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Political theorist Jeremy Waldron makes a bracing case against identifying rule of law with predictability. Seeing the rule of law as just one value to which democracies aspire, he embraces thoughtfulness rather than rote rule-following, flexibility even at the cost of vagueness, and emphasizing procedure and argument over predictable outcomes.
Rule of law. --- Law --- Thoughtfulness. --- Philosophy. --- agency. --- argument. --- constitutionalism. --- discretion. --- due process. --- efficacy. --- fidelity. --- friedrich hayek. --- international. --- joseph raz. --- judges. --- judicial review. --- legality. --- positivism. --- public law. --- self application. --- sovereignty. --- stare decisis. --- supreme court.
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What is law, and why does it matter? Scott Hershovitz says that law is a moral practice--a tool for adjusting our moral relations. This claim is simple on its face, but it has stark implications for the rule of law. At once erudite and entertaining, Hershovitz's argument engages with the most important legal and political controversies of our time.
Law and ethics. --- Law --- Moral and ethical aspects. --- Interpretation and construction. --- Congress. --- HLA Hart. --- Joseph Raz. --- Mark Greenberg. --- Supreme Court. --- authority. --- community. --- duties. --- enforcement. --- fairness. --- litigation. --- norms. --- ownership. --- promises. --- property. --- realism. --- responsibilities. --- rights. --- rule. --- textualism.
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In Philosophy of Law, Andrei Marmor provides a comprehensive analysis of contemporary debates about the fundamental nature of law--an issue that has been at the heart of legal philosophy for centuries. What the law is seems to be a matter of fact, but this fact has normative significance: it tells people what they ought to do. Is the normative content of a law entirely determined by the facts that make it a law? Are there some normative moral constraints on what the law can be? And can we fully characterize and define the law without assuming a moral conception about what the law oug
Legal theory and methods. Philosophy of law --- Law --- Philosophy --- Jurisprudence --- Law - Philosophy --- Philosophy. --- Dworkin. --- H. L. A. Hart. --- Hans Kelsen. --- Joseph Raz. --- antireductionism. --- detachment view. --- detachment. --- factual. --- interpretation. --- language. --- law. --- legal philosophy. --- legal positivism. --- legal thought. --- legal validity. --- moral views. --- nature of law. --- nondetachment view. --- normative consideration. --- normative. --- political views. --- reduction. --- social rules. --- state sovereignty. --- substance method. --- theory of law.
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In Philosophy of Law, Andrei Marmor provides a comprehensive analysis of contemporary debates about the fundamental nature of law--an issue that has been at the heart of legal philosophy for centuries. What the law is seems to be a matter of fact, but this fact has normative significance: it tells people what they ought to do. Is the normative content of a law entirely determined by the facts that make it a law? Are there some normative moral constraints on what the law can be? And can we fully characterize and define the law without assuming a moral conception about what the law oug
Law --- Philosophy. --- Dworkin. --- H. L. A. Hart. --- Hans Kelsen. --- Joseph Raz. --- antireductionism. --- detachment view. --- detachment. --- factual. --- interpretation. --- language. --- law. --- legal philosophy. --- legal positivism. --- legal thought. --- legal validity. --- moral views. --- nature of law. --- nondetachment view. --- normative consideration. --- normative. --- political views. --- reduction. --- social rules. --- state sovereignty. --- substance method. --- theory of law.
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