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In 1988, Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn challenged connectionist theorists to explain the systematicity of cognition. In a highly influential critical analysis of connectionism, they argued that connectionist explanations, at best, can only inform us about details of the neural substrate; explanations at the cognitive level must be classical insofar as adult human cognition is essentially systematic. This volume reassesses Fodor and Pylyshyn's 'systematicity challenge' for a post-connectionist era, covering the most important recent developments in the systematicity debate.

PHILOSOPHY --- Mind & Body --- Cognition --- Cognitive psychology --- Cognitive science --- Models, Theoretical --- Psychological Phenomena and Processes --- Models, Biological --- Psychology --- Investigative Techniques --- Psychiatry and Psychology --- Behavioral Sciences --- Analytical, Diagnostic and Therapeutic Techniques and Equipment --- Behavioral Disciplines and Activities --- Models, Neurological --- Cognitive Science --- Mental Processes --- Models, Psychological --- Social Sciences --- Cognition. --- Cognitive science. --- Cognitive psychology. --- Psychology, Cognitive --- Science --- Philosophy of mind --- Human information processing. --- Connectionism. --- Fodor, Jerry A. --- Pylyshyn, Zenon W., --- Influence. --- Fodor, Jerry --- Pylyshyn, Zenon --- PHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/General --- COGNITIVE SCIENCES/General --- Connexionism --- Information processing, Human --- Bionics --- Information theory in psychology --- Perception --- Fodor, J. A. --- Fodor, Jerome Alan