Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Poor rural women in the developing world spend considerable time collecting water. How then do they respond to improved access to water infrastructure? Does it increase their participation in income earning market-based activities? Does it improve the health and education outcomes of their children? To help address these questions, a new approach for dealing with the endogeneity of infrastructure placement in cross-sectional surveys is proposed and implemented using data for nine developing countries. The paper does not find that access to water comes with greater off-farm work for women, although in countries where substantial gender gaps in schooling exist, both boys' and girls' enrollments improve with better access to water. There are also some signs of impacts on child health as measured by anthropometric z-scores.

Access & Equity in Basic Education --- Child health --- Child mortality --- Decision making --- Drinking water --- Drinking Water Supply --- Early Child and Children's Health --- Education --- Gender --- Health --- Health care --- Households --- Nutrition and Population --- Price of water --- Rural communities --- Rural Development --- Rural Labor Markets --- Rural water --- Rural water supply --- Rural Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water collection --- Water infrastructure --- Water quality --- Water Resources --- Water shortages --- Water source --- Water sources --- Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water use --- Wells

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Why did reform in Santiago improve water system performance, when similar reform attempts under public management in other countries failed? In the late 1980s, Chile planned to privatize Santiago's sanitary works enterprise (EMOS) but instead reformed it under public ownership. It did so through a regulatory framework that mimicked the design of a concession with a private utility, setting tariffs that ensured at least a 7 percent return on assets, creating a neutral regulator independent of ministry intervention, and giving EMOS the right to appeal the regulator's tariff decisions. This reform of Santiago's water system is often cited as a case of successful reform under public management. Comparing a comprehensive measure of welfare with a counterfactual example, Shirley, Xu, and Zuluaga show surprisingly large gains from Santiago's reform, given the relatively good initial conditions. (The gains accrued largely to government and employees, but consumers benefited from improved service and coverage.) Why did reform in Santiago improve water system performance, when similar reform attempts under public management in other countries failed? Chile has a long tradition of private water rights, shaped by early recognition that water is a scarce and tradable private good; The reformed regulatory framework was designed to attract private investors to the water system and to motivate them to operate efficiently and expand the system; Chile's unique electoral institutions sustained this framework under state operation after democracy was restored; Chile's strong bureaucratic norms and institutions (permitting little corruption), combined with Santiago's relatively low-cost water system, permitted prices that effectively increased quasi-rents for investing in the system while minimizing the risk of inefficiency or monopoly rents. The authors also address the question of why EMOS was reformed but not privatized, and what the costs of not privatizing were. The system was privatized in 1999, but the changes from privatization are likely to be less significant than those introduced in 1989-90. This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to draw lessons from regulatory reform and understand political and institutional change. This study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Competition and Privatization in Urban Water Supply (RPO 682-64). Mary Shirley may be contacted at mshirley@worldbank.org.

Bill Collection --- Cubic Meters --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory and Research --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Industry --- Infrastructure Economics and Finance --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Number Of Connections --- Price Of Water --- Private Participation in Infrastructure --- Private Sector Development --- Private Utility --- Public Works --- Sewage Treatment --- Sewerage Services --- Tariff Decisions --- Tariff Setting --- Tariff Setting Process --- Town Water Supply and Sanitation --- Urban Water --- Urban Water Supply --- Urban Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water and Industry --- Water Companies --- Water Conservation --- Water Consumption --- Water Resources --- Water Sector --- Water Services --- Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions --- Water Supply and Systems --- Water System --- Water Systems --- Water Tariffs

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

June 2000 - In several ways, the reform introduced to the water sector in Conakry, Guinea, in 1989 under a World Bank-led project was remarkable. It showed that even in a weak institutional environment, where contracts are hard to enforce and political interference is common, private sector participation can improve sector performance. Why did the sector improve as much as it did, and what has inhibited reform? Both consumers and the government benefited from reform of the water system in Conakry, Guinea, whose deterioration since independence had become critical by the mid-1980s. Less than 40 percent of Conakry's population had access to piped water - low even by regional standards - and service was intermittent, at best, for the few who had connections. The public agency in charge of the sector was inefficient, overstaffed, and virtually insolvent. In several ways, the reform introduced to the sector in 1989 under a World Bank-led project was remarkable. It showed that even in a weak institutional environment, where contracts are hard to enforce and political interference is common, private sector participation can improve sector performance. Menard and Clarke discuss the mechanisms that made progress possible and identify factors that inhibit the positive effects of reform. Water has become very expensive, the number of connections has increased very slowly, and conflicts have developed between SEEG (the private operator) and SONEG (the state agency). Among the underlying problems: The lack of strong, stable institutions; The lack of an independent agency capable of restraining arbitrary government action, regulating the private operator, and enforcing contractual arrangements; The lack of adequate conflict resolution mechanisms for contract disputes; Weak administrative capacity. This paper - a joint product of Public Economics and Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to promote competition and private sector development. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Institutions, Politics, and Contracts: Private Sector Participation in Urban Water Supply (RPO 681-87). The authors may be contacted at menard@univ-paris1.fr or gclarke@worldbank.org.

Banks and Banking Reform --- Cost Of Water --- Debt Markets --- Drinking Water --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Households --- Industry --- Mortality Rate --- Pipeline --- Pit Latrines --- Population Growth --- Price Of Water --- Private Operator --- Private Participation --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Raw Water --- Town Water Supply and Sanitation --- Urban Areas --- Urban Water --- Urban Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water --- Water and Industry --- Water Conservation --- Water Resources --- Water Sector --- Water Supply --- Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions --- Water System --- Water Systems --- Water Use --- Wells