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This paper examines whether natural resource dependence has a negative influence on various indicators of institutional quality when controlling for the potential effects of other geographic, economic and cultural initial conditions. Analysis of a panel of countries from 1996 to 2010 indicates that a high degree of resource dependence, measured as the share of mineral fuel exports in a country's total exports, is associated with worse government effectiveness, as well as with reduced levels of competition across the economy. Furthermore, estimation of long-run elasticities suggests that government effectiveness and the intensity of domestic competition decrease over time as the dependence on natural resources increases. An illustration of the Russian case shows that the negative effects accumulate in the long run, leading to a worse deterioration of government effectiveness in Russia than in Canada, a country with a comparable resource endowment but far better overall institutional quality. This result is corroborated by a significant negative correlation found between regional resource dependence and an indicator of regulatory capture in Russian regions, which indicates that the regulatory environment is more likely to be subverted in regions that are more dependent on extractive industries. Overall, the findings would be consistent with a situation in which a generally weak institutional environment would allow resource interests to wield the bidding power accruing from export revenues to subvert the content of laws and regulations, as well as their enforcement. The fact that this is associated with negative externalities for the rest of the economy, notably by undermining a level playing field across non-resource sectors, sheds light on a potential channel for the resource curse.
Competition --- Dutch disease --- E-Business --- Economic Theory & Research --- Emerging Markets --- Environmental Economics & Policies --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Governance Indicators --- Institutions --- Natural resources --- Regulatory capture --- Resource curse --- World Governance Indicators --- Russia
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Analyzing over 100,000 industrial spills from Alberta, Saskatchewan, North Dakota, Montana, and the Northwest Territories, this book takes the reader behind the firewall of disinformation to uncover scientific truths about crude oil and saline water spills and the cumulative impacts of the fossil fuel industry on ecosystems and society.
Oil spills --- Oil spills --- Petroleum industry and trade --- Petroleum industry and trade --- Environmental aspects --- Environmental aspects --- Canada, Western --- West (U.S.) --- Environmental conditions. --- Environmental conditions. --- Great Acceleration. --- biodiversity. --- birds. --- blowout. --- caribou. --- climate change. --- corruption. --- crude. --- cumulative effects. --- disinformation. --- domains attraction. --- ecology. --- energy transition. --- exotic species. --- flowering plants. --- fossil fuels. --- fraud. --- hydrocarbons. --- lichens. --- mammals. --- meta-organization. --- mosses. --- oil spills. --- pipelines. --- pollution. --- regulatory capture. --- saline water. --- salt. --- seismic lines. --- soil. --- vegetation. --- wells.
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This book presents essential elements for understanding, interpreting, and conducting cost benefit analysis (CBA) in the context of local government. The cost benefit technique is so often referenced in government policy that a correct understanding is necessary for officials entrusted with public decisions. It is especially useful for those charged with preparing numerical analyses to assess the worthiness of a specific policy proposal. In this manual, costs and benefits are identified and analyzed in terms of economic efficiency and resource allocation.
Public works --- Cost effectiveness. --- cost benefit analysis (CBA) --- local government --- project evaluation --- discount rate --- willingness to accept --- willingness to pay --- economic efficiency --- positive time preference --- net discounted benefits --- present value of costs --- present value of benefits --- social welfare functions --- externalities/spillovers --- cost effectiveness analysis --- benefits ratio --- sensitivity analysis --- market failure --- government failure --- standing --- external/social costs --- external/social benefits --- existence values --- hedonic valuation --- hypothetical contingent valuation --- rent seeking --- regulatory capture
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How central banks and independent regulators can support rather than challenge constitutional democracyUnelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers and other independent regulators act as stewards of the common good. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, this critically important book explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. It explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Now with a new preface by Paul Tucker, Unelected Power explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint.
Banks and banking --- State supervision. --- Accountability. --- Adjudication. --- Administrative law. --- Balance sheet. --- Bank for International Settlements. --- Bank of England. --- Bank. --- Basic law. --- Central bank. --- Civil service. --- Committee. --- Consideration. --- Constitutionalism. --- Contract. --- Cost–benefit analysis. --- Crisis management. --- Criticism. --- De facto. --- Deliberation. --- Democracy. --- Democratic deficit. --- Discretion. --- Due process. --- Economic policy. --- Economics. --- Economist. --- Economy. --- Election. --- Executive (government). --- Executive agency. --- Financial crisis. --- Financial institution. --- Financial intermediary. --- Financial regulation. --- Fiscal policy. --- Governance. --- Government agency. --- Government bond. --- Government failure. --- Government. --- Inflation. --- Institution. --- Interest rate. --- Job security. --- Judicial independence. --- Judiciary. --- Jurisdiction. --- Lawmaking. --- Legislation. --- Legislator. --- Legislature. --- Legitimacy (political). --- Legitimation. --- Lender of last resort. --- Liberal democracy. --- Liberalism. --- Macroeconomics. --- Market economy. --- Market liquidity. --- Monetary Policy Committee. --- Monetary authority. --- Monetary policy. --- Nondelegation doctrine. --- Ordinary law. --- Policy. --- Political economy. --- Political party. --- Political philosophy. --- Political science. --- Politician. --- Politics. --- Primary and secondary legislation. --- Principal–agent problem. --- Principles (retailer). --- Provision (contracting). --- Public administration. --- Public consultation. --- Public policy. --- Regime. --- Regulation. --- Regulatory agency. --- Regulatory capture. --- Regulatory state. --- Representative democracy. --- Requirement. --- Rule of law. --- Separation of powers. --- Social cost. --- State of emergency. --- Statute. --- Supply (economics). --- Tax. --- Technocracy. --- The Administrative State. --- Trade-off. --- Treaty. --- Uncertainty. --- Veto. --- Voting. --- Welfare.
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