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During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), state-owned or public banks lent relatively more than domestic private banks in many countries. However, data limitations have hindered a thorough assessment of what led public banks to better maintain lending during the GFC. Using a novel bank-level dataset covering 25 emerging market economies, we show that public banks lent relatively more during the GFC because they pursued an objective of helping to stabilize the economy, rather than because they had superior fundamentals or access to public or depositors’ funding. Nonetheless, their countercyclical behavior seems unique to the GFC rather than a regular characteristic of public banks before and after the GFC.

Brazil --- Banks and Banking --- Macroeconomics --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Industries: Financial Services --- Financial Crises --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government --- Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Banking --- Monetary economics --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Finance --- State-owned banks --- Bank credit --- Global financial crisis of 2008-2009 --- Loans --- Financial institutions --- Money --- Financial crises --- Nonperforming loans --- Banks and banking --- Credit --- Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009

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The paper investigates the impact of the global financial crisis on public-private partnerships (PPPs) and the circumstances under which providing support to new and existing projects is justified. Based on country evidence, cost of and access to finance are found to be the main channels of transmission of the financial crisis, affecting in particular pipeline PPP projects. Possible measures to help PPPs during the crisis include contract extensions, output-based subsidies, revenue enhancements and step-in rights. To limit government's exposure to risk, while preserving private partner's efficiency incentives, intervention measures should be consistent with the wider fiscal policy stance, be contingent on specific circumstances, and be adequately costed and budgeted. Governments should be compensated for taking on additional risk.

Public-private sector cooperation. --- Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009. --- Global Economic Crisis, 2008-2009 --- Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008-2009 --- Private-public partnerships --- Private-public sector cooperation --- Public-private partnerships --- Public-private sector collaboration --- Financial crises --- Cooperation --- Accounting --- Banks and Banking --- Financial Risk Management --- Public Finance --- Business Fluctuations --- Cycles --- Project Evaluation --- Social Discount Rate --- Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Infrastructures --- Other Public Investment and Capital Stock --- Governmental Loans, Loan Guarantees, Credits, and Grants --- Financial Crises --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Public Administration --- Public Sector Accounting and Audits --- Public finance & taxation --- Economic & financial crises & disasters --- Financial services law & regulation --- Financial reporting, financial statements --- Public investment and public-private partnerships (PPP) --- Financial statements --- Exchange rate risk --- Market risk --- Expenditure --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Public-private sector cooperation --- Financial risk management --- Finance, Public --- Canada