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"Rent-Seeking and Human Capital: How the Hunt for Rents is Changing our Economic and Political Landscape explores the debates around rent seeking and contextualizes it within the capitalist economy. It is vital that the field of economics does a better job of analyzing and making policy recommendations that reduce the opportunities and rewards for rent seeking, generating returns from the redistribution of wealth rather than wealth creation. This short and provocative book addresses the key questions: who are the rent seekers? What do they do? Where do they come from? What are the consequences of rent seeking for the broader economy? And finally, what should policymakers do about them? The chapters examine the existing literature on rent seeking, including looking at the differences between rent seeking, economic rent and unproductive labor. The work provides an in-depth look at the case of the impact of rent seeking degrees in the US, particularly Business and Law, and explores potential policy remedies such as a wealth tax or changes to the rules on financial transactions and patents. This text provides an important intervention on rent-seeking for students and scholars of heterodox economics, political economy, inequality, and anyone interested in the shape of the modern capitalist economy. Kurt von Seekamm Jr. is Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at Salem State University, USA"--

Rent seeking

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Does decentralizing the allocation of public resources reduce rent-seeking and improve equity? This paper studies a governance reform in Pakistan's vast Indus Basin irrigation system. Using canal discharge measurements across all of Punjab province, the analysis finds that water theft increased on channels taken over by local farmer organizations compared with channels that remained bureaucratically managed, leading to substantial wealth redistribution. The increase in water theft was greater along channels with larger landowners situated upstream. These findings are consistent with a model in which decentralization accentuates the political power of local elites by shifting the arena in which water rights are contested.

Bureaucracy --- Elite Capture --- Governance --- Inequality --- Landownership Inequality --- Poverty Reduction --- Rent-Seeking

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Surface irrigation is a common pool resource characterized by asymmetric appropriation opportunities across upstream and downstream water users. Large canal systems are also predominantly managed by the state. This paper studies water allocation under an irrigation bureaucracy subject to corruption and rent-seeking. Data on the landholdings and political influence of nearly a quarter million irrigators in Pakistan's vast Indus Basin watershed allow the construction of a novel index of lobbying power. Consistent with a model of misgovernance, the decline in water availability and land values from channel head to tail is accentuated along canals having greater lobbying power at the head than at the tail.

Bureaucracy --- Common Property Resource --- Corruption --- Energy --- Governance --- Irrigation --- Poverty Reduction --- Rent-Seeking --- Water Use

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ECONOMIC ASPECTS -- 327.6 --- -Political violence --- -Rent (Economic theory) --- Economic rent --- Ground-rent --- Rent seeking --- Rent (Economic theory). --- Game theory. --- Peace --- Political violence --- Security, International --- War --- Economic aspects.

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This study investigates the existence of political rents in bank lending, using a comprehensive loan-level data set of the universe of commercial loans in Mexico from 2003 to 2012. Identification relies on changes in the state of origin of a senate committee chairman as a source of exogenous variation in firms' political relationship. The study finds that banks offer favorable loan terms to politically connected firms with larger loan quantities, lower loan spreads, longer maturities, and lower collateral requirements. Furthermore, political loans exhibit higher default rates. To isolate the bank supply channel, a rich set of fixed-effects is included with various specifications. The favorable lending increases with the strength of a firm's political connection, varies gradually along the political cycle, and is mainly offered by large and domestic banks. Consistent with the quid pro quo hypothesis, the study finds that banks that extend political loans receive significantly more government borrowings with better credit quality. The study also shows that the greater credit supply due to political connection leads to a large and significant increase in firm-level employment and assets. The study provides estimates of the total social cost of political lending and net revenue for banks that are engaged in rent provision activity. Finally, a series of robustness tests are performed to rule out alternative mechanisms and explanations.

Access to Finance. --- Bank Lending. --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress. --- Banks and Banking Reform. --- Debt Markets. --- Finance and Financial Sector Development. --- Political Economy. --- Privatization. --- Rent Seeking.