in which the prisoners served their sentences. The prisoners put out announcements throwing light on the substandard and inhuman conditions prevailing in Serbia’s penitentiaries and prisons. During the riots, groups and individual prisoners made statements complaining that the prison conditions were far below the levels set by relevant international standards and domestic prison rules. The prisoners alleged serious violations of their physical and psychological integrity, humiliating and degrading treatment, unjust punishment and general arbitrary treatment by prison personnel. They complained of, among other things, torture by beating, lack of minimum personal hygiene facilities, absence of medical treatment and health care, and corruption among prison administrative staff. Some of the allegations and complaints were partly confirmed by competent officials of the Ministry of Justice. As a palliative for the utterly unsatisfactory prison conditions, federal and republican amnesty laws were duly introduced to be finally adopted respectively on 26 February 2001 and 13 February 2001. Nonetheless, although a number of convicts were fully amnestied and a percentage of sentences commuted, the conditions in which prisoners served their sentenced remained unchanged. In addition to the factors mentioned above, the inhuman conditions in Serbia’s prisons endured and multiplied also owing to the country’s isolation of many years, during which time no international organization other than the International Red Cross was granted access to its prisons. Domestic non-governmental organizations were also kept at arm’s length and only rarely allowed to see what went on inside. In view of the circumstances enumerated above, it was clearly necessary to introduce continuous monitoring of prisons by an independent, non-governmental institution in order to obtain a realistic picture of the prison conditions. The new government is aware that admission to the Council of Europe and to other international organizations depends in part on the conditions in which sentenced persons serve their prison sentences, as well as that the public must be informed about those conditions. So, after presenting the concept and objectives of the Prison Monitoring project, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia was granted permission in May 2001 to visit institutions for the enforcement of criminal sanctions. This meant that for the first time in the history of this state an NGO could apply for and be granted permission to visit places of detention, custody and imprisonment without any restrictions, to interview prisoners with no personnel being present, and to talk to personnel without the presence of administration officers. Between June 2001 and October 2003, the Helsinki Committee paid a total of twenty-one visits to institutions for the enforcement of sanctions entailing the deprivation of liberty. During the period covered by this report (April 2002 to October 2003) the Helsinki Committee visited twelve institutions (one maximum-security prison, two closed prisons, three open prisons, two district prisons, one psychiatric prison, one reformatory, and one juvenile prison). In launching the project, the Helsinki Committee was principally guided by Article 64 of the European Prison Rules which states: ‘Imprisonment is by the deprivation of liberty a punishment in itself. The conditions of imprisonment and the prison regimes shall not, therefore, except as incidental to justifiable segregation or the maintenance of discipline, aggravate the suffering inherent in this.’ The Helsinki Committee hopes that its efforts to complete the project and publish this book will make a small but valuable contribution towards achieving this goal.

Law, Constitution, Jurisprudence --- Criminal Law --- Security and defense --- Evaluation research --- Penal Policy

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Moscow has been developing a new model of governance for Kaliningrad Oblast in 2016. The changes in the regional government (the governance of the oblast was entrusted to people sent from Moscow and had no links with the region) were part of it. These are a result of Russia's depleting financial resources and austerity policy, the increasing militarisation of the Russian Federation and the important role the oblast plays in this policy, and the need to ensure a satisfactory result in the upcoming presidential election. Although there are at present no visible symptoms suggesting an intensification of protest sentiments, Moscow is taking preventive action to try to tighten its grip on local elites and residents. Kaliningrad Oblast remains an essential element of the Russian military strategy in the Baltic region. This is borne out by the deployment in the region of S-400 air defence systems, ships equipped with Kalibr missiles, and Bastion missile defence systems (which are nominally anti-ship weapons but are also adjusted to attacking ground targets). Furthermore, the deployment of Iskander missile systems has been launched which enables the creation of a so-called 'Anti-Access/Area Denial' (A2/AD) zone, extending the range of Russian weapons to the territories and airspace of the neighbouring NATO member states.

Politics / Political Sciences --- Economic policy --- Government/Political systems --- Security and defense --- Geopolitics --- Russia (Federation) --- History.