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Kollektive Entscheidungen unter Einstimmigkeit sind neben Mehrheitsentscheidungen in Politik und Wirtschaft weit verbreitet. Einer Reform der Europäischen Verträge müssen alle Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Union zustimmen. Bestimmend für die Einigung (oder deren Scheitern) sind nicht nur die Präferenzen der Verhandler, sondern auch der Verhandlungsverlauf, der durch die Interaktion der Teilnehmer geprägt wird. Um diese Verhandlungsprozesse zu analysieren leitet Frank Arndt ein formales theoretisches Modell ab und überprüft es empirisch am Beispiel der Amsterdamer Regierungskonferenz 1996. Besondere Berücksichtigung findet hierbei politischer Tausch, der als zentrale Verhandlungsstrategie wahrgenommen und dessen Rolle bei der Kompromissfindung analysiert wird.

Sociology. --- Economic sociology. --- Political theory. --- Sociology, general. --- Organizational Studies, Economic Sociology. --- Political Theory. --- multilateral negotiations models

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This paper examines the role of the public sector in providing additional information to exporters in developing countries as they seek to monitor and keep open their access to foreign markets by using the rules of the WTO system. It highlights new information generation and dissemination initiatives undertaken by the WTO Secretariat, Global Trade Alert, and the World Bank in response to the global economic crisis of 2008-2009. Given trends in the imposition of new crisis-era trade barriers that these initiatives have identified, the paper describes ways in which the new sources of rich and detailed data may be used to further assist developing country exporters that may lack the capacity to sufficiently monitor their trading interests by relying solely on private resources.

Antidumping --- Antidumping Database --- Dispute settlement --- Dispute settlement process --- Economic Crisis --- Economic Theory & Research --- Emerging Markets --- Exporters --- Foreign market --- Foreign markets --- Free Trade --- Global Trade --- International Economics and Trade --- International market --- International trade --- Law and Development --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market access --- Multilateral negotiations --- Positive externalities --- Private Sector Development --- Trade barriers --- Trade flows --- Trade Law --- Trade policies --- Trade Policy --- Trade restrictions --- World trade

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June 2000 - As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for previous unilateral liberalization. The feasibility and desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted. As each new round of multilateral trade negotiations approaches, there is a demand for a negotiating rule that would give credit for autonomous (unilateral) liberalization. Mattoo and Olarreaga show that the feasibility and desirability of such a rule depend on when it is instituted. A credit rule established at the beginning of a round of negotiations has a primarily distributional effect, favoring those who have already undertaken liberalization. Implementing such a rule would depend on the generosity of those who have not liberalized. The authors propose instead establishing a credit rule at the end of a round of negotiations, which creates an ex ante assurance that any unilateral liberalization will receive credit in the next round. Such a rule would help induce or enhance liberalization in some countries between negotiating rounds by reducing the gains from retaining protection as negotiating currency. More strikingly, it could also lead to deeper levels of multilateral liberalization and induce other countries to go further than they would in the absence of a rule. Most important, such an ex ante rule would not rely on altruism to be generally acceptable. This paper - a product of Trade, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to improve trade policy in goods and services. The authors may be contacted at amattoo@worldbank.org or molarreaga@worldbank.org.

Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Currency --- Debt Markets --- Dispute Settlement --- Economic Theory and Research --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Free Trade --- Insurance and Risk Mitigation --- International Economics & Trade --- International Trade and Trade Rules --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Multilateral Liberalization --- Multilateral Negotiations --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Development --- Reciprocal Concessions --- Tariff --- Tariff Reductions --- Tariff Schedule --- Tariffs --- Terms Of Trade --- Terms Of Trade Loss --- Trade --- Trade Liberalization --- Trade Negotiations --- Trade Policy --- Unilateral Liberalization --- Unilateral Reduction --- Unilateral Tariff Reduction --- World Trade --- World Trade Organization