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Understanding how and why liability laws and liability reforms alter the medical treatment decision-making process is central to reforming the current U.S. malpractice liability system. Survey methods serve a valuable role in this process because they measure how malpractice pressure affects physician perceptions of appropriate practices, and thereby capture an important determinant of treatment decisions. Based on analysis of the American Medical Association Socioeconomic Monitoring System survey, we present four findings. First, physicians from states enacting liability reforms that directly reduce malpractice pressure experience lower growth over time in malpractice claims rates and in real malpractice insurance premiums. Second, physicians from reforming states report significant relative declines in the perceived impact of malpractice pressure on practice patterns. Third, individual physicians' personal experiences with the malpractice system are a key determinants of the perceived importance of defensive medicine. Fourth, the impact of individual physicians' claims experience on perceptions is smaller in reforming than in nonreforming states. Taken together, these results suggest that reforms in law affect physicians' attitudes, both by reducing the probability of an encounter with the liability system and by changing the nature of the experience of being sued, for those physicians who defend against malpractice claims.

Physicians' malpractice insurance.

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Damages awarded in a malpractice suit must be viewed not only as compensating the victim but also as deterring health-care providers from negligent behavior. Economic analysis of the malpractice system indicates that awards can send a signal to providers that informs them how much to invest in avoiding mishaps. The malpractice system is beset by difficulties, but not the ones commonly incriminated. The signal to the physician, as determined by the number of claims and the size of awards ("expected damages"), appears to be insufficient for ideal deterrence. Moreover, the deterrence signal is attenuated because malpractice premiums are set for groups of physicians, not for individuals according to their record of previous malpractice incidents. Replacing the present tort system with a no-fault insurance scheme would not necessarily be cheaper, and might well abolish the deterrent signal or distort clinical decisionmaking.

Physicians' malpractice insurance --- Malpractice --- Economics.

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Physicians' malpractice insurance --- Physicians --- Malpractice

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Physicians --- Physicians' malpractice insurance --- Malpractice --- Malpractice --- legislation.

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The cost of malpractice insurance to physicians has been increasing rapidly in recent years, and in some areas is not even available. This study describes and analyzes, in a non-technical manner, the workings of physicians' own liability insurance.

Physicians' malpractice insurance --- Liability insurance --- Malpractice --- Legislation.