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Imaginée par la pratique au milieu du dix-neuvième siècle pour le contrat de cession de fonds de commerce et le contrat de travail, la convention de non-concurrence, visant à interdire au cocontractant une activité professionnelle, occupe désormais de multiples champs de l'activité contractuelle en mêlant le droit civil, le droit du travail, le droit commercial et le droit de la concurrence. Ce succès croissant ne doit cependant pas détourner l'interdiction conventionnelle de son objectif de protection de la clientèle justifié uniquement dans des hypothèses de danger concurrentiel anormal de l'actuel ou de l'ancien partenaire contractuel. Réel est en effet le danger d'assister à des comportements protectionnistes de certains créanciers de non-concurrence, enclins à user de cette convention dans le seul but d'éliminer la concurrence sur un marché donné tout en négligeant les intérêts des débiteurs. Il est donc impératif que s'élaborent des règles juridiques qui préservent un équilibre satisfaisant les aspirations divergentes des deux parties à la convention de non-concurrence. Malgré la volonté relativement récente de se départir d'une tendance historique favorable au créancier de non-concurrence, le droit des contrats n'est pas parvenu à une véritable conciliation des intérêts contradictoires en présence. Parallèlement, les droits spéciaux - règles de concurrence, professionnelles ou légales - donnent de la convention de non-concurrence une image éclatée. Au sein de cette réglementation hétérogène émergent toutefois le droit des pratiques anticoncurrentielles et les conventions collectives dont l'un des soucis majeurs est de préserver ou restaurer un juste équilibre de la convention de non-concurrence. Cependant, il reste que la protection de la liberté économique du débiteur de non-concurrence n'est qu'imparfaitement assurée, notamment lorsque celui-ci est salarié, franchisé ou concessionnaire. La solution pourrait être trouvée dans une intervention législative…

Law - Non-U.S. --- Law, Politics & Government --- Law - Europe, except U.K. --- 347.74 --- Handelsovereenkomsten. Wissels. Mandaat tot betaling. Assignaties --- 347.74 Handelsovereenkomsten. Wissels. Mandaat tot betaling. Assignaties --- Covenants not to compete --- Contracts not to compete --- Non-compete agreements --- Noncompetition agreements --- Covenants (Law) --- Competition --- Law and legislation --- droit de la concurrence --- concurrence --- droit privé --- convention de non-concurrence

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This book adds to the debate on the effects of covenants on third-party creditors (externalities), which have recently become a focus of discussion in the contexts of bankruptcy law, corporate law and corporate governance. The general thrust of the debate is that negative effects on third-party creditors predominate because banks act in their own self-interest. After systematising the debated potential positive and negative externalities of covenants, the book empirically examines these externalities: It investigates the banks’ factual conduct and its effects on third-party creditors in Germany and the US. The study’s most significant outcome is that it disproves the assumption that banks disregard third-party creditors’ interests. These findings are then interpreted with the tools of economic analysis; particularly, with the concept of common pool resources (CPRs). Around the aggregated value of the debtor company’s asset pool (as CPR) exists an n-person prisoner’s dilemma between banks and third-party creditors: No creditor knows when and under what conditions the other creditor will appropriate funds from the debtor company’s asset pool. This coordination problem is traditionally addressed by means of bankruptcy law and collaterals. However, the incentive structure that surrounds the bilateral private governance system created by covenants and an event of default clause (a CPR private governance system) is found to also be capable of tackling this problem. Moreover, the interaction between the different regulation spheres – bankruptcy law, collateral and the CPR private governance system − has important implications for both the aforementioned discussions as well as the legal treatment of covenants and event of default clauses. Covenants alone cannot be seen as an alternative to institutional regulation; the complete CPR private governance system and its interaction with institutional regulation must also be taken into consideration. In addition, their function must first find more acceptance and respect in the legal treatment of covenants and event of default clauses: The CPR private governance system fills a gap in the regulation of the tragedy of the commons by bankruptcy law and collateral. This has particularly important implications for the German § 138 BGB, § 826 BGB and ad hoc duties to disclose insider information.

Bankruptcy. --- Debtor and creditor. --- Covenants not to compete. --- Contracts not to compete --- Covenants not to compete --- Non-compete agreements --- Noncompetition agreements --- Covenants (Law) --- Competition --- Creditor --- Debtor and creditor --- Commercial law --- Contracts --- Obligations (Law) --- Credit --- Creditors' bills --- Fraudulent conveyances --- Liens --- Payment --- Security (Law) --- Bankruptcy --- Cessio bonorum --- Insolvency --- Privileged debts --- Business failures --- Debt --- Law and legislation --- Business enterprises-Finance. --- Law and economics. --- Corporations-Finance. --- Commercial law. --- Private International Law, International & Foreign Law, Comparative Law . --- Business Finance. --- International Economic Law, Trade Law. --- Law and Economics. --- Corporate Finance. --- Commercial Law. --- Business --- Business law --- Commerce --- Law, Commercial --- Mercantile law --- Law --- Law merchant --- Maritime law --- Economics and jurisprudence --- Economics and law --- Jurisprudence and economics --- Economics --- Jurisprudence --- Private international law. --- Conflict of laws. --- Business enterprises—Finance. --- International law. --- Trade. --- Corporations—Finance. --- Law of nations --- Nations, Law of --- Public international law --- Choice of law --- Conflict of laws --- Intermunicipal law --- International law, Private --- International private law --- Private international law --- Legal polycentricity --- Civil law