Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

February 2000 - Some say that democracy is more likely to survive under parliamentary governments. That result is not robust to the use of different variables from the Database of Political Institutions, a large new cross-country database that may illuminate many other issues affecting and affected by political institutions. This paper introduces a large new cross-country database on political institutions: the Database on Political Institutions (DPI). Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh summarize key variables (many of them new), compare this data set with others, and explore the range of issues for which the data should prove invaluable. Among the novel variables they introduce: Several measures of tenure, stability, and checks and balances; Identification of parties with the government coalition or the opposition; Fragmentation of opposition and government parties in legislatures. The authors illustrate the application of DPI variables to several problems in political economy. Stepan and Skach, for example, find that democracy is more likely to survive under parliamentary governments than presidential systems. But this result is not robust to the use of different variables from the DPI, which raises puzzles for future research. Similarly, Roubini and Sachs find that divided governments in the OECD run higher budget deficits after fiscal shocks. Replication of their work using DPI indicators of divided government indicates otherwise, again suggesting issues for future research. Among questions in political science and economics that this database may illuminate: the determinants of democratic consolidation, the political conditions for economic reform, the political and institutional roots of corruption, and the elements of appropriate and institutionally sensitive design of economic policy. This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the institutional bases of poverty alleviation and economic reform. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Database on Institutions for Government Decisionmaking (RPO 682-79). The authors may be contacted at tbeck@worldbank.org, gclarke@worldbank.org, pkeefer@worldbank.org, or pwalsh@worldbank.org.

Cabinet --- Candidates --- Constituents --- Decision Makers --- Decision Making --- Democracy --- E-Business --- E-Government --- Economic Theory and Research --- Election --- Election Data --- Elections --- Governance --- Government --- Industry --- Information Security and Privacy --- Legislation --- Legislative Powers --- Legislators --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Microfinance --- Parliament --- Parliamentary Government --- Parliamentary Governments --- Parliamentary Systems --- Policy Making --- Political System --- Political Systems --- Prime Minister --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Technology Industry

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Interests, Institutions, and Information examines the central factors that influence the strategic game of domestic politics. It shows that it is the outcome of this internal game - not fears of other countries' relative gains or the likelihood of cheating - that ultimately shapes how the international game is played out and therefore the extent of cooperative endeavors. The interaction of the domestic actors' preferences, given their political institutions and levels of information, defines when international cooperation is possible and what its terms will be. Several test cases examine how this argument explains the phases of a cooperative attempt: the initiation, the negotiations at the international level, and the eventual domestic ratification. The book reaches the surprising conclusion that theorists - neo-Institutionalists and Realists alike - have overestimated the likelihood of cooperation among states.

International relations. Foreign policy --- #SBIB:327.1H10 --- #SBIB:327.7H01 --- #SBIB:AANKOOP --- Internationale betrekkingen: theorieën --- Grondslagen, principes, evolutie internationale gemeenschap --- #A0206PO --- Information policy. --- International relations. --- Nation-state. --- World politics --- Information policy --- International relations --- Nation-state --- Information science --- Information services and state --- Communication policy --- National state --- State, The --- National interest --- Self-determination, National --- Coexistence --- Foreign affairs --- Foreign policy --- Foreign relations --- Global governance --- Interdependence of nations --- International affairs --- Peaceful coexistence --- World order --- National security --- Sovereignty --- Government policy --- INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. --- CASE STUDIES. --- STATES. --- POLITICAL COOPERATION. --- International co-operation. --- Information. --- States. --- International politics. --- Foreign policy. --- Politics. --- Política interna. --- Política internacional. --- Relações internacionais. --- Rationele keuze. --- Politieke instellingen. --- Binnenlandse politiek. --- Internationale samenwerking. --- Theorie --- Nationalstaat --- Internationale Politik --- Interessenpolitik --- World politics. --- Accords internationaux. --- CED = Communaute europeenne de defense. --- Politique de l'information. --- Politique internationale. --- Relations internationales. --- UE/CE CECA. --- UE/CE Traite de Maastricht. --- Unions economiques et monetaires. --- 89.70 international relations: general. --- 89.71 international cooperation: general. --- Information --- Politique mondiale --- Nation. --- Politique gouvernementale. --- Colonialism --- Global politics --- International politics --- Political history --- Political science --- World history --- Eastern question --- Geopolitics --- International organization --- Belgium. --- Bundesbank. --- Chicago Convention. --- Democrats (US). --- Evans, Peter. --- Frieden, Jeffry. --- German rearmament. --- Jacobson, Harold. --- Keohane, Robert. --- Keynes Plan. --- Laver, Michael. --- Lijphart, Arendt. --- Milner, Helen. --- Obstfeld, Maurice. --- Phillips curve. --- Putnam, Robert. --- Rogowski, Ronald. --- Schelling conjecture. --- Truman Administration. --- absolute gains. --- amendment power. --- balance of payments. --- capital mobility. --- cartel. --- domestic politics. --- hierarchy. --- independents. --- interest groups. --- legislature. --- parliamentary systems. --- ratification. --- side payments. --- two-level games. --- World politics - 1989 --- -Information policy --- VIE INTERNATIONALE --- POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES --- REGLES INTERNATIONALES --- POLITIQUE ECONOMIQUE EXTERIEURE --- ORGANISATIONS INTERGOUVERNEMENTALES --- REGIMES INTERNATIONAUX --- Interessenvermittlung --- Lobbyismus --- Interessenverband --- Internationale Beziehungen --- Politische Beziehungen --- Zwischenstaatliche Beziehungen --- Weltpolitik --- Außenpolitik --- Internationales politisches System --- Nationalstaaten --- Staat --- Nationale Einheit --- Praxis