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Oligopoly and conflict: a dynamic approach
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ISBN: 0853232202 9780853232209 Year: 1972 Publisher: Liverpool Liverpool University Press

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Oligopoly : old ends, new means
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ISBN: 364215963X 9786612994982 3642159648 1282994980 Year: 2010 Publisher: Heidelberg ; New York : Springer,

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The book focuses classical oligopoly theory as developed in 1840-1940. By the end of this period oligopoly came under the spell of game theory in its probabilistic equilibrium format. Work by Cournot, von Stackelberg, Palander, and Hotelling, causal and dynamic in essence, but ignored, is reconsidered in the light of modern dynamics using topology and numerics. As particular features, von Stackelberg leadership is included in the dynamic Cournot model, the Hotelling problem is solved with elastic demand, thus skipping the absurd idea of quadratic transportation costs. Further, it is shown that the celebrated destabilisation of Cournot equilibrium under increased competition is due to mistakenly assuming constant returns, and that the whole idea of rational expectations is untenable in dynamic oligopoly. Early original ideas in oligopoly theory, such as coexistence and multiplicity of attractors are focused again after many undeserved decades of oblivion.

Dynamic models of oligopoly
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ISBN: 3718602792 9783718602797 Year: 1986 Volume: 3 Publisher: Chur Harwood


Book
Nonlinear oligopolies : stability and bifurcations
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ISBN: 3642021077 3642021050 9786612832369 1282832360 3642021069 Year: 2010 Publisher: Heidelberg : Springer,

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The book focuses on the dynamics of nonlinear oligopoly models. It discusses the classical Cournot model with a large variety of demand and cost functions that illustrate the many different types of possible best response functions and it shows the existence of unique and multiple equilibria. Particular emphasis is placed on the influence of nonnegativity and capacity constraints. Dynamics are introduced under various assumptions for the adjustment process. An introduction to the analysis of global dynamics is given through some specific examples. The book also considers concave and general oligopolies and gives conditions for the local asymptotic stability of their equilibria, and it investigates global dynamics in some special cases. Other oligopolies examined include market share attraction games, labor-managed oligopolies, partially cooperating firms and models with intertemporal demand attraction. Local/global stability analyses are carried out for these models and the impact of constraints is discussed. The book contains a number of technical appendices that summarize techniques of global dynamics not easily accessible elsewhere. .

Oligopoly and the theory of games
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ISBN: 072040505X 9780720405057 Year: 1977 Volume: 8 Publisher: Amsterdam North-Holland


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Longitudinal perspectives on educational attainment
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ISBN: 0892321229 9780892321223 Year: 1980 Volume: 1 Publisher: Greenwich JAI


Book
Cooperation and efficiency in markets
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ISBN: 3642197620 3642197639 Year: 2011 Publisher: New York : Springer,

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The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we apply. It requires that no coalition of players in no subgame can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation average discounted payoffs of its members by a deviation. If the sum of firms' average discounted profits is maximized along the equilibrium path then the equilibrium output of each type of good is produced with the lowest possible costs. If, in addition, all buyers are retailers (i.e., they resell the goods purchased in the analyzed market in a retail market) then the equilibrium vector of the quantities sold in the retail market is sold with the lowest possible selling costs. We specify sufficient conditions under which collusion increases consumer welfare.

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