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Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructure in the 1990s : Successes ... and Bugs to Fix for the Next Mille
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Year: 1999 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Learning to regulate fairly, effectively, and at arm's length may be the main challenge governments face in attracting private investment and financing to the transport sector; Governments should increasingly be able to rely on the private sector for help supporting (and financing) the transport sector - especially infrastructure support services for which there is heavy demand - but first they must improve their regulatory tools and sort out the institutional mess surrounding the regulatory process. Some countries have put together creative restructuring models and financing designs that tap potential in the private sector. Roads will continue to need significant public funding, but there are innovative ways (including shadow tolls) to attract private financing for road maintenance and investment. Partnerships between the public and private sectors have remained largely untapped at ports and airports. To attract more private capital to the sector, regulators must know the cost of capital, know how to be fair to captive shippers, and have a better handle on demand - so they have more credibility when conflicts arise. Governments have overemphasized making deals and have generally underestimated the difficulty of taking on their new job as regulators. They are increasingly switching to contract-based regulation, to firm up the commitments of all parties involved, but are not adequately emphasizing contract design that anticipates problems and addresses unpredictable situations. This increases the risk of arbitrary regulatory rulings, which increases regulatory and political risks, which raises the expected rate of return required by potential investors. And all that makes future projects costlier or more difficult, adding to the effects of the 1998-99 financial crisis. As a result of increased risk, the two groups most interested in the sector are: Large, strong operators in the sector - typically in tandem with local construction companies - that feel confident they can take on regulators in case of conflict; Risk-takers carving a niche for themselves. Either way, taxpayers and transport users are exposed to government, regulator, or operator failures that result in contract renegotiations (the norm, rather than the exception, in transport infrastructure projects). Gains from privatization might not reach consumers, simply because governments are ignoring the importance of ensuring fair distribution of long-run gains through the early creation of independent and accountable regulatory institutions that work closely with effective competition agencies. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The author may be contacted at aestache@worldbank.org.


Book
Privatization and Regulation of Transport Infrastructure in the 1990s : Successes ... and Bugs to Fix for the Next Mille
Author:
Year: 1999 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Bookmark

Abstract

Learning to regulate fairly, effectively, and at arm's length may be the main challenge governments face in attracting private investment and financing to the transport sector; Governments should increasingly be able to rely on the private sector for help supporting (and financing) the transport sector - especially infrastructure support services for which there is heavy demand - but first they must improve their regulatory tools and sort out the institutional mess surrounding the regulatory process. Some countries have put together creative restructuring models and financing designs that tap potential in the private sector. Roads will continue to need significant public funding, but there are innovative ways (including shadow tolls) to attract private financing for road maintenance and investment. Partnerships between the public and private sectors have remained largely untapped at ports and airports. To attract more private capital to the sector, regulators must know the cost of capital, know how to be fair to captive shippers, and have a better handle on demand - so they have more credibility when conflicts arise. Governments have overemphasized making deals and have generally underestimated the difficulty of taking on their new job as regulators. They are increasingly switching to contract-based regulation, to firm up the commitments of all parties involved, but are not adequately emphasizing contract design that anticipates problems and addresses unpredictable situations. This increases the risk of arbitrary regulatory rulings, which increases regulatory and political risks, which raises the expected rate of return required by potential investors. And all that makes future projects costlier or more difficult, adding to the effects of the 1998-99 financial crisis. As a result of increased risk, the two groups most interested in the sector are: Large, strong operators in the sector - typically in tandem with local construction companies - that feel confident they can take on regulators in case of conflict; Risk-takers carving a niche for themselves. Either way, taxpayers and transport users are exposed to government, regulator, or operator failures that result in contract renegotiations (the norm, rather than the exception, in transport infrastructure projects). Gains from privatization might not reach consumers, simply because governments are ignoring the importance of ensuring fair distribution of long-run gains through the early creation of independent and accountable regulatory institutions that work closely with effective competition agencies. This paper - a product of Governance, Regulation, and Finance, World Bank Institute - is part of a larger effort in the institute to increase understanding of infrastructure regulation. The author may be contacted at aestache@worldbank.org.


Book
Evaluation in the Practice of Development
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Year: 2008 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Knowledge about development effectiveness is constrained by two factors. First, the project staff in governments and international agencies who decide how much to invest in research on specific interventions are often not well informed about the returns to rigorous evaluation and (even when they are) cannot be expected to take full account of the external benefits to others from new knowledge. This leads to under-investment in evaluative research. Second, while standard methods of impact evaluation are useful, they often leave many questions about development effectiveness unanswered. The paper proposes ten steps for making evaluations more relevant to the needs of practitioners. It is argued that more attention needs to be given to identifying policy-relevant questions (including the case for intervention); that a broader approach should be taken to the problems of internal validity; and that the problems of external validity (including scaling up) merit more attention.


Book
Do Regulation and Institutional Design Matter for Infrastructure Sector Performance ?
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2007 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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This paper evaluates the impact of economic regulation on infrastructure sector outcomes. It tests the impact of regulation from three different angles: aligning costs with tariffs and firm profitability; reducing opportunistic renegotiation; and measuring the effects on productivity, quality of service, coverage, and prices. The analysis uses an extensive data set of about 1,000 infrastructure concessions granted in Latin America from the late 1980s to the early 2000s. The analysis finds that as the theory indicates, regulation matters. The empirical work here reported shows that in three relevant economic aspects-aligning costs and tariffs; dissuading renegotiations; and improving productivity, quality of service, coverage, and tariffs-the structure, institutions, and procedures of regulation matter. Thus, significant efforts should continue to be made to improve the structure, quality, and institutionality of regulation. Regulation matters for protecting both consumers and investors, for aligning closely financial returns and the costs of capital, and for capturing higher levels of benefits from the provision of infrastructure services by the private sector.


