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The ancient custom of dowry, that is, bride-to-groom marriage payments, remains ubiquitous in many contemporary societies. This paper examines whether dowry impacted household decision making and resource allocation in rural India during 1986-2007. Utilizing variation in firstborn gender and dowry amounts across marriage markets, the paper finds that the prospect of higher dowry payments at the time of a daughter's marriage leads parents to save more in advance. The higher savings are primarily financed through increased paternal labor supply. This implies that people are farsighted; they work and save more today with payoff in the distant future.

Dowry --- Female Labor Force --- Gender --- Gender and Development --- Gender and Social Policy --- Inequality --- Labor Markets --- Labor Supply --- Marriage Age --- Marriage Payment --- Poverty --- Poverty Reduction --- Savings --- Schooling --- Social Protections and Labor