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The institutional landscape of local dispute resolution in Bangladesh is rich: it includes the traditional process of shalish, longstanding and impressive civil society efforts to improve on shalish, and a somewhat less-explored provision for gram adalat or village courts. Based on a nationally representative survey, qualitative evidence from focus groups, and a telephone survey of 40 Union Parishad chairpersons (a little less than 1 percent of the total Union Parishads), it provides both an empirical mapping of local conflict and justice and pointers to possible policy reforms. It suggests a number of opportunities for strengthening local justice and argues that the village courts may pose a useful bridge between Bangladesh's informal and formal justice institutions.

Gender and Law --- Judicial System Reform --- Justice --- Law and Development --- Legal Institutions of the Market Economy --- Legal Products --- Local conflict --- Local dispute resolution --- Policy reforms --- Public Sector Corruption & Anticorruption Measures --- Qualitative evidence

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Public interest litigation has historically been an innovative judicial procedure for enhancing the social and economic rights of disadvantaged and marginalized groups in India. In recent years, however, a number of criticisms of public interest litigation have emerged, including concerns related to separation of powers, judicial capacity, and inequality. These criticisms have tended to abstraction, and the sheer number of cases has complicated empirical assessments. This paper finds that public interest litigation cases constitute less than 1 percent of the overall case load. The paper argues that complaints related to concerns having to do with separation of powers are better understood as criticisms of the impact of judicial interventions on sector governance. On the issue of inequality, the analysis finds that win rates for fundamental rights claims are significantly higher when the claimant is from an advantaged social group than when he or she is from a marginalized group, which constitutes a social reversal, both from the original objective of public interest litigation and from the relative win rates in the 1980s.

Access to justice --- Administration of justice --- Case law --- Civil law --- Corruption --- Court --- Courts --- Criminal --- Fundamental right --- Fundamental rights --- Gender --- Gender and Law --- Human Rights --- Human rights --- Inequality --- Information Security and Privacy --- Judges --- Justices --- Law and Development --- Law Enforcement Systems --- Laws --- Legal Institutions of the Market Economy --- Prisoners --- Rule of law --- Sexual harassment --- Social Development --- Social justice --- Will

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Public interest litigation has historically been an innovative judicial procedure for enhancing the social and economic rights of disadvantaged and marginalized groups in India. In recent years, however, a number of criticisms of public interest litigation have emerged, including concerns related to separation of powers, judicial capacity, and inequality. These criticisms have tended to abstraction, and the sheer number of cases has complicated empirical assessments. This paper finds that public interest litigation cases constitute less than 1 percent of the overall case load. The paper argues that complaints related to concerns having to do with separation of powers are better understood as criticisms of the impact of judicial interventions on sector governance. On the issue of inequality, the analysis finds that win rates for fundamental rights claims are significantly higher when the claimant is from an advantaged social group than when he or she is from a marginalized group, which constitutes a social reversal, both from the original objective of public interest litigation and from the relative win rates in the 1980s.

Access to justice --- Administration of justice --- Case law --- Civil law --- Corruption --- Court --- Courts --- Criminal --- Fundamental right --- Fundamental rights --- Gender --- Gender and Law --- Human Rights --- Human rights --- Inequality --- Information Security and Privacy --- Judges --- Justices --- Law and Development --- Law Enforcement Systems --- Laws --- Legal Institutions of the Market Economy --- Prisoners --- Rule of law --- Sexual harassment --- Social Development --- Social justice --- Will

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Recent empirical research has focused on the role of institutions in overall economic performance. This paper examines the impact of institutions on the relative performance of the service sector. Through cross-country level and growth regressions it establishes the following stylized fact: countries with better institutions have relatively larger and more dynamic service sectors. It suggests that regulatory and contract enforcing institutions play a key role in the development of service sectors because these sectors enter into a more complex web of transactions with the rest of the economy and are more prone to market failure due to asymmetric information.

Accountability --- Bank --- Bribe --- Children and Youth --- Civil Law --- Corruption --- Corruption and Anticorruption Law --- Debt Markets --- E-Business --- Economic Theory and Research --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Gender --- Gender and Law --- Governance --- Government --- Judicial Independence --- Labor Policies --- Law and Development --- Laws --- Legal Framework --- Legal Frameworks --- Legal Institutions of the Market Economy --- Legal Products --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Medium --- Policies --- Policy --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Remedy --- Rule Of Law --- Service --- Services --- Social Protections and Labor --- Strategy