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Die Arbeit untersucht, wie sich unternehmensexterne Wettbewerbsbedingungen und Principal-Agent-Probleme zwischen Eigentümern und Managern auf die Anreize zur Kostensenkung, die interne Effizienz in den Unternehmen und die Konsumentenrente auswirken. Es wird gezeigt, dass Principal-Agent-Probleme unter bestimmten Produktmarktbedingungen einen wohlfahrtssteigernden Effekt haben, indem sie einer Überinvestition bei der Kostenreduktion entgegenwirken. Aus der theoretischen Analyse werden Hypothesen zur Einführung von Prozessinnovationen und personalpolitischen Anreizsystemen in manager- und eigentümergeleiteten Betrieben abgeleitet. Die Hypothesen werden auf der Basis von Betriebsdaten empirisch überprüft.

Monetary economics --- Political economy --- Agency-Theorie --- Anreizsystem --- Ineffizienz --- Innovationen --- Jirjahn --- Management --- Managementanreize --- Principal-Agent-Theorie --- Produktmarktwettbewerb --- Produktwettbewerb --- Volkswirtschaftslehre --- Wettbewerb --- Wettbewerbstheorie --- Wohlfahrtsanalyse --- X-Ineffizienz

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This article studies the extent to which participation in productive associations in Nicaragua contributes to increase individuals' access to social programs and credit services. By participating in productive associations, individuals give a good signal to firms and are rewarded with better transactions and more access to the services they provide, ceteris paribus. Estimates using 2005 data indicate that households that participate in productive associations display higher access to credit and to social programs that promote investment. Additionally, participation in productive associations is weakly associated to more favorable credit outcomes among those households that receive loans, such as lower interest rates and a lower probability of wanting more credit than what was accessible to them.

Collective --- Collective action --- Collective action problem --- Communities & Human Settlements --- Corporate Law --- Debt Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Housing and Human Habitats --- Individuals --- Insurance and Risk Mitigation --- Labor Policies --- Law and Development --- Municipality --- Principal-agent --- Principal-agent problems --- Proxy --- Public firms --- Social Protections and Labor --- Unions

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This paper examines the conceptual foundations of macroprudential policy by reviewing the literature on financial frictions from a policy perspective that systematically links state interventions to market failures. The method consists in gradually incorporating into the Arrow-Debreu world a variety of frictions and sources of aggregate volatility and combining them along three basic dimensions: purely idiosyncratic vs. aggregate volatility, full vs. bounded rationality, and internalized vs. uninternalized externalities. The analysis thereby obtains eight "domains," four of which include aggregate volatility, hence call for macroprudential policy variants grounded on largely orthogonal rationales. Two of them emerge even assuming that externalities are internalized: one aims at offsetting the public moral hazard implications of (efficient but time inconsistent) post-crisis policy interventions, the other at maintaining principal-agent incentives continuously aligned along the cycle. Allowing for uninternalized externalities justifies two additional types of macroprudential policy, one aimed at aligning private and social interests, the other at tempering mood swings. Choosing a proper regulatory path is complicated by the fact that the relevance of frictions is likely to be state-dependent and that different frictions motivate different (and often conflicting) policies.

Banks & Banking Reform --- Bounded rationality --- Collective action --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory & Research --- Emerging Markets --- Externalities --- Financial crises --- Financial frictions --- Financial policy --- Labor Policies --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Macroprudential policy --- Principal-agent problems --- Pro-cyclical financial markets --- Prudential oversight --- Regulatory architecture

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In the 21st century, many developing countries will become emerging markets and will no longer be in need of the carrot-and-stick approach to development assistance most prevalent today: development financing made available conditional on certain policies and interventions. This paper suggests that interactions between development agencies and recipient governments are mostly about inputs deemed (but not known) to contribute to improvements in living standards in recipient countries, rather than outcomes. The paper argues that the development marketplace is beset by market imperfections because of externalities, principal-agent problems, and decision making under uncertainty, which not only make it difficult to achieve the right outcomes, but also take away incentives to learn about outcomes. A fundamental rethink of responsibilities and accountabilities in the development business would make sure that development outcomes are traded in the development marketplace. It would put recipient countries in charge of contracting development agencies to provide these outcomes. Development agencies would commit to and be held financially accountable for outcomes, that is, real improvements in welfare indicators. The paper describes the role of the evaluation function in aligning incentives with the ultimate goal of improving lives and provides examples of emerging solutions.

Debt Markets --- Development Economics & Aid Effectiveness --- Development Outcomes --- Economic Theory & Research --- Evaluation Function --- Externalities --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Labor Policies --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market Failure --- Poverty Impact Evaluation --- Poverty Reduction --- Principal-Agent --- Social Protections and Labor

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Law is supposed to encourage innovation, morality, and conformity with societal expectations, yet it may provide perverse incentives causing individuals, or even the State, to act in discordant, inefficient, and even immoral ways. It will explore the inefficiencies that are created that serve to deny individuals work and shelter in a haphazard and capricious manner. It will examine property rights, including eminent domain that lets the State take property away with seemingly arbitrary compensation to the owner. Individuals must understand both civil law, codified by statutes, and common law, enshrined in precedential judicial decisions, and why the common law tends to better reduce transactions costs and thus avoid courts entirely. This book is written for economists and noneconomists and has an extensive glossary of economic, political, and legal terms. Two items that are not formally treated in other economics of law textbooks are the legal organization of businesses and tax law from an economics perspective.

Law and economics. --- Law --- Economic aspects. --- adverse selection --- antitrust law --- civil law --- climate change --- Coase theorem --- common law --- contracts --- corporate personhood --- deadweight loss --- discrimination --- externalities --- family law --- free trade --- information asymmetry --- Laffer curve --- moral hazard --- patents --- Pigouvian tax --- precedent --- price discrimination --- principal-agent program --- property rights --- Supreme Court decisions --- tax incidence --- Theory of the Firm --- torts --- transaction costs --- unconscionability