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Intention (Logic) --- Intentionalism --- Intention (Logique) --- Intentionnalité (Psychologie)

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Object (Philosophy) --- Act (Philosophy) --- Intentionalism. --- Objet (Philosophie) --- Action (Philosophie) --- Intentionnalité (Psychologie) --- Presentation (Philosophy) --- Intentionalism --- Act psychology --- Action psychology --- Psychology --- Action (Philosophy) --- Agent (Philosophy) --- Philosophy --- Intentionnalité (Psychologie)

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Intentionalism --- Goal (Psychology) --- Intentionnalité (Psychologie) --- But (Psychologie) --- Behavior. --- Goals. --- Act psychology --- Action psychology --- Psychology --- Goal setting --- Setting of goals --- Motivation (Psychology) --- Goal --- Intention --- Acceptance Process --- Acceptance Processes --- Behaviors --- Process, Acceptance --- Processes, Acceptance --- Intentionnalité (Psychologie) --- Behavior --- Goals

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Gestion de projets --- Planification --- Projets --- But (Psychologie) --- Psychologie appliquée --- Planification. --- Intentionalism. --- Psychologie appliquée --- Cognitive psychology --- 159.9 --- Gestion de projets. --- Planning --- Psychological aspects. --- Sociological aspects. --- Psychology, Applied --- Gestion des projets --- Intentionnalite (psychologie) --- Projet (philosophie)

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A study in the philosophy of mind, centred on the problem of 'intentionality' the sense in which emotions can be said to have objects, their relation to these objects, and the implications of this relation for our understanding of human action and behaviour. Dr Wilson sets his enquiry against a broad historical background on what distinguishes man from inanimate objects by describing both Cartesian view of man is matter plus mind and the neo-Wittgensteinian view that there is a dynamic behavioural difference - causal notions being often inapplicable to human action. Dr Wilson goes on to show the controversies and arguments that arise from the notion of intentionality cannot be analysed in causal terms. Dr Wilson believes that this notion can be shown causally and sets out to prove it. Finally, he brings this argument to a larger context mentioning that it has far-reaching effects in natural and social sciences.

Affective and dynamic functions --- Human beings --- Mind and body --- Intentionalism --- Emotions --- Homme --- Esprit et corps --- Intentionnalité (Psychologie) --- Intentionnalité (Psychologie) --- Arts and Humanities --- Philosophy --- Human beings. --- Mind and body. --- Intentionalism. --- Emotions. --- Act psychology --- Action psychology --- Psychology --- Body and mind --- Body and soul (Philosophy) --- Human body --- Mind --- Mind-body connection --- Mind-body relations --- Mind-cure --- Somatopsychics --- Brain --- Dualism --- Philosophical anthropology --- Holistic medicine --- Mental healing --- Parousia (Philosophy) --- Phrenology --- Psychophysiology --- Self --- Homo sapiens --- Human race --- Humanity (Human beings) --- Humankind --- Humans --- Man --- Mankind --- People --- Hominids --- Persons --- Feelings --- Human emotions --- Passions --- Affect (Psychology) --- Affective neuroscience --- Apathy --- Pathognomy --- Psychological aspects