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Inspections have a statistically significant impact on firms' environmental performance in the Chinese city of Zhenjiang, and citizens' complaints have a significant impact on inspections. So stronger information and education campaigns may improve social welfare in the city; Little empirical research has been done on monitoring and enforcement issues in environmental economics, especially to analyze the impact of monitoring and enforcement on polluters' environmental performance. No studies have been done in developing economies. Dasgupta, Laplante, Mamingi, and Wang explore the impact of inspections, and the potential impact of pollution charges and citizens' complaints, on the environmental performance of polluters in China. Their analysis of plant-level data from the city of Zhenjiang shows that: Inspections have a statistically significant impact on firms' environmental performance; Pollution charges do not have a statistically significant effect on firms' performance - although the lack of variation in pollution charges in Zhenjiang precludes effectively capturing their impact; Complaints have a significant impact on inspections and therefore on pollution control. Currently available data do not allow analysis of whether the cost of additional inspections is justified, but it is reasonable to speculate that additional inspections would improve social welfare in Zhenjiang and that information and education campaigns are probably a good way to encourage citizen complaints. This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study environmental regulation in developing countries. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Pollution Control in China: The Role and Impact of Inspection and Complaints (RPO 682-44). The authors may be contacted at sdasgupta@worldbank.org, blaplante@worldbank.org, or hwang1@worldbank.org.
Developed Countries --- Emissions --- Environment --- Environmental --- Environmental Economics --- Environmental Economics and Policies --- Environmental Performance --- Environmental Protection --- Industry --- Information --- Monitoring --- Need --- Policies --- Polluters --- Pollution --- Pollution Charges --- Pollution Control --- Productivity --- Regulations --- Resources --- Water --- Water and Industry --- Water Pollution --- Water Resources
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One of the main reasons for noncompliant firms' poor environmental performance is the information gap on Mexico's environmental policy. Pollution control could be improved through systematically fuller communication targeted to noncompliant firms - including more environmental education, especially of senior managers; Survey evidence from Mexico reveals large observed differences in pollution from factories in the same industry, or the same area, or operating under the same regulatory regime. Many factories have adopted significant measures for pollution control and are in compliance with environmental regulations, but some have made little or no such effort. For lack of data, systematic research on the reasons behind such variations in plant-level environmental performance (especially on how impediments to pollution control affect plant behavior) is rare, even in industrial societies. Drawing on a recent plant-level survey of Mexican factories, Dasgupta identifies a number of performance variables characteristic of compliant and noncompliant plants, as well as factors that non-compliant plants perceive to be obstacles to pollution control. Noncompliant firms made less effort than compliant firms to change materials used, to change production processes, or to install end-of-pipe treatment equipment. They had significantly fewer programs to train their general workers in environmental responsibilities. They lagged behind in environmental training, waste management, and transportation training. They received less technical training, especially about the environment, environmental policy and administration, and clean technology and audits. Responses about obstacles to better environmental performance included scarcity of training resources, government bureaucracy, high interest rates, and Mexico's lack of an environmental protection culture. Respondents said that senior managers did not emphasize the environment, assigned more priority to economic considerations, and were not trained in the subject. There were too few suitable programs, training was not recognized, and workers were not interested in the subject. Most important, however, little information was available about Mexico's environmental policy. These findings suggest the importance of technical assistance - especially training and information. In Mexico, the information gap on policy is a major problem. Mexican environmental agencies should invest more in technical assistance and environmental training targeted to noncompliant enterprises. Environmental education, especially of senior managers, could significantly improve pollution control. Maintaining close contact with noncompliant firms, designing programs targeted to them, and pursuing them systemically should increase their responsiveness to regulations. This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the determinants of environmental performance in developing countries. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project The Economics of Industrial Pollution Control in Developing Countries (RPO 680-20). The author may be contacted at sdasgupta@worldbank.org.
Economics --- Economies --- Emissions --- Environment --- Environmental --- Environmental Economics and Policies --- Environmental Information --- Environmental Management --- Environmental Performance --- Environmental Quality --- Environmental Regulations --- Information --- Metals --- Monitoring --- Options --- Policy Makers --- Polluters --- Pollution --- Pollution Control --- Regulation --- Regulations --- Technology
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Inspections have a statistically significant impact on firms' environmental performance in the Chinese city of Zhenjiang, and citizens' complaints have a significant impact on inspections. So stronger information and education campaigns may improve social welfare in the city; Little empirical research has been done on monitoring and enforcement issues in environmental economics, especially to analyze the impact of monitoring and enforcement on polluters' environmental performance. No studies have been done in developing economies. Dasgupta, Laplante, Mamingi, and Wang explore the impact of inspections, and the potential impact of pollution charges and citizens' complaints, on the environmental performance of polluters in China. Their analysis of plant-level data from the city of Zhenjiang shows that: Inspections have a statistically significant impact on firms' environmental performance; Pollution charges do not have a statistically significant effect on firms' performance - although the lack of variation in pollution charges in Zhenjiang precludes effectively capturing their impact; Complaints have a significant impact on inspections and therefore on pollution control. Currently available data do not allow analysis of whether the cost of additional inspections is justified, but it is reasonable to speculate that additional inspections would improve social welfare in Zhenjiang and that information and education campaigns are probably a good way to encourage citizen complaints. This paper - a product of Infrastructure and Environment, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study environmental regulation in developing countries. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Pollution Control in China: The Role and Impact of Inspection and Complaints (RPO 682-44). The authors may be contacted at sdasgupta@worldbank.org, blaplante@worldbank.org, or hwang1@worldbank.org.
