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There have been significant improvements in both the quality of regulation and the supervisory approach since the 2007 FSAP. Many amendments to existing laws, new laws, and regulations have been introduced, aimed at addressing shortfalls identified in the 2007 FSAP. These improvements will be evident throughout this assessment. At the same time, a number of weaknesses have been identified. Among these is an operational risk within the NBG’s own Banking Supervisory Department. There has been a very high level of staff turnover in recent years due to a lack of salary competitiveness vis-à-vis the commercial banks, and there appears to be over-reliance on key personnel. Also, the level and type of staff training need to be expanded. While the NBG puts significant effort into understanding the risk profile of each individual bank and the banking system as a whole, more attention is needed to improve the quality of risk management of the banks. In a number of areas, notably bank licensing, the NBG relies on its broad supervisory powers to carry out its functions in the absence of detailed explicit powers. While this regime generally seems to work well in practice, it could leave the NBG open to challenge where these broad powers are not supported by more granular powers. Recently, several amendments to the legislation have been introduced in order to address these shortcomings.
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Recent experience in handling troubled banks was limited. The National Bank of Georgia (NBG) is the lead authority responsible for managing problem banks, as it can appoint a temporary administrator, declare a bank as insolvent and bankrupt, and commence a liquidation procedure. In the 1990s, market entry was not subject to significant restrictions, and the number of banks operating in Georgia reached a peak of 229 in 1994. Since then, the authorities have commenced a significant number of liquidation procedures, and the last cases based on insolvency grounds have been closed in 2009. Therefore, the legal framework for bank resolution and liquidation has not been applied to a significant extent in recent times. The framework for emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) has been improved, but enhancement is needed to protect the NBG against financial risk. The NBG is explicitly authorized to provide ELA to commercial banks that are considered to be viable, and a 2012 NBG decree sets out certain procedural rules governing the disbursement of the ELA. However, when financial stability is endangered, rules on collateral, interest rate, and duration of the facility can be relaxed. This special carve-out can expose the NBG to financial risks—the existence of a systemic threat, rather, calls for a role to be played by the government. Moreover, provisions on collateral, interest rate, and duration should be updated to better take into account the specificities of ELA, and accountability mechanisms should be enhanced. The bank resolution and liquidation regime presents important shortcomings. The NBG can take control of a problem bank by appointing a temporary administrator, which can, in theory, arrange for certain resolution transactions. The bank liquidation framework is prescribed in more detail, given the significant experience gained by the NBG in the past. However, the bank resolution framework lacks a number of important features and several amendments are needed to update it in line with emerging international best practices, with a view to enabling the authorities to implement a speedy and cost-effective resolution process.
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The National Bank of Georgia (NBG) has a broad mandate to safeguard financial stability in Georgia and has applied several measures that can be considered macroprudential. For instance, the NBG adjusted risk weights for foreign-currency (FX) loans to unhedged borrowers in a countercyclical manner in recent years. Going forward, it plans to introduce the Basel III countercyclical capital buffer regime for the banking system in 2015, which will require that it sets or releases the buffer on a regular basis, based on assessments of cyclical risks. Policymakers should consider establishing a full-fledged macroprudential policy framework in line with international best practices. The current framework is too broad to support the effective and transparent use of macroprudential policy going forward. An improved system would involve a revised legal framework to cement the use of a broad range of macroprudential instruments, the establishment of a Financial Stability Committee at the NBG level, and strong accountability and communication practices, including by the publication of regular reports on financial stability. The list of available macroprudential instruments should go beyond risk buffers and allow the NBG to set measures that directly influence the banks’ activities, e.g., through the application of loan-to-value (LTV) or payment-to-income (PTI) caps. The introduction of macroprudential measures for FX-induced credit and liquidity risks have led to a strengthening of banks’ risk buffers. On the asset side, additional risk weights are applied to FX loans to unhedged borrowers, while on the liability side, reserve requirements are higher for FX deposits and other borrowings. Furthermore, banks have to hold more liquidity for nonresident deposits (of which 92 percent are in foreign currency as of end-2013), if those deposits exceed 10 percent of total deposits. Combined with the general liquidity regulation, these measures have increased banks’ capital and liquidity buffers, as shown in the results of the FSAP solvency and liquidity stress tests. The planned introduction of buffer requirements to mitigate cyclical and structural risks is a welcome step. The countercyclical capital buffer and the capital surcharge for systemically important banks are planned to be implemented over the next few years. The capital surcharge for systemically important banks, which would currently apply at least to the three largest banks by total assets, is particularly important in the Georgian context due to the high market concentration in the banking sector.
