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This paper estimates the elasticity of substitution of U.S. imports using detailed trade data over the 1990-2003 period. The authors use a two-stage least squares framework in order to identify the elasticity parameter of interest. The authors use the elasticity estimates to assess the extent to which Latin American and Chinese goods compete in the U.S. market by providing forecasts of how alternative policy scenarios may affect exports to the United States. The analysis considers the following scenarios: (i) currency revaluation in China; (ii) elimination of U.S. tariffs on Latin American exports under a hemispheric free trade agreement; and (iii) the elimination of quotas on apparel and textile exports under the Multi-Fiber Agreement. The findings show that a 20-percent appreciation of the renminbi reduces Chinese exports to the United States by a fifth, although since other regions increase sales to that market (0.5 percent for Latin America), U.S. imports decline by only 1.7 percent. Hemispheric free trade would increase Latin America's exports to the United States by around 3 percent. The removal of the quotas would lead to a sharp increase in Chinese sales to the United States (40 percent), but Latin America would see its share of the U.S. market decline by around 2 percent (2.5 percentage points). China's gains would come mainly at the expense of other regions of the world.

Comparative advantage --- Competitiveness --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory and Research --- Elasticity --- Elasticity of substitution --- Exports --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Forecasts --- Free Trade --- Free trade --- International Economics & Trade --- Low tariffs --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Markets and Market Access --- Public Sector Development --- Quotas --- Trade policy

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This paper uses an analytically tractable intertemporal framework for analyzing the dynamic pricing of a utility with an underdeveloped network (a typical case in most developing countries) facing a competitive fringe, short-run network adjustment costs, theft of service, and the threat of a retaliatory regulatory review that is increasing with the price it charges. This simple dynamic optimization model yields a number of powerful policy insights and conclusions. Under a variety of plausible assumptions (in the context of developing countries) the utility will find its long-run profits enhanced if it exercises restraint in the early stages of network development by holding price below the limit defined by the unit costs of the fringe. The utility's optimal price gradually converges toward the limit price as its network expands. Moreover, when the utility is threatened with retaliatory regulatory intervention, it will generally have incentives to restrain its pricing behavior. These findings have important implications for the design of post-privatization regulatory governance in developing countries.

Choice --- Consumers --- Costs --- Debt Markets --- Demand --- Discount Rate --- Diseconomies of Scale --- E-Business --- Economic Efficiency --- Economic Theory and Research --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Incentives --- Investment --- Low Tariffs --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Marginal Costs --- Markets and Market Access --- Monopoly --- Optimization --- Prices --- Pricing --- Private Sector Development --- Profit Maximization --- Profits --- Urban Water Supply and Sanitation --- Utility --- Variables --- Water Supply and Sanitation --- Welfare

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Turning the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa around requires badly needed national policy reform-abandoning the region's restrictive fiscal, monetary, property, and wage policies and trade barriers. Economists often argue that the level and structure of a country's trade barriers and the quality of its governance policies (for example, regulating foreign investment or limiting commercial activity with red tape) have a major influence on its economic growth and performance. One problem testing those relations empirically was the unavailability of objective cross-country indices of the quality of governance and statistics on developing countries' trade barriers. Ng and Yeats use new sources of empirical information to test the influence of trade and governance policies on economic performance. They use a model similar to those used in the literature on causes and implications of economic growth but focus more heavily on the World Bank's index of the speed with which countries are integrating into the world economy. Their results show that countries that adopted less restrictive governance and trade policies achieved significantly higher levels of per capita GDP; experienced higher growth rates for exports, imports, and GDP; and were more successful integrating with the world economy. Regression results indicate that national trade and governance regulations explain over 60 percent of the variance in some measures of economic performance, implying that a country's own national policies shape its rate of development, industrialization, and growth. Their tests provide new insights into the phenomenon of economic convergence, showing that poorer open countries are integrating more rapidly into the global economy than others. This finding parallels what others have observed about economic growth rates. They test their empirical results in a case study asking whether inappropriate national policies have caused Sub-Saharan Africa's dismal economic performance. The evidence strongly supports this proposition. Indices of the quality of national governance show that African countries have generally adopted the most inappropriate (restrictive) fiscal, monetary, property, and wage policies and that their own trade barriers (including customs procedures constraining commercial activity) are among the world's highest. Improving African trade and governance policies to levels currently prevailing in such (non-exceptional) countries as Jordan, Panama, and Sri Lanka would be consistent with a sevenfold increase in per capita GDP (to about USD 3,500) and an annual increase of 3 or 4 percentage points in the growth rate for this variable. This paper-a product of Trade, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to accelerate the trade and growth of developing countries. The authors may be contacted at fng@worldbank.org or ayeats@worldbank.org.

Consumers --- Debt Markets --- Development --- Economic Growth --- Economic Performance --- Economic Theory and Research --- Economy --- Emerging Markets --- Exports --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Free Trade --- GDP --- GDP Per Capita --- Governance --- Governance Indicators --- Growth Rate --- Industrialization --- Influence --- International Economics & Trade --- International Trade --- Investment --- Law and Development --- Low Tariffs --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Markets --- Monopoly --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Development --- Trade --- Trade Barriers --- Trade Law --- Trade Policies --- Trade Policy