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Obligation de rendre compte (administration publique) --- Transparence politique.

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All democracies have had to contend with the challenge of tolerating hidden spy services within otherwise relatively transparent governments. Democracies pride themselves on privacy and liberty, but intelligence organizations have secret budgets, gather information surreptitiously around the world, and plan covert action against foreign regimes. Sometimes, they have even targeted the very citizens they were established to protect, as with the COINTELPRO operations in the 1960s and 1970s, carried out by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) against civil rights and antiwar activists. In this sense, democracy and intelligence have always been a poor match. Yet Americans live in an uncertain and threatening world filled with nuclear warheads, chemical and biological weapons, and terrorists intent on destruction. Without an intelligence apparatus scanning the globe to alert the United States to these threats, the planet would be an even more perilous place. In Spy Watching, Loch K. Johnson explores the United States' travails in its efforts to maintain effective accountability over its spy services. Johnson explores the work of the famous Church Committee, a Senate panel that investigated America's espionage organizations in 1975 and established new protocol for supervising the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the nation's other sixteen secret services. Johnson explores why partisanship has crept into once-neutral intelligence operations, the effect of the 9/11 attacks on the expansion of spying, and the controversies related to CIA rendition and torture programs. He also discusses both the Edward Snowden case and the ongoing investigations into the Russian hack of the 2016 US election. Above all, Spy Watching seeks to find a sensible balance between the twin imperatives in a democracy of liberty and security. Johnson draws on scores of interviews with Directors of Central Intelligence and others in America's secret agencies, making this a uniquely authoritative account.

Intelligence service --- Government accountability --- Transparency in government --- Legislative oversight --- Service des renseignements --- Obligation de rendre compte (Administration publique) --- Transparence (Sciences sociales) --- Contrôle parlementaire --- Transparency (Ethics) in government

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In recent decades, we have seen an explosion in expectations for greater accountability of public policymaking. But, as accountability has increased, trust in governments and politicians has fallen. By focusing on the heart of public accountability-the reason-giving by policymakers for their policy decisions (i.e., deliberative accountability)-this work offers an empirical route for understanding why more accountability may not always deliver more public trust. The focus is on the British Parliament, where both the Treasury Select Committee and the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee hold hearings on monetary policy, financial stability, and fiscal policy. The intent in these hearings is to challenge policymakers to explain their decisions, and thus the dialogue is expected to be deliberative. But how do we judge the quality of this deliberative accountability? Three metrics are explored and measured: respect, non-partisanship, and reciprocity. The approach is multi-method, including (1) quantitative text analysis to gauge the verbatim transcripts in committee hearings; (2) qualitative coding combined with an experimental design to gauge the role of nonverbal communication in the hearings; and (3) interviews with the MPs, peers, central bankers, and Treasury officials who participated in the hearings. The first method measures the content of 'what' was said, the second examines 'how' the words and arguments were expressed, and the third provides a more reflective 'why' component by asking participants to explain their motivations. This merging of the 'what', the 'how', and the 'why' offers a novel template for studying both accountability and deliberation.

Government accountability. --- Legislative bodies --- Committees. --- Legislative committees --- Committees --- Accountability in government --- Public administration --- Responsibility --- Government accountability --- Obligation de rendre compte (Administration publique) --- Commissions parlementaires

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Human rights --- Political persecution --- Government accountability --- Droits de l'homme (Droit international) --- Répression politique --- Obligation de rendre compte (Administration publique) --- Political repression --- Repression, Political --- Persecution --- Civil rights --- Accountability in government --- Public administration --- Responsibility

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International law --- Criminal law. Criminal procedure --- Administrative law --- Transparency in government --- Corruption --- Political corruption --- Administrative agencies --- Transparence (Sciences sociales) --- Corruption (Politique) --- Administration publique --- Government policy --- Prevention --- Prevention. --- Politique gouvernementale --- Prévention --- Partis politiques --- Lobbying. --- Gouvernance. --- Conflits d'intérêts. --- Transparence politique. --- Obligation de rendre compte (administration publique) --- Morale politique. --- Bonne administration (droit) --- Finances --- Prévention --- Conflits d'intérêts. --- Transparency (Ethics) in government