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This study evaluates whether surprise and intelligence failure leading to mass casualty terrorism are inevitable. It explores the extent to which four factors – failures of public policy leadership, analytical challenges, organizational obstacles, and the inherent problems of warning information – contribute to intelligence failure. The study applies existing theories of surprise and intelligence failure to case studies of five mass casualty terrorism incidents: World Trade Center 1993; Oklahoma City 1995; Khobar Towers 1996; East African Embassies 1998; and September 11, 2001. A structured, focused comparison of the cases is made using a set of thirteen probing questions based on the factors above. The study concludes that while all four factors were influential, failures of public policy leadership contributed directly to surprise. Psychological bias and poor threat assessments prohibited policy makers from anticipating or preventing attacks. Policy makers mistakenly continued to use a law enforcement approach to handling terrorism, and failed to provide adequate funding, guidance, and oversight of the intelligence community. The study has implications for intelligence reform, information sharing, congressional oversight, and society’s expectations about the degree to which the intelligence community can predict or prevent surprise attacks.
Intelligence service --- Terrorism --- Bombings --- Evaluation --- Prevention --- Bombings. --- Evaluation. --- Prevention. --- Intelligence service -- United States -- Evaluation. --- Interagency coordination -- United States. --- Military intelligence -- United States -- Evaluation. --- Terrorism -- Prevention -- Government policy -- United States. --- Terrorism -- Prevention. --- Military Administration --- Military & Naval Science --- Law, Politics & Government --- Bomb attacks --- Terrorist bombings --- Offenses against public safety --- Political crimes and offenses --- Political violence --- Bombs --- Anti-terrorism --- Antiterrorism --- Counter-terrorism --- Counterterrorism --- Intelligence service - United States - Evaluation --- Terrorism - Prevention
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The U.S. government spends enormous resources each year on the gathering and analysis of intelligence, yet the history of American foreign policy is littered with missteps and misunderstandings that have resulted from intelligence failures. In Why Intelligence Fails, Robert Jervis examines the politics and psychology of two of the more spectacular intelligence failures in recent memory: the mistaken belief that the regime of the Shah in Iran was secure and stable in 1978, and the claim that Iraq had active WMD programs in 2002. The Iran case is based on a recently declassified report Jervis was commissioned to undertake by CIA thirty years ago and includes memoranda written by CIA officials in response to Jervis's findings. The Iraq case, also grounded in a review of the intelligence community's performance, is based on close readings of both classified and declassified documents, though Jervis's conclusions are entirely supported by evidence that has been declassified. In both cases, Jervis finds not only that intelligence was badly flawed but also that later explanations-analysts were bowing to political pressure and telling the White House what it wanted to hear or were willfully blind-were also incorrect. Proponents of these explanations claimed that initial errors were compounded by groupthink, lack of coordination within the government, and failure to share information. Policy prescriptions, including the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, were supposed to remedy the situation. In Jervis's estimation, neither the explanations nor the prescriptions are adequate. The inferences that intelligence drew were actually quite plausible given the information available. Errors arose, he concludes, from insufficient attention to the ways in which information should be gathered and interpreted, a lack of self-awareness about the factors that led to the judgments, and an organizational culture that failed to probe for weaknesses and explore alternatives. Evaluating the inherent tensions between the methods and aims of intelligence personnel and policymakers from a unique insider's perspective, Jervis forcefully criticizes recent proposals for improving the performance of the intelligence community and discusses ways in which future analysis can be improved.
Intelligence service --- Iraq War, 2003-2011 --- Weapons of mass destruction --- Evaluation --- Military intelligence --- Evaluation. --- United States. --- Iran --- History --- Anglo-American Invasion of Iraq, 2003-2011 --- Dawn, Operation New, 2010-2011 --- Gulf War II, 2003-2011 --- Iraqi Freedom, Operation, 2003-2010 --- New Dawn, Operation, 2010-2011 --- Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003-2010 --- Operation New Dawn, 2010-2011 --- Operation Telic, 2003-2011 --- Persian Gulf War, 2003-2011 --- Telic, Operation, 2003-2011 --- Counter intelligence --- Counterespionage --- Counterintelligence --- Intelligence community --- Secret police (Intelligence service) --- Agjencia Qendrore e Inteligjencës --- Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.) --- CIA (Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.)) --- CIP (United States. Centrālās izlūkošanas pārvalde) --- Mei-kuo chung yang chʻing pao chü --- National Security Council (U.S.). --- Si Aing Ei --- T︠S︡entralʹnoe razvedyvatelʹnoe upravlenie SShA --- T︠S︡RU SShA --- T︠S︡RU (T︠S︡entralʹnoe razvedyvatelʹnoe upravlenie SShA) --- ЦРУ США --- ЦРУ (Центральное разведывательное управление США) --- Центральное разведывательное управление США --- ארצות הברית. --- 美國. --- War on Terrorism, 2001-2009 --- Public administration --- Research --- Disinformation --- Secret service --- National Security Council (U.S.) --- CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) --- Polemology --- United States --- Case studies --- United States. Central Intelligence Agency --- Revolution, 1979 --- Iraq --- Intelligence service - United States - Evaluation - Case studies --- Iraq War, 2003-2011 - Military intelligence - United States - Evaluation --- Weapons of mass destruction - Iraq --- Iran - History - Revolution, 1979 --- United States of America
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