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Why are contracts incomplete? Transaction costs and bounded rationality cannot be a total explanation since states of the world are often describable, foreseeable, and yet are not mentioned in a contract. Asymmetric information theories also have limitations. We offer an explanation based on 'contracts as reference points'. Including a contingency of the form, 'The buyer will require a good in event ', has a benefit and a cost. The benefit is that if occurs there is less to argue about; the cost is that the additional reference point provided by the outcome in can hinder (re)negotiation in states outside. We show that if parties agree about a reasonable division of surplus, an incomplete contract is strictly superior to a contingent contract. If parties have different views about the division of surplus, an incomplete contract can be superior if including a contingency would lead to divergent reference points.

Incomplete contracts. --- Contracts.

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Secure property rights are considered a key determinant of economic development. However, evaluation of the causal effects of land titling is a difficult task. Since 2004, the Brazilian government, through a program called "Papel Passado," has issued titles to more than 85,000 families and has the goal to reach 750,000. Another topic in public policy that is crucial for developing economies is child labor force participation. In Brazil, about 5.4 million children and teenagers between 5 and 17 years old are working full time. This paper examines the direct impact of securing a property title on child labor force participation. In order to isolate the causal role of ownership security, this study uses a comparison between two close and similar communities in the City of Osasco case (a town with 650,000 people in the Sao Paulo metropolitan area). The key point of this case is that some units participate in the program and others do not. One of them, Jardim Canaa, received land titles in 2007; the other, Jardim DR, given fiscal constraints, will not be part of the program until 2012, and for that reason became the control group. Estimates, generated using the difference-in-difference econometric technique suggest that titling results in a substantial decrease in child labor force participation for the families that received the title compared with the others. These findings are relevant for future policy tools for dealing with informality and how it affects economic growth.

Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Child labor --- Children and Youth --- Communities & Human Settlements --- Debt Markets --- Economic growth --- Economic historians --- Employment --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Gender --- Gender and Law --- Human capital --- Income --- Incomplete contracts --- Labor --- Labor allocation --- Labor force --- Labor force participation --- Labor market --- Labor Markets --- Labor Policies --- Labor productivity --- Labor supply --- Land and Real Estate Development --- Law and Development --- Marginal value --- Market wage --- Municipal Housing and Land --- Optimal allocation --- Private Sector Development --- Property rights --- Real Estate Development --- Social Protections and Labor --- Street Children --- Urban Development --- Work force