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The Georgian banking sector is sound and stable and has continued to perform well, but faces a number of key risks and vulnerabilities that need to be closely monitored. Particularly challenging among them are credit and funding risks related to dollarization, concentration in the banking sector, and reliance on nonresident deposits. While NPLs are gradually declining from their peak in 2009, credit growth is above its long-term sustainable trend. Dollarization presents specific challenges as it increases credit and liquidity risks. There are two major dollarization-related problems: First, most of the borrowers in U.S. dollars (USD) are unhedged, as their income and expenditures are in national currency (this is especially evident in case of households). Second, the NBG has limited ability to provide liquidity support in USD and other foreign currencies. However, it should be noted that the NBG is implementing a set of macroprudential measures aimed at making FX lending more expensive for banks. For example, current risk weights for FX loans are topped at 175 percent. Separate stress tests (STs) performed by the NBG and by the FSAP mission show that the banking system as a whole is able to withstand severe shocks, given that most banks maintain healthy capital buffers well above regulatory minimum. The tests were conducted in several scenarios ranging from slow growth to severe macroeconomic shocks, and the results show that major banks would generally remain adequately capitalized, taking into account current profits and introduction of Basel II. In adverse scenarios, recapitalization needs are manageable in terms of GDP (1.6 percent for the worst-case scenario). At the same time, uncertainty due to non-linearity of shocks related to lari depreciation warrant continuation of build-up of capital buffers as long as FX denominated loans constitute substantial share of banks’ loan portfolios. Credit portfolio concentration risks are limited: default by the largest three borrowers would require additional capital of GEL 50 million for five banks. Market risks are very limited, and trading books do not exist. However, some banks are particularly vulnerable and need to strengthen their capital buffers and to mitigate funding risks. These banks exceed the minimum capital requirement by only a few percentage points (p.p.), which limits their loss-absorption capacity. The high level of profitability and solid net interest margins would go down during crisis periods, driving down net interest and other income. To avoid this pitfall, it is important to introduce Individual Capital Guidance, especially for the weakest banks. When it comes to funding risks, further diversification of funding sources and de-dollarization could help to minimize identified vulnerabilities.
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There have been significant improvements in both the quality of regulation and the supervisory approach since the 2007 FSAP. Many amendments to existing laws, new laws, and regulations have been introduced, aimed at addressing shortfalls identified in the 2007 FSAP. These improvements will be evident throughout this assessment. At the same time, a number of weaknesses have been identified. Among these is an operational risk within the NBG’s own Banking Supervisory Department. There has been a very high level of staff turnover in recent years due to a lack of salary competitiveness vis-à-vis the commercial banks, and there appears to be over-reliance on key personnel. Also, the level and type of staff training need to be expanded. While the NBG puts significant effort into understanding the risk profile of each individual bank and the banking system as a whole, more attention is needed to improve the quality of risk management of the banks. In a number of areas, notably bank licensing, the NBG relies on its broad supervisory powers to carry out its functions in the absence of detailed explicit powers. While this regime generally seems to work well in practice, it could leave the NBG open to challenge where these broad powers are not supported by more granular powers. Recently, several amendments to the legislation have been introduced in order to address these shortcomings.
