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Although sharecropping has long fascinated economists, the determinants of this contractual form are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. The authors address both issues by emphasizing the role of landlord supervision. When tenant effort is observable, but at a cost to the landlord, otherwise identical share-tenants can receive different levels of supervision and have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from sharetenants in rural Pakistan confirm that, controlling for selection, "supervised" tenants are significantly more productive than "unsupervised" ones. Landlords' decisions regarding the intensity of supervision and the type of incentive contract to offer depend importantly on the cost of supervising tenants.

Accounting --- Adverse Selection --- Communities & Human Settlements --- Contract Law --- Contracts --- Debt Markets --- E-Business --- Economic Theory and Research --- Effects --- Efficiency --- Equity --- Family Labor --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Incentive Problems --- Incentives --- Information --- Investment and Investment Climate --- Labor Allocation --- Labor Policies --- Law and Development --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Monitoring --- Moral Hazard --- Municipal Housing and Land --- Policies --- Political Economy --- Private Sector Development --- Production --- Productivity --- Property Rights --- Real Estate Development --- Risk --- Social Protections and Labor --- Supply --- Theory --- Urban Development --- Urban Housing

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Secure property rights are considered a key determinant of economic development. However, evaluation of the causal effects of land titling is a difficult task. Since 2004, the Brazilian government, through a program called "Papel Passado," has issued titles to more than 85,000 families and has the goal to reach 750,000. Another topic in public policy that is crucial for developing economies is child labor force participation. In Brazil, about 5.4 million children and teenagers between 5 and 17 years old are working full time. This paper examines the direct impact of securing a property title on child labor force participation. In order to isolate the causal role of ownership security, this study uses a comparison between two close and similar communities in the City of Osasco case (a town with 650,000 people in the Sao Paulo metropolitan area). The key point of this case is that some units participate in the program and others do not. One of them, Jardim Canaa, received land titles in 2007; the other, Jardim DR, given fiscal constraints, will not be part of the program until 2012, and for that reason became the control group. Estimates, generated using the difference-in-difference econometric technique suggest that titling results in a substantial decrease in child labor force participation for the families that received the title compared with the others. These findings are relevant for future policy tools for dealing with informality and how it affects economic growth.

Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Child labor --- Children and Youth --- Communities & Human Settlements --- Debt Markets --- Economic growth --- Economic historians --- Employment --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Gender --- Gender and Law --- Human capital --- Income --- Incomplete contracts --- Labor --- Labor allocation --- Labor force --- Labor force participation --- Labor market --- Labor Markets --- Labor Policies --- Labor productivity --- Labor supply --- Land and Real Estate Development --- Law and Development --- Marginal value --- Market wage --- Municipal Housing and Land --- Optimal allocation --- Private Sector Development --- Property rights --- Real Estate Development --- Social Protections and Labor --- Street Children --- Urban Development --- Work force