Listing 1 - 2 of 2 |
Sort by
|
Choose an application
In Bhutan, the public sector is usually seen as the most desirable employer. This study asks if this can be attributed to public sector employees receiving higher wages than comparable private sector workers. To answer the question, the study combines an Oaxaca-type decomposition of wage differentials into characteristics and coefficients effects with a multinomial logit model for self-selection into labor force participation and the public or private sector. The study finds that the public/private wage differential is sizeable but can entirely be accounted for by observable characteristics. At the same time, there is strong evidence that preferences for public sector jobs are caused by pronounced intersectoral differences in overall compensation packages, in particular fringe benefits.
Decomposition Methods --- Public/Private Wage Differential --- Sector Selection
Choose an application
The paper uses a new country-level, panel data set to study the effect of public sector wages on corruption. The results show that wage inequality in the public sector is an important determinant of the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. Increasing the wages of public officials could help reduce corruption in countries with low public sector wage inequality. In countries where public sector wages are highly unequal, however, raising the wages of government employees could increase corruption. These results are robust to a wide range of empirical model specifications, estimation methods, and distributional assumptions. The relation persists when controlling for latent omitted variables, using the share of contracts in the private sector as an instrument for the public-private wage differential. Combining increases in public sector wages with policies affecting the wage distribution could help policy makers design cost-effective programs to reduce corruption in their countries.
Listing 1 - 2 of 2 |
Sort by
|