Banks and banking -- State supervision -- Georgia. --- Financial institutions -- State supervision -- Georgia. --- International monetary fund -- Georgia. --- Finance --- Business & Economics --- Banking --- Banks and banking --- Banking law --- Financial institutions --- State supervision --- Law and legislation --- International Monetary Fund --- National Bank of Georgia. --- Financial intermediaries --- Lending institutions --- Law, Banking --- Agricultural banks --- Banking industry --- Commercial banks --- Depository institutions --- Internationaal monetair fonds --- International monetary fund --- Associations, institutions, etc. --- Money --- E-books --- Banks and Banking --- Industries: Financial Services --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financing Policy --- Financial Risk and Risk Management --- Capital and Ownership Structure --- Value of Firms --- Goodwill --- Financial services law & regulation --- Market risk --- Credit risk --- Operational risk --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Loans --- Financial risk management --- Georgia
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This paper discusses key findings of the Third Review under the Stand-By Arrangement for Georgia. With monetary policy impaired by high dollarization, the authorities’ response to the downturn relies mostly on fiscal stimulus. The reduction of policy interest rates and ample liquidity injections have not led to a resumption of bank lending, owing to balance sheet weaknesses and higher credit risk. The authorities have thus decided to accommodate tax revenue losses in a higher deficit in 2009. The authorities have requested an augmentation of access and an extension of the arrangement through mid-2011.
Fiscal policy -- Georgia (Republic). --- Foreign exchange rates -- Georgia (Republic). --- International Monetary Fund -- Georgia (Republic). --- Monetary policy -- Georgia (Republic). --- Banks and Banking --- Exports and Imports --- Foreign Exchange --- Public Finance --- Industries: Financial Services --- Statistics --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- Fiscal Policy --- Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology --- Computer Programs: Other --- Banking --- Public finance & taxation --- International economics --- Currency --- Foreign exchange --- Finance --- Econometrics & economic statistics --- External debt --- Public debt --- Loans --- Financial institutions --- Debt service --- Banks and banking --- Debts, External --- Debts, Public --- Georgia
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This paper discusses key findings of the Sixth Review Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) for Georgia. Economic performance in recent years has been impressive, with the establishment of macroeconomic stability, a dramatic fiscal turnaround, and remarkable improvements in governance and the business environment. The original targets under the PRGF arrangement have been reached or exceeded. All quantitative performance criteria for the final review were met. Given the authorities’ strong performance, IMF staff supports the completion of the Sixth Review and the request for a waiver.
Georgia (Republic) -- Economic conditions. --- Georgia (Republic) -- Economic policy. --- International monetary fund -- Georgia (Republic). --- World Bank -- Georgia (Republic). --- Exports and Imports --- Macroeconomics --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Public Finance --- Social Services and Welfare --- Trade: General --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Current Account Adjustment --- Short-term Capital Movements --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- Fiscal Policy --- International economics --- Monetary economics --- Public finance & taxation --- Social welfare & social services --- Monetary base --- Export performance --- Current account deficits --- External debt --- Imports --- Money --- International trade --- Balance of payments --- Money supply --- Exports --- Debts, External --- Georgia --- Georgia (Republic) --- Economic conditions. --- Economic policy.
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This paper discusses key findings of the Fourth Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement for Georgia. The strategy remains appropriate, and program targets for 2010 are in line with those presented at the Third Review. Fiscal policy will transition from an expansionary stance in 2009 to a path of strong consolidation, with a reduction in the deficit of 2¼ percent of GDP in 2010. Despite sizable adjustment, an external financing gap of roughly US$400 million remains in 2010, mostly because of the slow recovery of private capital inflows.
Georgia -- Economic conditions. --- Georgia -- Economic policy. --- International monetary fund -- Georgia. --- Banks and Banking --- Exports and Imports --- Foreign Exchange --- Macroeconomics --- Public Finance --- Industries: Financial Services --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- International Lending and Debt Problems --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- Fiscal Policy --- Banking --- Public finance & taxation --- Currency --- Foreign exchange --- International economics --- Finance --- External debt --- Public debt --- Fiscal stance --- Loans --- Financial institutions --- Fiscal policy --- Banks and banking --- Debts, External --- Debts, Public --- Georgia --- Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009 --- Financial crises --- Monetary policy --- International Monetary Fund
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