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The study examines a vast panorama of the policies on which depend the living and working conditions of young people. Measures were examined that can be enacted on a regional level starting from the concrete experience of 6 Regional Governments in as many European countries. The book shows that a true "Youth Guarantee" must guarantee support for the complexity of the transitions that characterise young person's life and shows how this must be adapted to the different conditions the various segments of young population live in. The wealth and variety of concrete experiences offered by regional policies show how it is possible to activate public ations that, having adequate ingredients, will be able to lessen the negative effects of the economic crisis and allow young people to take one step ahead at any time in their private and professional life.

Moral hazard.

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The study examines a vast panorama of the policies on which depend the living and working conditions of young people. Measures were examined that can be enacted on a regional level starting from the concrete experience of 6 Regional Governments in as many European countries. The book shows that a true "Youth Guarantee" must guarantee support for the complexity of the transitions that characterise young person's life and shows how this must be adapted to the different conditions the various segments of young population live in. The wealth and variety of concrete experiences offered by regional policies show how it is possible to activate public ations that, having adequate ingredients, will be able to lessen the negative effects of the economic crisis and allow young people to take one step ahead at any time in their private and professional life.

Moral hazard.

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"Moral Hazard is a core concept in economics. In a nutshell, moral hazard reflects the reduced incentive to protect against risk where an entity is (or believes it will be) protected from its consequences, whether through an insurance arrangement or an implicit or explicit guarantee system. It is fundamentally driven by information asymmetry, arises in all sectors of the economy, including banking, medical insurance, financial insurance, and governmental support, undermines the stability of our economic systems and has burdened taxpayers in all developed countries, resulting in significant costs to the community. Despite the seriousness and pervasiveness of moral hazard, policymakers and scholars have failed to address this issue. This book fills this gap. It covers 200 years of moral hazard: from its origins in the 19th century to the bailouts announced in the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak. The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the ethics and other fundamental issues connected to moral hazard. Part II provides historical and empirical evidence on moral hazard in international finance. It examines in turn the role of the export credit industry, the international lender of last resort, and the IMF. Finally, Part III examines specific sectors such as automobile, banking, and the US industry at large. This is the first book to provide an interdisciplinary analysis of moral hazard and explain why addressing this issue has become crucial today. As such, it will attract interest from scholars across different fields, including economists, political scientists and lawyers"--

Moral hazard. --- Risk.

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We investigate whether individuals exhibit forward looking behavior in their response to the non-linear pricing common in health insurance contracts. Our empirical strategy exploits the fact that employees who join an employer-provided health insurance plan later in the calendar year face the same initial ("spot") price of medical care but a higher expected end-of-year ("future") price than employees who join the same plan earlier in the year. Our results reject the null of completely myopic behavior; medical utilization appears to respond to the future price, with a statistically significant elasticity of medical utilization with respect to the future price of -0.4 to -0.6. To try to quantify the extent of forward looking behavior, we develop a stylized dynamic model of individual behavior and calibrate it using our estimated behavioral response and additional data from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. Our calibration suggests that the elasticity estimate may be substantially smaller than the one implied by fully forward-looking behavior, yet it is sufficiently high to have an economically significant effect on the response of annual medical utilization to a non-linear health insurance contract. Overall, our results point to the empirical importance of accounting for dynamic incentives in analyses of the impact of health insurance on medical utilization.

Medical care --- Moral hazard. --- Health insurance. --- Utilization.

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This paper presents a model of bank risk taking and government guarantees. Levered banks take excessive risk, as their actions are not fully priced at the margin by debt holders. The impact of government guarantees on bank risk taking depends critically on the portion of bank investors that can observe bank behavior and hence price debt at the margin. Greater guarantees increase risk taking (moral hazard) when informed investors hold a sufficiently large fraction of liabilities. Otherwise, greater guarantees reduce risk taking by increasing the profits of the bank (franchise value effect). The results extend to the case in which information disclosure, and thus the portion of informed investors, is endogenous but costly. The model also shows that when bank capital is endogenous, public guarantees lead unequivocally to an increase in bank leverage and an associated increase in risk taking. The analysis points to a complex relationship between prudential policy and the institutional framework governing bank resolution and bailouts.

Bailouts --- Leverage --- Moral Hazard --- Risk Pricing --- Transparency --- Value Effect