Book
Procurement Efficiency for Infrastructure Development and Financial Needs Reassessed
Authors: ---
Year: 2008 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Infrastructure is the engine for economic growth. The international donor community has spent about 70-100 billion U.S. dollars on infrastructure development in developing countries every year. However, it is arguable whether these financial resources are used efficiently, particularly whether the current infrastructure procurement prices are appropriate. Without doubt a key is competition to curb public procurement costs. This paper analyzes procurement data from multi and bilateral official development projects in three infrastructure sectors: roads, electricity, and water and sanitation. The findings show that the competition effect is underutilized. To take full advantage of competition, at least seven bidders are needed in the road and water sectors, while three may be enough in the power sector. The paper also shows that not only competition, but also auction design, especially lot division, is crucial for reducing unit costs of infrastructure. Based on the estimated efficient unit costs, the annual financial needs are estimated at approximately 360 billion U.S. dollars. By promoting competition, the developing world might be able to save at most 8.2 percent of total infrastructure development costs.


Book
Collaborative damage : an experimental ethnography of Chinese globalization
Authors: --- ---
ISBN: 9781501759802 1501759809 9781501759833 1501759833 1501759825 Year: 2022 Publisher: Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press,

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"A comparative anthropological study of Chinese globalization, this book explores the emergence of a global polity and the implications of collaborative endeavors and failures through ethnographic fieldwork on Chinese infrastructure and resource-extraction projects in Mongolia and Mozambique"--


Book
Procurement Efficiency for Infrastructure Development and Financial Needs Reassessed
Authors: ---
Year: 2008 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Abstract

Infrastructure is the engine for economic growth. The international donor community has spent about 70-100 billion U.S. dollars on infrastructure development in developing countries every year. However, it is arguable whether these financial resources are used efficiently, particularly whether the current infrastructure procurement prices are appropriate. Without doubt a key is competition to curb public procurement costs. This paper analyzes procurement data from multi and bilateral official development projects in three infrastructure sectors: roads, electricity, and water and sanitation. The findings show that the competition effect is underutilized. To take full advantage of competition, at least seven bidders are needed in the road and water sectors, while three may be enough in the power sector. The paper also shows that not only competition, but also auction design, especially lot division, is crucial for reducing unit costs of infrastructure. Based on the estimated efficient unit costs, the annual financial needs are estimated at approximately 360 billion U.S. dollars. By promoting competition, the developing world might be able to save at most 8.2 percent of total infrastructure development costs.


Book
Evaluation in the Practice of Development
Author:
Year: 2008 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Bookmark

Abstract

Knowledge about development effectiveness is constrained by two factors. First, the project staff in governments and international agencies who decide how much to invest in research on specific interventions are often not well informed about the returns to rigorous evaluation and (even when they are) cannot be expected to take full account of the external benefits to others from new knowledge. This leads to under-investment in evaluative research. Second, while standard methods of impact evaluation are useful, they often leave many questions about development effectiveness unanswered. The paper proposes ten steps for making evaluations more relevant to the needs of practitioners. It is argued that more attention needs to be given to identifying policy-relevant questions (including the case for intervention); that a broader approach should be taken to the problems of internal validity; and that the problems of external validity (including scaling up) merit more attention.


Book
Do Regulation and Institutional Design Matter for Infrastructure Sector Performance ?
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2007 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Abstract

This paper evaluates the impact of economic regulation on infrastructure sector outcomes. It tests the impact of regulation from three different angles: aligning costs with tariffs and firm profitability; reducing opportunistic renegotiation; and measuring the effects on productivity, quality of service, coverage, and prices. The analysis uses an extensive data set of about 1,000 infrastructure concessions granted in Latin America from the late 1980s to the early 2000s. The analysis finds that as the theory indicates, regulation matters. The empirical work here reported shows that in three relevant economic aspects-aligning costs and tariffs; dissuading renegotiations; and improving productivity, quality of service, coverage, and tariffs-the structure, institutions, and procedures of regulation matter. Thus, significant efforts should continue to be made to improve the structure, quality, and institutionality of regulation. Regulation matters for protecting both consumers and investors, for aligning closely financial returns and the costs of capital, and for capturing higher levels of benefits from the provision of infrastructure services by the private sector.


Book
Crisis in Latin America : Infrastructure Investment, Employment and the Expectations of Stimulus
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2009 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Infrastructure investment is a central part of the stimulus plans of the Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC) region as it confronts the growing financial crisis. This paper estimates the potential effects on direct, indirect, and induced employment for different types of infrastructure projects with LAC-specific variables. The analysis finds that the direct and indirect short-term employment generation potential of infrastructure capital investment projects may be considerable - averaging around 40,000 annual jobs per USD 1billion in LAC, depending upon such variables as the mix of subsectors in the investment program; the technologies deployed; local wages for skilled and unskilled labor; and the degrees of leakages to imported inputs. While these numbers do not account for substitution effect, they are built around an assumed "basket" of investments that crosses infrastructure sectors most of which are not employment-maximizing. Albeit limited in scope, rural road maintenance projects may employ 200,000 to 500,000 annualized direct jobs for every USD 1billion spent. The paper also describes the potential risks to effective infrastructure investment in an environment of crisis including sorting and planning contradictions, delayed implementation and impact, affordability, and corruption.

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