Developed Countries --- Emissions --- Environment --- Environmental --- Environmental Economics --- Environmental Economics and Policies --- Environmental Performance --- Environmental Protection --- Industry --- Information --- Monitoring --- Need --- Policies --- Polluters --- Pollution --- Pollution Charges --- Pollution Control --- Productivity --- Regulations --- Resources --- Water --- Water and Industry --- Water Pollution --- Water Resources
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April 2000 - Environmental improvements should be sought from different polluters (public or private, producer or consumer, rich or poor) at the same cost, regardless of the nature of the polluting activity. Under a plausible structure of monitoring costs, emissions standards play a central role. Eskeland brings together two of government's primary challenges: environmental protection and taxation to generate revenues. If negative externalities can be reduced not only by changes in consumption patterns but also by making each activity cleaner (abatement efforts), how shall inducements to various approaches be combined? If negative externalities are caused by agents as different as consumers, producers, and government, how does optimal policy combine inducements to reduce pollution? Intuitively it seems right to tax emissions neutrally, based on marginal damages - no matter which activity pollutes or whether the polluter is rich or poor, consumer or producer, private or public. Eskeland provides a theoretical basis for such simplicity. Three assumptions are critical to his analysis: Returns to scale do not influence the traditional problem of revenue generation; Consumers have equal access to pollution abatement opportunities (but he also relaxes this assumption); Planners can differentiate policy instruments (emission taxes or abatement standards) by polluting good, and by whether the polluter is a consumer, producer, or government, but they cannot differentiate such instruments (or commodity taxes) by personal characteristics or make them nonlinear in individual emissions. Among Eskeland's findings and conclusions: Abatement efforts and consumption adjustments at all stages are optimally stimulated by a uniform emission tax levied simply where emissions occur. It simplifies things that optimal abatement is independent of whether the car is used by government, firms, or households - for weddings or for work. It also simplifies implementation that the stimulus to abatement at one stage (say, the factory) is independent of whether it yields emission reductions from the factory or from others (say, from car owners who buy the factory's products). Finally, ministers of finance and of the environment should coordinate efforts, but they need not engage in each other's business. The minister of environment need not know which commodities are elastic in demand and thus would bear a low commodity tax. The finance minister need not know which commodities or agents pollute or who pays emission taxes. This paper - a product of Public Economics, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to establish principles for public intervention. The author may be contacted at geskeland@worldbank.org.
Commodity Taxes --- Economic Welfare --- Economics --- Efficiency --- Emission Standards --- Emission Tax --- Emissions --- Environment --- Environmental --- Environmental Economics and Policies --- Environmental Management --- Environmental Protection --- Externalities --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Marginal Costs --- Polluters --- Pollution --- Pollution Abatement --- Pollution Management and Control --- Production --- Revenue --- Taxation --- Taxation and Subsidies --- Taxes
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Deceit and Denial details the attempts by the chemical and lead industries to deceive Americans about the dangers that their deadly products present to workers, the public, and consumers. Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner pursued evidence steadily and relentlessly, interviewed the important players, investigated untapped sources, and uncovered a bruising story of cynical and cruel disregard for health and human rights. This resulting exposé is full of startling revelations, provocative arguments, and disturbing conclusions--all based on remarkable research and information gleaned from secret industry documents. This book reveals for the first time the public relations campaign that the lead industry undertook to convince Americans to use its deadly product to paint walls, toys, furniture, and other objects in America's homes, despite a wealth of information that children were at risk for serious brain damage and death from ingesting this poison. This book highlights the immediate dangers ordinary citizens face because of the relentless failure of industrial polluters to warn, inform, and protect their workers and neighbors. It offers a historical analysis of how corporate control over scientific research has undermined the process of proving the links between toxic chemicals and disease. The authors also describe the wisdom, courage, and determination of workers and community members who continue to voice their concerns in spite of vicious opposition. Readable, ground-breaking, and revelatory, Deceit and Denial provides crucial answers to questions of dangerous environmental degradation, escalating corporate greed, and governmental disregard for its citizens' safety and health. After eleven years, Markowitz and Rosner update their work with a new epilogue that outlines the attempts these industries have made to undermine and create doubt about the accuracy of the information in this book.
Environmental health. --- Environmental health --- Factory and trade waste --- Pollution --- Chemical pollution --- Chemicals --- Contamination of environment --- Environmental pollution --- Contamination (Technology) --- Asbestos abatement --- Bioremediation --- Environmental engineering --- Environmental quality --- Hazardous waste site remediation --- Hazardous wastes --- In situ remediation --- Lead abatement --- Pollutants --- Refuse and refuse disposal --- Health --- Health ecology --- Public health --- Health risk assessment --- Social aspects. --- Environmental aspects. --- Health aspects. --- Environmental aspects --- Health aspects --- Environmental Pollution --- Industry --- Disclosure. --- History, 20th Century. --- Lead Poisoning. --- Vinyl Chloride --- history. --- ethics. --- adverse effects. --- History, 20th Century --- history --- american workers. --- chemical industry. --- conspiracy. --- corporate control. --- deadly products. --- disease. --- ecology. --- engaging. --- environment. --- environmental hazard. --- environmental health. --- environmental history. --- environmental pollution. --- environmental. --- global warming. --- health care issues. --- historical. --- immediate dangers. --- industrial polluters. --- lead industry. --- manufacturing industry. --- pharmocology. --- political. --- politics. --- public health. --- science and math. --- sociological. --- sustainability. --- technology. --- toxic chemicals. --- toxicology.
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